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Abstract 
The current theoretical approach to equipment authorisation (EA) regulation has proven 
problematic to resource-poor countries. EA is the technical and administrative process that all 
electronic communications equipment are subject to before sale and use. EA involves checking 
the technical characteristics of equipment, by dedicated test facilities, to national or international 
standards which are enforced by the regulatory authority. Initial research in the South African EA 
environment has revealed several real-world trends that show that the current approach to EA 
regulation has limitations when faced with a changing electronic communications (EC) landscape.  
The general theories of public interest and the economic theory of regulation only broadly form 
the theoretical basis for EA regulation. The narrow focus of the thesis in developing an innovative 
approach to EA regulation, in the context of a developing country, required seeing beyond the 
existing theory surveyed in the literature. Using a Straussian approach to grounded theory, the 
epistemology of the EA environment is studied inductively via a post-modernistic interpretative 
framework. The research finds that the EA framework, applicable to efficiency driven and 
transitional countries with a relatively rich EA testing infrastructure, is predicated on a calculated 
concept of trust. The regulatory authority employs a tacit computational mechanism to 
determine the level of trust when dealing with EA applications. The rationale for such an 
approach is largely driven by sub-optimal decision heuristics available to the regulator, as a result 
of an inability to corroborate technical data associated with the EA process. The regulator thus 
applies a differential trust paradigm based on determining factors such as salience.  
A future knowledge-based approach to EA regulation is theorised, in which technology 
innovation assimilated from other EA environments, is applied to the EA process to improve 
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institutional efficiency. The goal of applying technology and innovation to the EA process is 
ultimately centred around increasing the trust value proposition. 
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Chapter One: Trends and context for a review of the Equipment 
Authorisation (EA) regime 
1.1 Introduction  
There exists a regulatory framework called Equipment Authorisation (EA) that has a significant 
impact on the digital economy1. EA frameworks have been adopted by most developed 
countries by the end of the 20th century and are responsible for controlling the supply of all 
electronic communications equipment into that country. There are classically defined 
approaches to EA regulation, following either a social policy approach or an economic one. 
While there is a multitude of compelling reasons for using either approach, the socio-
economic factors uniquely prevalent in developing countries intensifies the importance of 
ensuring that the approach to EA regulation is appropriate to the needs of that country. The 
phenomena being investigated is the approach to EA regulation in developing countries. This 
thesis develops an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation that best articulates the 
requirements of a developing country. 
 
1.2 Background to the regulation of EA 
The Electronic Communications (EC) landscape is evolving. The term EC as used within the 
scope of this study would refer broadly to the emission, transmission or reception of 
information using magnetism, radio or other electromagnetic waves (RSA, 2005:9). As we 
move into the digital economy, we can observe three distinct generations of 
telecommunications markets (He, 2010:287). The first generation was characterised by a 
highly regulated state-owned (and sometimes state-provided) monopoly system, based on 
analogue technology. This was followed by a more liberalised second generation 
telecommunications market, characterised by open structure networks with accelerated 
innovation. This second generation telecommunications market was based on deregulation 
and the introduction of competition. The third and current generation of telecommunications 
market relies on high-capacity fibre and wireless systems supporting mass consumer 
                                                          
1 Digital Economy can be defined as “... the incorporation of data and the Internet into production processes and 
products, new forms of household and government consumption, fixed-capital formation, cross-border flows, 
and finance” (IMF, 2018). 
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converged operations.  A changing EC landscape needs to be complemented with an effective 
regulatory environment to support and attract investment (Coulter, Negishi & Foskett, 2010).  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) realised this as far back as 2008 and set about positioning itself as 
a global technology leader that promoted both a regulatory approach and a digital economy 
attractive for technology investment, with the Digital Economy Act of 2010  (Coulter, Negishi 
& Foskett, 2010: 25). Mahan and Melody (2005:15) argue that regulation should be constantly 
responsive to changing conditions. This view is supported by Wright and Head (2009:191) who 
stated that current models of regulatory governance need to adequately capture and explain 
the characteristics and operations of existing regulatory spaces. Bourreau and Dogan 
(2001:168) argue that the telecommunications industry is the most dynamic industry that has 
sector-specific regulators and a high speed of innovation, hence the theoretical approach to 
regulation underpinning the practical approach needs to move just as quickly to keep up with 
the pace of innovation. 
 
The essential requirements for sustainable economic growth in a developing country are the 
provision of efficient, reliable and affordable infrastructure services (Kirkpatrick, Parker & 
Zang, 2006:144).  As a developing country, South Africa needs to ensure that its regulatory 
approach is conducive to investment and economic growth. A particular critical area is the EC 
equipment market, as it is a significant contributor to the GDP of South Africa. The EC 
equipment market was estimated by Kaplan (1992) to be valued at two billion Rand in 19922. 
Current estimates3 put the value of the market at more than 20 billion Rand, although the 
actual value has not been accurately determined. Internationally, the export value of EC 
equipment was approximately 670 billion dollars in 2013 (WTO, 2014). The rapid growth of 
the “Internet of Things” (IoT), as shown in Figure One, will further fuel these number, with 
commentators predicting up to 50 billion devices connected to the internet by 20204. The EA 
                                                          
2 This figure would be much higher when adjusted for inflation. 
3 Figure estimated by the Type Approval unit of ICASA (30 June 2011) 
4 This is CompTIA’s  estimation  (Computing Technology Industry Association). More information can be found 
at https://www.comptia.org/resources/sizing-up-the-internet-of-things  
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process would have to be applied to each device to ensure that the cumulative impact of 
these devices does not degrade network interoperability and quality of service.  
 
 
  Figure 1: The growth of connected devices that would require EA 
 
Source: Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) 
 
The Equipment Authorisation (EA) process is key to the provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure, as no equipment may be (legally) used in a telecommunications network in 
South Africa, without first being approved by the regulator (ICASA, 2013).  EA is an important 
process to manufacturers, importers and distributors wishing to market EC equipment to be 
used on any network in a country. EA (or type approval as it is known in some jurisdictions) 
details the minimum set of regulatory, technical and safety requirements that a product 
would need to meet before it can be certified for use in a particular country (ITU, 2012:9). 
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The “Carterfone” (Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2008) ruling of 1968 by the Federal 
Communications Commission is of significance, in that it was a case of regulatory intervention 
that allowed a competitor’s equipment on the incumbent’s telephone network.  The need for 
EA can be attributed to this single landmark ruling, as it liberalised the EC equipment market. 
Before the Carterfone ruling, only the incumbent network operator would supply equipment 
to be used on its network, negating the need for an equipment authorisation regime. The 
European Commission Directive 88/301/EEC essentially adopted this principle, by liberalising 
the supply of EC equipment in the European Union (EU, 1998). The FCC ruling has been applied 
to other areas of the equipment supply market in the United States, the latest being the 
“wireless Carterfone” rules which essentially mandates networks service providers to allow 
the user to use a wireless handset of their choice (Ford et al., 2008:649). Wireless service 
providers were locking handsets to their network, setting data bandwidth limitations and 
limiting features of wireless equipment. Critics of these practices asserted that these 
restrictions have led to the restriction of competition in the market and called for regulatory 
intervention that banned these practices. The regulation intervention that followed became 
known as the “Wireless Carterfone” rules.  
 
The importance of equipment authorisation regulations is highlighted by the Carterfone and 
Wireless Carterfone cases. The principle that applied to the Carterfone case in 1968 was 
argued almost 40 years later, in 2007, with the Wireless Carterfone debate. This principle of 
open access has been implemented in other communications markets such as set-top boxes 
and cable television in the United States. EA rules and processes are thus still relevant and 
critical to the communications industry, given that the fundamental policy decisions taken 
more than 40 years ago are still being applied within the same industry, with a different 
technology. This strengthens the argument for an appropriate theoretical approach to 
regulation, rather than drafting new regulation applicable to changing technology. The 
regulations applicable to EA should be technology agnostic to ensure that technological 
change does not render them obsolete. What makes the Carterfone case more interesting is 
that research by Ford et al. (2008) show that Carterfone-esque regulations may harm 
competition in that market and increase barriers to entry, rather than decrease them. They 
further show that Carterfone regulations may inadvertently increase prices of handsets 
without any reduction in prices for wireless network services. Hence regulations that were 
14 
 
 
 
meant to promote public interest by reducing prices and increasing choice may affect markets 
in a converse manner. The economic and social welfare implications brought about by these 
EA regulations are thus called into question, more so in developing countries, as they are 
arguably more vulnerable to increasing prices.  
 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2006:166) show that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in a developing country 
responds positively to the existence of a credible regulatory framework. If a developing 
country makes the transition from developing to developed, a credible and innovative 
regulatory framework could be considered as one of the key elements to that transition. With 
such compelling arguments in favour of developing a credible regulatory framework, it would 
seem simple to adopt the successful deregulation approach to EA of countries in the European 
Union (Salisbury, 2000) and the United States of America (FCC, 2012). It should be noted that 
these are first world countries and such changes to the regulatory framework are 
underpinned by the applicable theoretical approaches to regulation relevant to first world 
countries. The regulatory framework underpinning developing countries, on the other hand, 
are faced with far more challenges than developed countries as they have to deal with issues 
like “poor infrastructure, weak economic conditions and inefficient institutions inherited from 
pre-reform eras” (Gasmi & Virto, 2010:275) as well as poor administrative resources (Ogus & 
Zang, 2005:131). With regulatory reform being critical to developing countries, the OECD 
(1991) has recognised that, although the trade in EC equipment is one of the key issues that 
have arisen from the changing EC landscape, regulatory intervention is still required to 
preserve economic and social concepts. 
  
In South Africa, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) has the 
overall responsibility for setting standards, certifying that EC equipment meets these 
standards and enforcing policy and regulation in South Africa (RSA, 2005).  It is important to 
note that ICASA does not conduct conformance testing (i.e. the physical testing of EC 
equipment to a specified standard), but only specifies the standard to which the equipment 
should prove conformance. ICASA will accept a test report from any accredited test 
laboratories that show conformance to the specified standard, but the testing process is 
costly and places an economic burden on the equipment supplier. The EA regulatory approach 
should ensure that the economic benefit of regulation should outweigh its economic burden 
15 
 
 
 
(Ogus, 1994:13; Bartle, 2009:692). Even if the regulation intends to protect consumers and 
create a safer product, it may still be problematic.  A regulation that purports to promote a 
safe and reliable product may lead to unnatural barriers to entry, thereby favouring certain 
suppliers to the detriment of others (Ogus 1999:225).  In this case, the objective of regulating 
in the public interest is overshadowed by the unintended consequences of excluding potential 
suppliers, which may then exacerbate the burden on consumers as prices of EC equipment 
could increase due to a lack of competition. There also exists a debate regarding the efficiency 
of regulation in the public interest. There is an assumption that public interest regulation is 
effective and can be administered at the least possible cost, which adds to the complexity of 
regulating in the public interest (Posner, 1974:336). This assumption is critical to developing 
countries as they are faced with impediments such as “poor infrastructures, weak economic 
conditions, and inefficient institutions inherited from the pre-reforms era” (Gasmi & Virto, 
2010: 275). These institutions would not have the resources to ensure that regulation is 
economically efficient. The term “public interest” is thus a key factor in determining an 
appropriate regulatory approach to EA. 
 
Interviews with the communications regulator in South Africa have shown that ICASA has 
concerns about successfully moving to a fully liberalised regulatory framework, due to the 
lack of monitoring and enforcement resources available in South Africa.5 Ogus and Zang 
(2005) support that concern when they state that “…in many developing countries, an 
adequate infrastructure for the monitoring and enforcement of ex-post systems of regulatory 
control does not exist” (Ogus & Zang, 2005:142).   It is also evident that a regulatory approach 
that supports deregulation has had a substantial positive economic impact on the EC 
equipment supply industry (OECD, 2012:11). It is thus challenging for a regulator in a 
developing country to balance the social agenda that regulation requires, against the 
economic windfall that deregulation encourages. Numerous previous studies have addressed 
the link between regulatory reform and economic growth in developing countries (Gasmi & 
Virto, 2010; Fink, Mattoo & Rathindran, 2002; Gutierrez, 2003; Ros, 1999; Li & Xu, 2004), but 
                                                          
5 Interview with Type Approval unit of ICASA, 30 June 2011 
16 
 
 
 
none to my knowledge have focused on the economic and social implications of EA reform, 
particularly in a developing country environment 
 
There is hence more research required in determining a theoretical approach to regulating 
EA in a developing country. This research thus focuses on studying the limitations of the 
current theoretical approaches to EA regulation, using the South African environment in 
developing an innovative theoretical regulatory approach to EA, bearing in mind the 
complexities inherent to a developing country.   
 
 
1.3 Four observable trends in EA regulation in South Africa 
The rapid introduction of new technologies and the high growth in telecom markets have 
proven challenging to ICASA’s mandate and the present working of the EA regime. Four trends 
have been observed with regards to EA in South Africa. These trends seem to suggest that the 
current regulatory approach is not suited to a developing country like South Africa. These 
trends are6: 
i) Total EA Applications received has increased ten-fold over the period 2000-2014. 
ii) The total processing time per EA application has grown three-fold over the same 
period. 
iii) The amount of harmful interference by approved equipment reported during the 
period 2004-2011 has increased significantly. 
iv) An increase in the number of non-type approved equipment confiscated during 
the period 2006-2009 has increased substantially (ICASA, 2015). 
It should be noted that these trends cannot be attributed solely to the EA environment, as 
several other contributing factors may affect these trends.  
 
These patterns (discussed in greater detail below) show that while the changing 
telecommunications markets warranted a change in the approach to EA regulation, the 
current approach has not changed and real problems can be observed. 
                                                          
6 All figures were provided by ICASA’s Type Approval department in 2011 and ICASA’s regional offices in 2012. 
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1.3.1 An increase in the total applications for equipment approval 
This trend deals with the total number of EA applications that have been submitted to the 
regulator over the last ten years. Figure Two shows that the total number of equipment 
authorisation applications have increased more than tenfold7  over the period 2000 -2014.  
 
Figure 2: Total equipment authorisations in South Africa for the period 2000-2014  
 
Source: ICASA Type Approval unit, personal communication, July 13, 2015. 
 
The increase in the number of authorisations indicates that the number of products sold in 
South Africa is proliferating. The fact that the EA market is growing does not shed light on the 
on the limitations of the current theoretical approaches to EA regulation in itself, but it is 
                                                          
7 Interview with the Type Approval unit of ICASA (30 June 2011). 
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telling when coupled with an analysis of the processing time. The processing time of EA 
equipment will be discussed in the next section. 
 
1.3.2 An increase in the processing time for equipment approval 
Technology and market developments have challenged the overall efficiency of the EA 
regime.  Figure 3 shows that the average processing time per application for the period 2000-
2010 has increased three-fold. The primary cause cited by the Type Approval Department of 
ICASA for this increase in processing time, was not the increase in the number of applications 
but problems with the regulatory approach that guides the type approval process.8 
 
Figure 3: Processing Time of Equipment authorisation applications 
 
Source: ICASA Type Approval unit, personal communication, June 30, 2011. 
 
The increase in processing time per application, coupled with the increase in the total number 
of applications, gives a more precise indication of the challenges that the current approach to 
regulation has on EA. The command and control approach to regulation (used currently for 
EA regulation) creates a substantial administrative burden for the regulator, which has to 
scrutinise and evaluate each application (Ogus & Zhang, 2005:132). The increased processing 
time for these applications also imposes a cost on the applicant as well as the consumer, since 
both parties ultimately will not have access to the product until the application process is 
                                                          
8 Interview with the Type Approval unit of ICASA, 30 June 2011 
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complete (Ogus & Zhang, 2005:132). This is also an excellent example of the challenges faced 
by the current approach to EA regulation, as the regulation should not add undue cost to the 
approval process. 
 
Another issue that relates to the inefficiency of the current EA approach is a duplication of 
the application process. The current EA process requires that equipment authorised by the 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), needs to be authorised once again by any other 
suppliers that are independent of the OEM supplier, effectively duplicating the approval 
process.9 An example would be a cellular telephone supplier who is not the OEM supplier, 
importing a branded cellular telephone via a parallel distribution channel, having to obtain EA 
approval for an identical product that has already been approved by the OEM supplier. 
 
This is in contravention of the overarching legislation that governs EA approval in South Africa, 
which states that ICASA may prescribe: 
..the types of equipment, electronic communications facilities and radio apparatus, the use of 
which does not require approval where such equipment, electronic communications facilities 
and radio apparatus have been approved for use by the European Telecommunications 
Standards Associations or other competent standards body where the equipment complies 
with the type approval standards prescribed by the Authority (RSA, 2005:31). 
For reasons unknown, this clause is yet to be implemented by the regulator and proof of 
compliance with performance standards is still required, even if the equipment has been 
approved for use in Europe by a competent standards-setting body (RSA, 2005:31). To prove 
compliance to the regulator, test reports from accredited test laboratories must be submitted 
to the regulator. If the entity applying for type approval of a particular product is not the 
original manufacturer of the product, getting hold of these test reports can be very difficult.10   
 
While to the casual observer, informational costs (such as providing test reports) may not be 
a problem in a first world country, it is a critical issue in a developing country, where test 
                                                          
9 Interview with Type Approval unit of ICASA, 30 June 2011 
10 The requirements for type approval was provided during and interview with the Type Approval unit of ICASA, 
30 June 2011 
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reports that are required for EA approval are expensive to procure or difficult to source from 
the OEM (as the OEM would generally would not provide support to 3rd part suppliers). This 
is particularly the case when a small non-OEM supplier is importing equipment into the 
country.11 This approach to EA regulation is pertinent to developing countries with limited 
administrative resources, as the costs of securing information are passed onto the supplier 
and not the administration (Ogus & Zang, 2005:131). 
 
The requirement of test reports for EA also points to the larger issue of trade and innovation. 
South Africa is not considered a major manufacturer of EC equipment, with only 3.1% of the 
world total of EC equipment manufacturers based in Africa (WTO, 2014). This means that 
South Africa is mostly a net importer of EC equipment and highlights the importance of 
developing an EA framework that promotes trade and innovation. 
 
The documentation required for type approval can be described as the informational costs 
associated with type approval. There are also application and licensing fees for each EA 
application made (RSA, 2013). These can be described as the transactional costs of type 
approval. The transactional and informational costs required to comply with EA regulations 
could be considered as factors that contribute to market failure. Hertog (1999:225) further 
distinguishes other costs of regulation: 
i)  The costs of formulating and implementing regulation; 
ii)  The costs of maintaining regulation; 
iii) The costs of compliance with the rules for industry; 
iv) The deadweight costs resulting from distortive changes in connection with 
 i-iii. 
                                                          
11 The difficulty in procuring test reports was cited as a key problem in the EA process during an interview with 
the Type Approval unit of ICASA, 30 June 2011 
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The costs of formulating and implementing EA regulations in South Africa does not seem to 
be well quantified. The 2013 EA regulations in South Africa had cost the regulator hundreds 
of thousands of rand in consultancy fees alone.12 This figure did not take into account the 
public hearings, labour and time costs incurred by ICASA to develop this regulation. The same 
applies to the expense of maintaining these regulations. These informational costs have 
contributed to the increase in the overall processing time of EA applications. 
 
1.3.3 An increase in the number of harmful interference incidents reported 
The ITU (2012) defines harmful interference as “Interference which endangers the functioning 
of a radio navigation service or other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or 
repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with the Radio 
Regulations” (ITU, 2012:10).  One of the critical functions of EA regulations would be to 
minimise harmful interference (Magallanes, 2011:1). As previously discussed, EA checks if the 
equipment being subjected to EA has fulfilled the essential requirements in terms of safety, 
electromagnetic compatibility and performance according to specific standards. It is this 
check that ensures that the equipment would not cause harmful interference. Harmful 
spectrum interference can be considered as one of the key measures to assess the 
effectiveness of the EC EA regime. If an EA regime worked effectively, the incidences of 
harmful interference should be minimal. The current EA regime has not been very effective 
in this regard as well. Figure Four shows that the total number of harmful interference cases 
caused by EC equipment has increased significantly since 2004.13 There are several factors 
that could affect these figures, although the key point to note is that type approved 
equipment should not cause harmful interference. 
                                                          
12 The figures were obtained from an internal ICASA document that listed the cost of the “Review of Type 
Approval Framework” project that was completed by ICASA in 2013. 
13 Figures provided by the regional offices of ICASA through email interactions (19 September 2012). 
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Figure 4: Harmful Interference Reported 2004-2011  
 
Source: ICASA regional offices, consolidation of email information, September 19, 2012. 
 
There exists a debate around the issue of harmful interference and the appropriate regulatory 
approach, with regulators like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United 
States (US) looking at ways to redefine harmful interference to ensure that the development 
of new radio systems is not inhibited (Marcus, 2008:6). These approaches are intended to 
maximise the economic value achievable with EC equipment, by developing systems that 
enable spectrum to be used more effectively, rather than relying on traditional methods for 
achieving this (Marcus, 2008:6). Veenstra and Leonhard (2008) discuss software defined 
radios as one such system.  They do admit however that “the ability of a Software Defined 
Radio to dynamically modify its operating parameters surely can help managing interference; 
however the potential for causing interference to other authorized radio services cannot be 
overlooked” (Veenstra & Leonhard, 2008:19).  These systems represent a challenge for the 
regulator as “the declaration of conformity as some species of ex-ante regulation must stay 
valid despite any eventual ex-post changing of the operating parameters of the equipment” 
(Veenstra & Leonhard, 2008:22).  This argument links the effect of the evolution of 
telecommunications technology unique to the EA environment, with a need to review the 
approach to EA regulation. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases of harmful interference 
reported
Harmful Interference
23 
 
 
 
1.3.4 An increase in the number of non-type approved equipment confiscated by 
ICASA 
EC EA regulations are meant to be an enabling environment for the approval of EC equipment, 
but a growing number of EC suppliers have chosen to sell their equipment illegally by not 
having their equipment type approved by ICASA.   
 
Figure 5: Non-type approved equipment confiscated by ICASA 2004-2010  
 
Source: ICASA regional offices, consolidation of email information, September 19, 2012. 
 
This trend is highlighted in Figure Five. The purpose of EC EA would be to ensure that all EC 
equipment is compliant with the relevant standards set out by the regulator (ITU, 2012:9).  
Figure Five shows the total number of non-type approved equipment confiscated by ICASA 
per year, which increases rapidly from 2006 until 2009. ICASA inspectors were then asked to 
scale back on type approval inspections, until the legal status of inspections could be 
determined.14This explains the decrease in non-type approved equipment from 2009 until 
2011. This trend highlights a challenge faced by the current public interest approach to EA 
regulation. An increase in the number of pieces of equipment confiscated by a regulator may 
be considered indicative of the inappropriateness of the current EA approach.  An effective 
and efficient EA regime that does not create barriers to entry for suppliers would have led to 
decreasing numbers of non-type approved equipment.  Non-type approved equipment 
                                                          
14 Interview with ICASA regional Office 29/10/12 
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essentially ignores the public interest goals of the regulator by bypassing the regulatory 
process completely.  
 
1.3.5 Implications of these trends for the EA regime in South Africa 
The trends and challenges have shown an increasing level of inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
of the present EC EA process in general. Rapid introduction of new technologies and high 
growth in telecom markets have proven challenging to ICASA’s mandate and the current 
working of the EA regime. Technology and market developments have challenged the overall 
effectiveness of the EA system. There is a trend of an increased processing time of EA 
applications, with duplicate approvals being conducted. 
 
The trends support a claim of increasing ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the current EA 
approach in fulfilling a mandate of regulating in the public interest. The present regulatory 
approach is also challenging to regulating with economic efficiency. With the evidence 
presented in the preceding sections, it could be argued that a need exists to develop an 
innovative approach to EA regulation that is cognisant of the complexities of developing 
countries such as South Africa. The present EA regulatory approach would thus require an 
assessment of its ability to address dynamic changes in the technology and markets of a 
developing country. 
 
1.4 EA in theory and practice 
There are three distinct regulatory approaches to EA, namely certification, verification and 
declaration of conformity (Magallanes, 2011:1). In essence, these EA regulatory approaches 
are either a command and control regulatory approach or a self-regulation approach. These 
approaches are detailed by the administrative procedures that dictate the EA process. 
 
1.4.1 Three EA approaches 
a) Certification or licensing 
Manufacturers, importers or distributors of EC equipment wishing to sell such equipment in 
South Africa, are required by law to ensure that the equipment they provide, conform to 
regulated technical standards. Proof of conformance can be obtained by testing the 
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equipment at ICASA accredited test laboratories, and submitting these test reports to ICASA 
for assessment.15 This process is called certification and is considered to be the most time-
consuming of all EA approaches, as such a process may have previously been undertaken in 
other countries (Magallanes, 2011:1). This process is at times referred to as “licensing” in 
other regulatory environments. 
 
Licensing tests whether the applicant meets substantive conditions, as well as the suitability 
of the application to numerous conditions (ICASA, 2013). This is the current EA approach in 
South Africa. The licensing process is in itself divided into different scales of regulatory 
scrutiny (Ogus & Zhang, 2005:125).  They describe a “rubber stamp” (Ogus & Zhang, 
2005:125) licensing process, where the application is not scrutinised but merely approved 
based on the information provided. The second licensing process is a more rigorous and 
involves a thorough investigation of the application (Ogus & Zhang, 2005:125).  The licensing 
EA process is on the extreme end of the licensing process spectrum as described above, with 
the regulator requiring large amounts of informational evidence, before the EA licensing 
process can be successfully concluded. As discussed earlier, ICASA requires test reports for EA 
approval. A test report in three categories is necessary for each product being considered for 
type approval (ICASA, 2013). These categories are safety, electromagnetic compatibility and 
equipment performance. This results in a significant amount of information being required 
before a product can be considered for EA. This process is consistent with public interest 
principles. 
 
Ogus and Zhang (2005) argue for the abolition of licensing in developing countries and 
propose a less interventionist regulatory strategy that can better serve the public interest. 
Minogue and Cariño (2006:134) conclude that an EA licensing regime imposes more 
compliance costs on entrepreneurs, more administrative costs on officials and more welfare 
losses on consumers than an independent regime. Given the high level of regulatory oversight 
                                                          
15 The type approval process was explained at an interview conducted with the type approval unit of ICASA on 
30 June 2011. 
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and the structured approach of using tests reports in this approach, licensing is regarded as a 
command and control strategy. 
 
b) Verification 
Magallanes (2011:1) describes verification as the simplest of the three approaches for 
obtaining equipment authorisation. It allows an equipment manufacturer to verify its 
equipment, with no additional external tests required by the regulator. Ogus and Zhang 
(2006) define the verification process as “registration”. Registration “involves the actor to 
furnish the regulatory authority with accurate information prior to being able to engage in a 
business activity” (Minogue & Cariño, 2006: 115). Regulatory officials would keep the 
information on file, without having to test whether the applicant meets substantive 
conditions set out by the regulatory authority. Verification differs from certification or 
licensing, in that the burden of proof lies with the supplier, with the regulator accepting on 
good faith, that the equipment conforms to the required technical specifications. 
 
Verification is considered as a form of self-regulation in which the manufacturer merely 
verifies compliance with regulations. Research conducted in this field shows that this type of 
economic deregulation has had a positive benefit for both consumers and producers alike 
(Magallanes, 2011:1; Hertog, 1999). 
 
c) Declaration of conformity 
Declarations of Conformity (DoC) allow the manufacturer to outsource equipment testing to 
an accredited test laboratory, and the results of these tests are used to declare conformity to 
a standard (Magallanes, 2011:1). DoC is also be considered a form of self-regulation, with a 
component of regulatory oversight (Magallanes, 2011:1). This approach would allow the OEM 
to apply for EA in a block of countries based on the initial test report, resulting in considerable 
savings. 
 
There are several reasons that could be put forward to support a de-regulated or self-
regulated market. Hertog (1999:246) describes some of them by listing three reasons for 
deregulation: 
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i) a changed balance of power of pressure groups 
ii) structure-induced equilibrium can be disturbed by the actions of political entrepreneurs, such as 
the chairpersons of regulatory commissions  
iii) Politicians can seek political support for deregulation by providing voters with information about 
the inefficiencies of regulation of all be accounted for by. Alternatively, politicians could try to use 
the complexities of regulatory issues by claiming that economic deregulation would greatly 
advance economic and social welfare. 
The claim that deregulation would automatically advance economic and social welfare in the 
EA sphere would have to be investigated thoroughly. This claim would be discussed in greater 
detail in the next section, but it is important to bear in mind that most of the research 
conducted in this field have been either focusing on deregulation in general in developing 
countries or would have looked at EA regulation in developed countries. The case of EA 
deregulation in a developing country is a combination that would require further study. 
 
1.5 The rationale for regulation  
EC equipment cannot be broadly categorised into levels of product preference, i.e. consumers 
cannot choose to pay less for an inferior unsafe product (or a product with fewer features), 
as all EC equipment approval have a health and safety related component as previously 
discussed. This means that the public interest justification for regulation holds a higher level 
of influence than for other products that are subject to regulation. The critical factor for 
regulating public safety would be to determine the optimal level of intervention. Ogus 
(1994:191) states that “the more technologically complex the determinants of quality, the 
fewer policymakers are likely to rely on information regulation”. This essentially implies that 
EC equipment, given its technical nature, would be highly regulated as the regulator would 
not rely on information provided by licensees. The regulator would require this information 
upfront before approval is provided.  The challenge to developing countries would be the 
capabilities and skills to process this information, since authorities in developing countries 
have relatively scarce skills and experience in these areas (Makhaya & Roberts, 2003:42). EC 
equipment, however, also have very short product cycles, requiring quicker EA times. An 
“inferior” product would still have to be as safe as any other product, although it may be 
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significantly cheaper. The approach to regulation would thus have to ensure both safety and 
economic value.  
 
Ogus (1994:180) goes further in determining the relationship between the risk creator and 
the potential victims. These risks are specific to health and safety or social concerns, which 
apply to EA. A good example would be the heterogeneous relationship between an industrial 
factory contaminating the atmosphere and the victims of pollution. In this example, the 
victims are diverse and numerous and are, therefore “…unlikely to constitute a coherent 
pressure group” (Ogus, 1994:180) to address their concerns. The other end of the spectrum 
would be a homogeneous relationship between an employer and employee, where unions 
could address safety issues in a collective manner (Ogus, 1994:180). The EA scenario of health 
and safety would be at the midpoint of either extreme. Consumers having product quality 
and safety issues, “…have a market relationship with producers but are less well-placed than 
employees to negotiate standards, both because of the difficulty and the cost of effective 
organisation” (Ogus, 1994:180). This is a compelling argument in favour of regulatory 
intervention on behalf of the consumer on public interest grounds, where the regulator would 
be responsible for ensuring product safety by setting enacting appropriate regulatory 
measures. 
 
1.6  The discourse of EA regimes and the gap in the knowledge 
A study similar to the one envisioned here was conducted by Knapp and Wall (1997:28) 
reviewing the FCC EC EA. Their proposals were to: 
a) Simplify current (at that time) equipment authorisation procedures;  
b) Liberalise the equipment authorisation requirements for certain equipment and;  
c) Provide for electronic filing of equipment authorisation applications  
 
In their study, Knapp and Wall (1997) did not provide alternatives to full liberalisation and 
suggested the change in the EA regime to be in line with the trend worldwide. Their study 
also did not investigate the local conditions of the EC market. While Knapp and Wall (1997) 
may have taken for granted that issues like access to test facilities may be inconsequential in 
a developed first world country, such issues are of significant importance in a country like 
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South Africa as the cost to set up such facilities may be prohibitive. It was also not the focus 
of their study to balance the social requirements with the economic impact of the new 
regulation. 
 
Research by Veenstra and Leonhard (2008) has shown that new technologies would have a 
significant impact on regulatory regimes, and changing technologies must be catered for 
when considering a liberalised EA regime. The FCC EA regulations are promulgated in terms 
of Section 302 of the US Communications Act of 1934 (Wall, 1995). This section allows the 
FCC to make regulations that are consistent in terms of the public interest. The FCC approach 
seems to focus on the social aspects of regulation from the description of Knapp and Wall  
(1996, 1997). 
 
A study by Pelkmans (1987) looked at a new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standardisation. This study looks at the framework that would eventually become known as 
the R&TTE directive. Pelkmans’ study mainly focuses on removing the barriers to trade within 
the EU and also does not suggest alternatives to complete liberalisation. 
 
Howard and Mazaheri (2009) conducted a study on the telecommunications reform in 
developing countries. In their study, they conclude that the ideal regulator in a developing 
country would focus on the public interest, but would not be above entering into agreements 
with private sector entities to pursue an economic agenda. Their findings are specific to 
mobile phone adoption and internet access. 
 
A significant amount of empirical literature has been analysed by various commentators that 
shows a positive correlation between regulatory reform in developing countries and 
economic gains (Gasmi & Virto, 2010; Fink et al., 2002; Gutierrez, 2003; Ros, 1999; Li & Xu, 
2004). These studies look primarily at introducing competition in the mobile and fixed 
telephony areas and do not focus on the EA regime.  
 
The US and EU are first world economies with mature telecommunications markets. Their 
move from a regulated EC EA environment to a liberalised one was generally successful. 
Although various commentators have extolled the value of moving from a regulated 
30 
 
 
 
environment to a liberalised one (Horwitz, 1989; Ogus, 1992; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003; He, 
2010 Gasmi & Virto, 2010; Fink et. al, 2002; Gutierrez, 2003; Ros, 1999; Li & Xu, 2004), very 
little has been theorised on the approaches to EA regulation in developing countries. From 
the literature surveyed, it seems that there is either research conducted about regulatory 
reform in developing countries as well as EA regulatory reform in developed countries, but 
not EA regulatory reform in developing countries. 
  
This research starts from the existing theoretical approaches to EA regulation in developing 
an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation, while considering the complexities 
pertinent to South Africa as a developing country. Simply proposing regulatory reform based 
solely on an economic calculation (such as for example using the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
theorem16) may not be a viable solution, as an optimum solution should contribute to the 
understanding of the theoretical approaches to applying EA regulation.  
 
1.7  The generalisability of developing countries 
It is a difficult task to generalise developing countries as a unique entity. Even though 
developing countries may share several similarities, they each may be in different stages of 
development. The stages of economic growth by Rostow (1960) is regarded as one of the vital 
economic models that describe growth in developing countries. The model theorises that 
growth can be defined in five major stages of varying length: 
i. Traditional Society. This initial stage is the most basic stage, characterised by a primitive 
society with access to little or no technology. This society is primarily dependent on 
agriculture on its main economic activity. 
ii. Preparatory Stage. This stage lists the socio-economic and political changes that are a pre-
requisite before the next stage can be achieved. 
iii. The Takeoff stage: This is an economic period that could span decades in which the rate of 
investment and per capita output increases. This stage is also characterised by technological 
innovation. 
iv. Drive to maturity. This is a period of self-sustaining growth of the economy. There is large 
scale investment, particularly in infrastructure, as well as industrial growth. 
                                                          
16 The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency theorem is a measure of economic efficiency used extensively in the calculation of 
welfare economics. See https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/kaldor-hicks/ for a detailed definition. 
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v. Age of Mass consumption. This final stage signifies a shift in focus from primary activities 
such as food production to the production of consumer goods. 
 
Rostow’s (1960) model, although frequently criticised, provides a clear indication that 
development occurs on a sliding scale rather than an immediate transition. Developing 
countries could fall into several of the categories listed above and could find themselves in a 
transitory period between these defined stages.  Porter, Sachs and McArthur (2002) have 
defined a scale that is more easily generalisable and pertinent to this study. In their aim of 
developing a country competitiveness index, they have defined three specific economic 
development stages and two transitionary stages: 
i. Factor-driven stage. This stage is characterised by the trade in natural resources and the use 
of unskilled labour.  
ii. Efficiency-driven stage: The focus of this stage is on more efficient means of production 
leading to higher output and better quality products. There is less self-employment in this 
stage as the formal job market would grow as production increases. 
iii. Innovation-driven stage: New products and services are created using technology and 
innovation. There is an increase in entrepreneurial activity driven by innovation and growth. 
iv. The transitionary stages are between stage one and stage two as well as between stage two 
and stage three. 
 
This characterisation is essential to the study as it provides a platform to distinguish between 
developing countries. The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2015) produces an annual report, 
shown in Figure Six, that categorises countries into the developmental stages defined by 
Porter et al. (2002).  This report uses two criteria to determine the stage of development of a 
country. The first criteria used is the measure of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at 
market exchange rates. The second measure acts as a correction to this categorisation by 
factoring in the extraction of resources and trade of mineral goods. The table of countries are 
categorised as follows: 
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Figure 6: Countries/economies at each stage of development 
 
Source: World Economic Forum (2015:13) 
 
South Africa is categorised in Figure Six as a stage two economy. A stage two economy 
classification is an efficiency-driven economy. This categorisation assists in identifying 
developing countries in similar stages of development as South Africa. There are 30 other 
developing countries in the world which are categorised in the same stage as South Africa. As 
this study is grounded by data obtained in South Africa, the generalisability and applicability 
of the theory developed in this study would be best suited to countries within the same 
developmental stage as South Africa. Even with this caveat, it is imperative to underline that 
grounded theory develops theory limited to the chosen data boundaries. The research in itself 
has a particular focus on understanding the unique characteristics of South Africa as a 
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developing country. The theoretical sampling and theoretical completeness of this study are 
thus limited to a specified population of the EA environment of South Africa.  
 
With that said, this study could form a suitable theoretical basis for future studies in other 
developing countries, as its theoretical underpinning is not based on the classical regulatory 
approaches to EA. While this study is delimited within the substantive area of the EA 
environment of South Africa, a formal theory can be developed by generating abstract 
concepts and specifying relationships in multiple substantive areas (Charmaz, 2006:8). By 
focusing on multiple developing countries and removing any delimitations, a formal theory of 
the approach to EA regulation in developing countries can be developed. This is however 
beyond the scope of this research, as the focus would solely be on developing a substantive 
theory of EA in a developing country, with a delimitation to South Africa. 
 
1.8 Why grounded theory? 
Grounded theory has evolved appreciably since initially being first introduced by Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967.  Their approach to qualitative research focused on a 
systematic process to formulate theory directly from data gathered during social research 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The area of their study focused on dying in hospitals and culminated 
with a detailed analysis and a theoretical explanation of the social organisation and the 
temporal order of dying. (Charmaz, 2006).  Glaser and Strauss (1967) shared the methodical 
strategies adopted for their study for other social science researchers to follow, when 
studying other topics. This approach to qualitative research has been the subject of various 
methodological debates since, but the core of grounded theory as a mechanism to generate 
theory remains valuable.   
 
The premise of developing a theory directly from data grounded through a logical process of 
deduction, aligns well with the focus of this research, as the assertion of this research is that 
the current theoretical approach to EA regulation seems to be problematic. Ongoing 
methodological debates in grounded theory have been crucial in fine tuning and clarifying the 
seminal work of Glaser and Strauss (1967). The original authors themselves diverged in their 
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approach to grounded theory, and a short account of these differences is included as part of 
the methodology discussion.  
 
Charmaz (2006) is one of the new generation of grounded theory writers who have built upon 
the original works of Glaser and Strauss (1967). This research is based on the grounded theory 
methodology proposed by Charmaz (2006), as her approach is best suited in the context of 
the study undertaken. Charmaz (2006) provides an interpretation of grounded theory and 
suggests methodological advice, guidelines and perspectives by re-examining the classical 
statements of grounded theory of the past century, through the theoretical lens of the 
present century. Charmaz (2006) adopts the theoretical and methodological assumptions of 
several decades of scholarly debate and provides principles and practices (not inflexible rules) 
that suit a qualitative research environment. 
 
This modernisation of the classical grounded theory ideology rings true to the intent of this 
research - looking at an old problem through a new lens. Grounded theory in itself helps the 
researcher “…foster seeing your data in fresh ways and exploring your ideas about the data 
through early analytic writing” (Charmaz, 2006:2). The concept of developing an innovative 
theoretical approach to EA regulation in a developing country can thus be considered as a 
realistic goal, should an appropriate methodology be adopted that can deliver on that stated 
objective. The concept of what is considered innovative is also discussed as part of the 
literature review, but it is important to note that grounded theory as a qualitative 
methodology is by itself a powerful tool that can be used to develop a substantive theory in 
this particular area of research. 
 
The focus of this study is not to simply generate a new and improved mechanism to conduct 
EA in a developing country. The focus of this study is instead to develop a theoretical 
explanation of the EA environment in a developing country. The statement by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) that grounded theory facilitates the move from a description of what is 
happening to an understanding of the process, by which it is happening, is significant as is 
articulates the approach adopted in this research. While the research has gathered data in 
first addressing the more practical issue of applying an appropriate approach to regulation, 
the end product is a theoretical explanation of this practical approach. I.e. it moves from a 
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description of an innovative approach to EA regulation, to a higher level of theoretical 
abstraction in understanding this process. This theoretical explanation is grounded in the data 
gathered as a result of a qualitative exploration of the EA environment in a developing 
country.  
 
Grounded theory is not a theory in the classical academic sense, it is rather a method of 
qualitative data research that uses systematic and flexible guidelines for collecting and 
analysing data, to generate theories grounded in the data itself (Charmaz, 2006:2). Using 
these guides and method of analysis, the data gathered as part of the research was coded, 
compared and analysed to generate a level of theoretical abstraction.  The final product of 
theoretical abstraction is the purpose of the investigation, rather than the practical 
considerations that formed part of the journey in obtaining the required data. The 
contribution to new knowledge is therefore a theoretical focus, rather than a practical 
exercise. This academic focus is framed by the particular subset of data gathered for this study 
and is thus applicable only to the particular environment being researched.  A common 
mistake made by grounded theory researchers is to increase the population size of the 
research. The error is in assuming that the focus of grounded theory is generalisability.  The 
logic of grounded theory applies to the specific population of the data and collecting 
unnecessary information only leads to gathering conceptually thin data (Charmaz, 2006:101). 
Grounded theory is thus an ideal tool that is utilised to achieve the required results of the 
study.  
 
1.9 A summary of the research problem 
While deregulation has been successful in many first world countries, the impact of 
liberalisation in a developing country is a pertinent subject of research, especially with a focus 
on a regulatory approach for EA.  The unique challenges of a developing country introduce a 
level of complexity not catered for by the current theoretical approaches to EA regulation. 
There may be a need to preserve the social agenda of regulation, while still being cognisant 
of the economic windfall associated with deregulation. Real world problems have been 
observed that stem from the use of the current EA regulatory approach. This study therefore 
analyses the South African EA environment using a lens of current theoretical approaches, 
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while ultimately focusing on developing an innovative substantive theory grounded in the 
environment of a developing country. A study of the South African environment is useful to 
other developing countries, hence the findings and conclusions of this study would be of value 
to developing countries with similar levels of development as South Africa.  
 
 
1.10 Problem statement 
The current theoretical approach to EA regulation has proven problematic to resource-poor 
countries. Initial research in the South African EA environment has revealed several real-world 
trends that show that the current approach to EA regulation has limitations when faced with 
a changing EC landscape.  The popular approach of EA deregulation that has proven successful 
in many first world countries, may not apply to developing countries given their unique 
challenges. These challenges, such as a lack of administrative resources, poor infrastructure 
and a lack of ex-post regulatory monitoring add to the complexity of designing an appropriate 
theoretical approach to EA regulation.  The primary focus of the current public interest EA 
regulatory approach in South Africa ensures that social obligations are met, to the detriment 
of economic imperatives. A predominantly economic-focused approach, however (such as a 
deregulated model of EA regulation), does little to ensure that social obligations are met. 
Research has shown that even deregulated markets require some form of regulatory 
intervention to preserve economic and social concepts (OECD, 2012). This summary of the 
research problem (and the subsequent literature review based on initial assumptions of the 
research problem) represents a naïve picture of the research at hand. There exists a need to 
develop an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation that is grounded in empirical 
data generated in a developing country, to develop a rich picture of the environment.   
 
1.11 Purpose of the research  
The purpose of the research is to develop an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation 
that can be applied to a developing country such as South Africa, to address the limitations 
presented by the current theoretical framework. This is achieved by first understanding the 
challenges brought about as a result of the current theoretical framework.  The unique 
challenges of a developing country, in relation to a theoretical approach to EA regulation, is 
37 
 
 
 
investigated next. The research finally proposes an innovative theoretical approach to EA 
regulation, grounded in South Africa.  
 
1.12 Research questions 
1.12.1 Central question 
In which ways can innovative theoretical approaches to regulation be applied to the EA 
regime of a developing country, in order to address possible limitations presented by the 
current theoretical approaches? 
 
The central question is further broken down into three sub-questions, where each sub-
question will address specific aspects of the central question. 
1.12.2 Sub-questions 
 In which ways does the current theoretical approach to regulation pose challenges to the EA 
regulatory approach? 
 Why are the characteristics of a developing country unique and how can these characteristics 
be considered when developing an innovative theoretical approach to regulating EA? 
 How can an innovative theoretical approach be created that addresses the challenges of the 
current theoretical approach to regulating EA? 
 
1.12.3 Questions context 
The current EA framework was examined by the first sub-question, identifying the challenges 
faced by the current theoretical approach, thereby identifying the problem areas of the 
current approach. The sub-question also investigates how effective and efficient the current 
approach is, regarding regulating in the public and economic interest. 
 
This second sub-question gives context and determines the unique characteristics of South 
Africa as a developing country. It investigates the characteristics unique to developing 
countries that specifically impact EA regulation.  
 
The final sub-question investigates the manner in which an innovative EA approach can be 
created in a developing country, by suggesting an alternative to the classical theoretical 
regulatory approaches. It assesses the responses of the previous questions and develops an 
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innovative approach that addresses the limitations presented by the current theoretical 
framework. 
 
1.13 The significance of research into theoretical approaches to EA regulation 
A study into developing innovative theoretical approaches to equipment authorisation in 
South Africa is important for several reasons. Initial evidence has shown a real-world problem 
that emanates from the theoretical approach to regulation. Previous studies have 
approached this problem, either in an environment of a developed country, or studied the 
effects of deregulation in developing countries in general. A study of an innovative theoretical 
approach to EA regulation in a developing country would thus be of value to developing 
countries looking to implement a regulatory approach that is grounded in the requirements 
unique to developing countries.  
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2. Literature review of regulatory theory relevant to EA approaches 
2.1 Introduction 
Before engaging in the literature reviewed for this study, it should be noted that there are 
several debates concerning the use of literature before commencing a grounded theory 
study.  Glaser (2009) is firmly opposed to exploring the literature prior to the commencement 
of the data gathering. Glaser is of the opinion that conducting a literature search before the 
data collection, will distract the researcher and prevent them from seeing the emergent 
categories from the data. He promotes conducting the literature review after the researcher 
has conducted an independent analysis of the data (thereby preventing distractions and 
letting the theory emerge from the data).  Charmaz (2006) supports this view and notes that 
there exists a danger of focusing on the research through the lens of earlier theory - resulting 
in “received theory” (Charmaz, 2006:165).  Charmaz suggests somewhat of a compromise, by 
stating that the literature can be reviewed in the build-up to the research, but ignored until 
the researcher can develop categories and analytical relationships based on the research 
data. The approach by Charmaz (2006) has been adopted in the study and relevant literature 
in the EA field was surveyed, and the study is located in the discussions that follow.  
 
This literature review argues, that although developed countries have migrated to an 
economic focus on EA regulation, there exists a gap in the approach to EA regulation for 
developing countries. This liberalised approach to regulation, in general, has been studied in 
great detail in developing countries, but without a specific focus to EA.  The critical theoretical 
assumption of public interest theory regarding regulatory efficiency is also discussed and is 
shown to be problematic to developing countries.  
 
The literature review thus focuses predominantly on the economic theory of regulation, 
public interest theory and regulatory strategy theory, with specific emphasis on equipment 
authorisation.  The core aspect of regulatory strategy is driven by the theoretical approach to 
regulation and can be further distilled into the key concepts of command and control, self-
regulation, design standards and output standards. These key concepts are also elaborated 
upon, concluding with a discussion on the Diffusion of Innovation theory as well as New Trade 
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theory. The aforementioned theoretical framework, along with the key concepts, is the 
foundation on which this research is undertaken. 
 
The starting point of the literature review is to investigate the best known EA approaches. 
 
2.2 Some examples of well-known EA approaches 
The European Radio and Terminal Telecommunications Equipment (R&TTE) Directive 
1999/5/EC is possibly the best known EA framework worldwide. This framework ushered in a 
new era for the type-approval of equipment in Europe. This formed part of the light touch 
approach to regulation that was envisioned by the European Community (Dillingham, 1999; 
Salisbury, 2000). These changes to regulatory regimes occurred around the world from the 
mid-nineties onwards, in response to globalisation and the integration of international 
markets (Ogus, 1999:223). In terms of this directive, equipment suppliers had only to declare 
conformance to a harmonised standard listed in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities (Salisbury, 2000). It provided a simpler procedure for manufacturers to enter 
the market, thus stimulating the market and improving the economy (Salisbury, 2000). More 
emphasis was placed on market surveillance and manufacturers’ liability, rather than an ex-
ante approach where emphasis is placed on product conformity, before the product goes to 
market. 
 
The European Council had realised early on that the EC market at that time was fragmented 
and did not realise the potential of a single European market (Müller, 1989).  The old process 
was also not appropriate in the technical areas, as the pace of technology change dictated 
that the technical standards should change just as rapidly (Salisbury, 2000). Unfortunately, 
technical specifications embodied in legal documents meant that change was a slow and 
arduous process. 
 
The post-1999 approach was to leave the essential requirements in law and separate the 
technical requirements into technical standards documents. The standards bodies thus 
produce harmonised standards in response to requests from the European Commission, 
which are published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. A manufacturer can 
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thus create a product according to a harmonised standard, and the European Community 
member states are obliged to presume that the equipment meets the requirements of the 
law. The manufacturer has expressly to identify which directives relate to his product and 
declare conformance to that directive. This regulatory approach ensured that national 
regulatory systems did not become barriers to trade (Ogus, 1999:223; Müller, 1989). 
 
Another popular equipment authorisation approach is managed by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), using Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCB) to 
conduct equipment approval on its behalf. The FCC (2012) also conducts approvals itself, 
allowing declarations of conformity for EC equipment. The FCC has a handbook which sets 
out regulation applicable to equipment authorisation. Again, this approach was a less 
interventionist one that sought to better facilitate the EA process by making the EA process 
simpler (Knapp, 1997). 
 
Most first world countries have adopted a variant of either the FCC or EU approach to 
regulating EC equipment. What is telling though, is the lack of current academic literature on 
EA regulatory approaches.  It would seem that first world countries have adopted a de jure 
deregulatory approach to EA regulation, stemming from the wave of telecommunications 
deregulation witnessed in Europe during the 1990s (Ogus, 1999:223).  
 
2.3 Origins of economic and social regulation 
As the EA approach is a regulatory one, it is important first to understand the historical roots 
of regulation in general. The first question intuitively to ask would be: “What is Regulation?” 
Baldwin and Cave (1999:2) define regulation as being a binding set of rules designed to 
influence industrial or social behaviour. Ogus (1999:223) defines regulation as a type of public 
law that the state uses to encourage a particular type of conduct, which would not have 
occurred without such regulation. Regulation has been part of modern society for a 
considerable period. Ogus (1992:6) shows that regulatory intervention dates back to the 
Tudor and Stuart periods and MacDonagh (1958:52) states that there was a burgeoning of 
regulation in the nineteenth century, with the emergence of specialist regulatory institutions, 
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especially in the supply of railway, water gas and electricity services. These regulatory 
measures were put in place to ensure control over the quality of service, prices and safety.  
 
The first independent regulatory body was established in the United States in 1887 (Baldwin 
& Cave, 1999:3). This body was the Interstate Commerce Commission formed to deal with 
issues such as discriminatory pricing and workplace health and safety. It was also in the United 
States that the “…notion of regulation had acquired a narrower meaning in response to the 
rise in the number of independent regulatory institutions and the consequent crystallisation 
of regulatory practices into a theory of governance” (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003:4). Jordana 
and Levi-Faur (2003:4) later describe regulation as a form of governance, and they note how 
deregulation has become a major political agenda for politicians as regulatory frameworks 
have advanced. Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003) define deregulation as “the reduction of 
economic, political and social restrictions on the behaviour of social actors” (Jordana & Levi-
Faur, 2003:5).   
 
This change in the evolution of regulation is of importance to the study, as deregulation is a 
key theme that is explored. Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003:6) define deregulation as “the 
reduction of economic, political and social restrictions on the behaviour of social actors”.  
Regulatory frameworks have evolved as markets have evolved, but deregulation as a popular 
political agenda for regulatory evolution may not be the solution for a developing country. 
 
2.4 Regulation and EA 
 For equipment authorisation, the rationale for regulating is the protection of the equipment 
user and the protection of the telecommunications network. Breyer (1982:34) points out that 
health and safety regulation would be justified as a rationale for regulating. This view is 
echoed by Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003:32) and Ogus (1999:223) who point out that social 
regulation would deal with health and safety, environmental and consumer protection. EA 
regulation is enacted to ensure EC equipment compliance to standards set by the regulator 
regarding public health and safety, performance and interoperability of the equipment as well 
as to minimise harmful interference (ITU, 2012:9). The elements of EA regulations that are 
health and safety related are thus aligned with the social aspects of regulatory theory.  The 
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public interest objectives would be to ensure that social, rather than economic considerations 
are at the forefront of the regulator's agenda. This approach to regulation is known as the 
public interest theory of regulation and will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
 
Environmental regulation, regulation of product safety and labour conditions are generally 
opposed by private entities as these regulations would increase the cost of compliance, which 
would, in turn, have a negative effect on profitability (Hertog, 1999:235). It is this balance 
between public and private agendas that is critical for a regulator when regulating EA.  
 
There is also an economic aspect of EA regulations, which states that the type and form of 
regulation would have to be the most efficient. The net costs of the regulation should not 
overshadow the net benefits of the regulation (Ogus, 1994:13; Bartle, 2009:692). This is 
described in further detail as the economic theory of regulation. The EA market contributes 
billions of dollars annually to the world economy (Carr et al., 1998:5) and any regulatory 
approach would have to be mindful of the economic impact that it carries.  
 
2.5 Public interest theory 
A regulator’s task of balancing the demands of both public and private actors can be daunting. 
In accommodating these diverse interests, the regulator sometimes has to be guided by an 
overarching principle in terms of the public interest. Beecher (2008) says that a good regulator 
“embraces the public interest” (Beecher, 2008:578). Telecommunications, and by extension, 
the supply of telecommunications equipment, is considered to be imbued with public interest 
(Horwitz, 1989:11). Hertog (1999:3) provides the following definition of public interest theory 
specific to regulation: ” …regulation is the instrument for overcoming the disadvantages of 
imperfect competition, unbalanced market operation, missing markets and undesirable 
market results”. Mclean (2004:42) has a similar definition when he notes that “regulation is 
the solution to certain sorts of market failure, especially market failure due to natural 
monopoly”. Public interest theory can therefore be summarised as an approach where 
regulation is developed in pursuit of public interest related objectives in reaction to market 
failure. 
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In this theory, the regulator of the sector has to act as an “expert” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:19). 
This theory applies to the EA regulatory framework as equipment authorisation is conducted 
in the public interest and the regulator acts as an impartial expert in evaluating the equipment 
authorisation requests. Public interest theory holds the perspective that regulation is 
established in response to the conflict between private corporations and the general public 
(Horwitz, 1989:23). It can be argued that private companies are vested in creating wealth for 
their shareholders, and equipment manufacturers would be no different. EA regulations 
should ideally have to be designed in the public interest, to mitigate against the aforesaid 
conflict. The biggest consideration for public interest theory, however, would be to strive for 
the lowest cost form of regulation (Bartle, 2009:692). This involves creating regulation that 
does not unnecessarily burden the consumer, while still holding true to the public interest. 
This is a vital link to the economic theory of regulation, which will be discussed in greater 
detail shortly. 
 
Kohlmeier (1974) paints a bleak picture of the US regulatory agencies in the 1970s (specifically 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)). He 
states that these regulatory agencies are not serving the interests of the public, but are rather 
focuses on the economic issues with a bias towards private corporations (Kohlmeier, 
1974:100). This situation changed with the regulatory agencies later in the 1990s, especially 
with the FCC.  Levi (2008) provides an account of how the FCC moved back towards public 
interest perspectives in their regulations during the 1990’s and 2000’s, after a long period of 
focus on economic regulation, attributed to a change in political direction.  
 
An important rationale for regulation is market failure (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003). Public 
interest theory states that regulation is the solution to market failure (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 
2003:45). One definition of market failure would be that the market failed to optimise social 
welfare and acted to pursue its self-interest (He, 2010:287). Externalities (such as pollution in 
the case of environmental regulation) would have to be regulated to ensure consumer 
protection (He, 2010:287). The assumption that public interest theory can quantify the value 
of such externalities and hence correct the failure optimally through regulation is 
problematic. The transactional and informational costs of regulation in terms of EA would be 
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challenging for the regulator to determine, given that most of this information lies in the 
hands of industry. Externalities such as interference caused by unauthorised equipment 
would be nearly impossible to quantify. The statement that regulation could optimally 
address market failure in the EA environment is thus dubious, given that the costs of such a 
failure would be difficult to determine. 
 
Developing countries, in particular, would be more susceptible to these externalities, as they 
generally have weak economies and poor infrastructure (Gasmi & Virto, 2010: 275), hence it 
would be prudent to assume that the need for regulation in developing countries to optimise 
social welfare may be much higher than developed countries. 
 
The biggest criticism of public interest theory is its propensity for regulatory capture. 
Opponents contend that self-interested business groups “capture” regulators for their private 
interests (Bartle, 2009:691). The economic actors use the significant resources at their 
disposal to ensure that the regulatory authority is coerced into pursuing actions that 
maximise their utility value (Bartle, 2009:691). He (2010) has a similar view and points out 
that regulatory capture by special interest groups leads to weak and ineffectual monitoring.  
 
Public interest theory states that regulation is the solution to market failure, especially 
monopolies (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2003:45). Dominant operators may be inclined to 
monopolise the supply of equipment on their networks. This could lead to a failure of the 
equipment supply market, as the EA process would act as a barrier to entry into the 
equipment supply market. 
 
Another definition of market failure would be that the market failed to optimise social 
welfare, and individuals acted to pursue their self-interest (He, 2010:287). In this case, 
negative externalities (like consumer health and safety) would have to be regulated to ensure 
consumer protection.  This is the case with EA regulation being introduced to ensure that 
consumer health and safety issues are not ignored in favour of corporate self-interest.  
 
Posner (1974) criticises public interest theory based on a critical assumption of the theory 
that regulation is effective and could be implemented without significant cost. This is the 
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second link to the normative description of the economic theory of regulation, which will be 
discussed later in this study. Tanguay, Lanoie and Moreau (2004) have a similar definition of 
public interest which highlights Hertog’s (1999) assumption that regulation is effective. 
Tanguay et al. (2004:1) stated that “At the optimum pollution level, government intervention 
will ensure that the marginal cost of eliminating pollution is equal to the marginal damage 
caused by the pollution”. This statement again assumes that regulation would be “optimum”, 
and in the real world, this is hardly the case. This is certainly an area that the research 
addresses, by understanding the efficiency limitations of the current theoretical approaches 
to EA regulation given the complexities of a developing country.  
 
An insidious application of public interest theory is cited by Hertog (1999). Hertog claims that 
larger organisations would support the sometimes onerous and costly administrative burden 
that accompanies regulatory intervention. This may seem counter-intuitive, given that 
companies would seek to maximise profits and minimise input costs. The rationale behind 
this approach is that larger corporations are better able to absorb the costs associated with 
regulation, which may prove unbearable to smaller companies, causing them to be driven out 
of the market (Hertog, 1999:241). This, in turn, reduces competition in the market and 
impedes the market, which is contrary to the objectives of regulatory intervention.  
 
As previously discussed, the “Carterfone” ruling was a landmark ruling that paved the way for 
the deregulation of EC equipment (Ford et al., 2008). This ruling by the FCC allowed telephonic 
devices unaffiliated with Bell Networks (the fixed-line monopoly incumbent at that time in 
the US) to be used, should they follow the standards prescribed by the FCC necessary to 
facilitate interoperability between the device and the network. It was well understood at the 
time that the Bell Telephone network was vertically integrated into the Western electric 
company, who was the sole supplier of equipment to the Bell network. This meant that the 
Bell Telephone Network would have had an incentive to sabotage the deployment of a rival’s 
equipment onto their network as they had significant market power, was vertically integrated 
and this practice was regulated  (Ford et al., 2008:649).  The FCC “Carterfone” regulations 
banned the bundling of the telephone device with the telephone service, opening up the 
market to third-party suppliers. This free market promoted competition, lowered prices and 
fostered innovation in this area. It is important to note that the regulation was developed in 
47 
 
 
 
a monopolistic market, with a vertically integrated incumbent with market power. The 
question that Ford et al. (2008) raise is whether such EA regulations are still applicable in the 
modern wireless market. They point out that the current wireless market in the US is a highly 
competitive one, with several operators completing aggressively for market share. The 
conditions of vertical integration do not exist in this market hence the potential for sabotage 
does not exist. The third component that existed during the “Carterfone” watershed ruling 
was price regulation, does not exist in the current US wireless market.  Ford et al. (2008) argue 
that the three paramount conditions that gave rise to the “Carterfone” regulations are no 
longer present in the current wireless market, yet the same type of “Carterfone like” 
regulations still apply to the wireless market (Ford et al., 2008:659).  They make a convincing 
argument that shows that the commoditising of the wireless networks due to open access 
type EA regulations would be harmful to the consumer. This view is supported by Faulhaber 
and Farber (2010), who show that a high level of innovation due to competition exists in the 
wireless market, thus regulation in this market would not be appropriate.  Open access 
networks allow customers to move freely between networks, without any long-term 
commitment, which may lead to operators becoming insolvent and thus decreasing 
competition in the market. Mobile operators who are not allowed to cross-subsidise the cost 
of a mobile handset with the cost of the service, would increase the handset price which 
would in turn negatively affect the consumer (Ford et al., 2008:673). This is an interesting 
take on the public interest perspective of EA regulation, as the defining EA regulation that 
was once lauded for liberating the EC equipment industry, may yet lead to its downfall. The 
supposed benefits of regulation (such as consumer choice and prices driven down by 
competition in the US example) may be outweighed by increased costs due to a lack of cross-
subsidisation or increased costs due to fewer operators who can survive in the current 
economic climate. Ford et al. (2008) suggest a move back to allowing network specific 
equipment with the sole intention of circumventing the pitfalls of applying the “Carterfone” 
like regulatory intervention to competitive markets that are not vertically integrated. 
 
Wu (2007) has a view that challenges some of the assertions made by Ford et al. (2008). He 
states that the wireless network carriers in the US can be considered to be an oligopoly, as 
although these markets are considered open markets, the multi-billion price tag required to 
enter this market can be regarded as restrictive enough to prevent entry (Wu, 2007:393). The 
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market power of these carriers is such that they can prevent entry into vertically integrated 
markets as well.  It is worth remembering that the arguments of Ford et al. (2008) and 
Faulhaber and Farber (2010) focus primarily on the premise that the Carterfone regulations 
were developed for a monopolistic market, at a time when there existed a vertically 
integrated incumbent with market power. Such types of regulation are no longer required for 
the open cellular markets without vertical integration in the US. The arguments by Wu (2007) 
show that while the wireless network market in the US can be defined as an open market 
using a classical definition of the term, there exist extenuating circumstances that prevent 
entry to these markets, effectively rendering the market an oligopoly.  Wu (2007) provides an 
instructive historical parallel between the 1960’s Carterfone regulatory initiative and the 
present day wireless environment that exists. He points out that voice telephone networks 
had reached a point of saturation of technology under the guise of AT&T leadership in the 
1960’s, and that innovation could only occur through deregulation of the equipment supply 
market (Wu, 2007:394).  In the present day scenario, only progressive policy initiatives would 
be able to propel the wireless industry to the next stage of innovation. 
 
Public interest is arguably the main theoretical base that has to be considered when 
investigating an approach to EA regulatory design. EA regulations as previously discussed are 
imbued with public interest objectives. Public interest as the theoretical underpinning to EA 
regulation alone, however, falls short when considering the complexities of a developing 
country. The assumption that public interest based regulation can be implemented optimally 
in a developing country would have to be tested. The perceived value of regulation developed 
in terms of public interest and its actual impact would also require investigation. It is also 
evident that changing markets will affect the implementation of public interest type 
regulations, and regulations that were previously applicable to the EC equipment market may 
no longer serve the intention of public good. It is even conceivable that such well-intentioned 
public interest regulatory measures may even be detrimental to the public interest.  
 
2.6 Economic theory of regulation 
Another underlying theme that is prevalent in the literature is the economic theory of 
regulation. The economic theory of regulation was proposed by Stigler (1971). Stigler (1971:3) 
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proposed a theory of the supply of regulation, where demand for regulation came from those 
who required regulation, as it would better their circumstances. Essentially, industries will 
acquire regulation for their purposes as they are the primary benefactors of such regulation. 
The supply of regulation came from the regulatory authority. Many commentators have built 
upon this theory, including Hertog (1999), Ogus (1994) and Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004), who 
have applied it to the telecommunications environment.  
 
Hertog (1999) describes a distinction between the positive and normative theories of 
economic regulation. He states that the “positive variant is directed to the economic 
explanation of regulation and deriving the consequences of regulation. The normative variant 
investigates which type of regulation is the most efficient” (Hertog, 1999:10).  In other words, 
the positive theory explains why regulation is applied, while the normative theory 
predominantly focuses on improving economic efficiency by reducing costs.  Both the 
normative and the positive aspects of the economic theory of regulation apply to the study. 
The positive variant in this context would focus on reducing the cost of compliance with EA 
regulations, while the normative aspect would look at the balance of EA regulations from an 
economically efficient point of view. 
 
A summary of Ogus’ (1994) analysis of economic theory is that the market that requires 
intervention must first be identified. The second step would be to select the method of 
intervention that would correct this failure, at the least cost (Ogus, 1994:13). It is the second 
step that is most applicable to this research, as the regulatory strategy chosen by the 
regulator should ensure that the lowest cost is incurred, while still correcting the market 
failure.   
 
Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003:32) attribute market failure to several factors such as 
externalities, information deficiencies and lack of competition. Externalities and information 
deficiencies are referred to as “social regulation” (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003:32). These are 
health and safety as well as consumer issues. The third factor, the lack of competition, is 
referred to as economic regulation (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003:32). These are generally price 
control regulations imposed in natural monopolies or oligopolistic markets.  In essence, 
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market failure as defined by Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003) are as a result of both public 
interest and economic interest variables. 
 
Competition in a market is an essential feature of economic theory. Ogus (1994) provides an 
excellent description of the key concepts of economic theory concerning competition. The 
first key concept is a perfectly competitive market. Economic theory posits that: 
  
…when an industry is “perfectly competitive” it will generate allocative efficiency, the 
resources of the society being put to their most valuable use. “Perfect competition” exists 
when the number of firms selling a homogenous commodity is so large, and each individual 
firm’s share of the market so small, that no individual firm finds itself able to influence 
appreciably the commodity’s price by varying the output it sells (Scherer & Ross, 1990:33). 
 
Ogus (1994:22) explains that in the circumstances described above, the manufacturer would 
produce goods up to the point where the marginal revenue of production equals the marginal 
cost of the goods. This means that prices of items generated by the manufacturer cannot be 
inflated to levels beyond the marginal cost of the goods. The market self-regulates this price, 
since given the definition of a perfect market with several manufacturers, consumers would 
have the ability to simply choose the manufacturers who have priced their product at the 
lowest price. This competitive equilibrium ensures that in the absence of externalities: 
…the marginal valuation of consumers will be equal to the marginal cost to produce the 
commodity and the marginal social benefit and the marginal social cost of producing the 
commodity are equal; and allocative efficiency will result (Ogus, 1994:22).  
This means that due to perfect competition, manufacturers have essentially been forced to 
maximise their output relative to their input costs. In a monopoly, the opposite essentially 
applies as the monopolist has no motivation to be efficient, and will hence maximise profits 
by increasing prices that are more than the marginal cost of production (Ogus, 1994:22). 
Competition is thus an excellent mechanism to ensure that both social and economic goals 
are realised with little or no regulatory oversight (Levy, 1996). The real world scenario, 
however, is almost always never a perfectively competitive market. Imperfect competition 
exists in the EC equipment supply market, which may somewhat alleviate the economic 
concerns brought about by supply and demand. The public interest perspective as a result of 
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competition is, however, unclear given that regulatory oversight is required to ensure 
consumer safety and network interoperability.  
 
Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003) question whether market failure correction is more costly than 
the perceived benefits of the regulation. This is significant to EA, as the social regulatory 
intervention must be implemented at the least cost (Bartle, 2009:692). This view is supported 
by Ogus and Zhang (2005:132), who states that the licensing process creates a heavy 
administrative burden to the regulator who scrutinises and evaluates these applications. They 
claim that the time taken for the regulator to reach a decision imposes a cost on the applicant 
as well as the consumer, who does not have access to the product until the licensing process 
is complete. They conclude that the public interest arguments need to identify significant 
benefits to justify the costs incurred using a licensing system. 
 
The most cynical view of the economic theory of regulation comes from Hertog (1999), who 
states that “The conclusion is that regulation is not directed at the correction of market 
failures, but at setting up income transfers in favour of the industries in exchange for political 
support” (Hertog, 1999:37). Hertog explains that companies can organise themselves more 
efficiently than private individuals. This enables them to lobby politicians more effectively to 
ensure that their agenda is prioritised, and in return, provide the politicians with votes and 
other resources to secure their re-election.  This take on the economic theory of regulation is 
very similar to the regulatory capture scenario that was expressed as a flaw of the public 
interest theory. As both these theories apply to EA, it lends credence to the notion that the 
theoretical underpinnings of EA regulation require attention as it may no longer be valid. 
 
Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003:31) state that the economic theory of regulation primarily 
explained how regulation came into being in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as explaining how 
it failed. He states that this theory is less adept at explaining the deregulation that occurred 
in the 1980s and 1990s. It is this period of deregulation that is essential to this study, hence a 
need to understand the intersection of this theory with that of the theory of public interest, 
to find the area that properly defines the requirements of a developing country. Paleologos 
and Polemis (2013), however, clearly define a link between regulation and economic growth. 
They find that there is a significant relationship between a sound regulatory environment and 
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economic growth. Their study also looks at the impact of privatisation and investment in 
relation to regulatory intervention, with a definite conclusion that privatisation regulation and 
policies that are implemented by governments contribute positively to economic growth. This 
finding is somewhat contradictory to Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003), who attribute the period 
of deregulation as the key contributor to economic growth. Paleologos and Polemis (2013) 
suggest that regulatory intervention aimed at privatisation promotes economic growth, 
hence regulation in itself can thus be attributed as key to the intervention that spurs 
economic growth. These regulations implement a structural measure that is aimed at the 
market under scrutiny (e.g.  privatisation). The key distinction, however, is that Paleologos 
and Polemis (2013) state that effective implementation of policy and regulatory interventions 
are responsible for the aforesaid economic growth, the emphasis being on the word 
“effective”. Developing countries, as discussed previously, have unique challenges that may 
render effective implementation of regulation as an impossible task. The principles of 
economic regulation, such as removing barriers to entry, promoting competition and 
preventing discrimination of essential facilities remain the same.  
 
The normative explanation of the economic theory of regulation, which looks the type of 
regulation that is the most efficient (Ogus, 2004:37), seems to contradict public interest 
theory, which assumes that government regulation is effective and can be implemented 
without greater cost (Hertog, 1999:10).  As explained earlier, it is important to study the 
intersection of these theories as they are both applicable to EA. The rationale of EA 
regulations should be aimed at ensuring the social aspects of EA are met, without increasing 
costs. Hence EA regulations would have to be (in an ideal scenario) drafted in terms of the 
economic theory of regulation, while still being faithful to the principles of public interest 
theory.  
 
 
2.7 A failure of the current theoretical approaches to EA Regulation? 
The telecommunication sector mixes the seemingly disparate paradigms of social and 
economic interest. In this sector, the social returns are in itself reflected in its contribution to 
economic development (Makhaya & Roberts, 2003:43).  Add to this the requirements of a 
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developing country, and it becomes more complex to combine these theories to ensure that 
EA regulation (or any similar telecommunications regulation for that matter) could be 
developed with a balance in mind.  Ogus (2004) has previously attempted an analysis of both 
public interest theory and the economic theory of regulation. He finds that economists 
postulating the economic theory of regulation have become obsessed with finding an overall 
theoretical framework which “provide(s) a complete explanation of the existence and 
incidence of regulation” (Ogus, 2004: 42). He also states that the public interest approach 
“…which assumes that law is made exclusively to generate aggregate social welfare is too 
naïve.” (Ogus, 2004: 42). 
 
It is clear that these competing theories are of significant value to EA regulation, but do not 
form a complete theoretical framework by themselves. Although they form the theoretical 
base to which an investigation into the design of EA regulation begins, they appear 
contradictory and less applicable to the specific needs of a developing country. The 
requirements and challenges of developing countries required further investigation, as they 
form the basis on which an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation is developed. 
Both public interest and economic theory of regulation theories contain assumptions about 
the efficiency of regulation. This notion that regulation is efficient and implemented at the 
least cost, seems implausible given the previously stated administrative challenges faced by 
developing countries. 
 
2.8 Regulatory strategy theory 
Regulatory strategy can be defined as the mechanism adopted by the regulatory agency to 
fulfil a particular mandate (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:35). Adler (2010: 15) defines regulatory 
strategy as “modalities of regulations” which he calls the generic legal structure for 
responding to market failure.  Baldwin and Cave (1999:60) list eight different regulatory 
strategies that can be used to achieve the relevant objectives effectively. For the research, 
the literature review primarily discusses the command and control strategy and the self-
regulation strategy. 
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2.8.1 Command and control 
As discussed previously, ICASA is responsible for EC equipment authorisation in South 
Africa, under section 35 the Electronic Communications Act (ECA) (RSA, 2005). This 
approach to EA can be described as a “command and control” regulatory approach, as it 
involves the setting of standards within a rule to control the quality of a product (Baldwin 
& Cave, 1999:35). Many countries around the world have abandoned the command and 
control regulatory approach in favour of more liberalised approaches to regulation (FCC, 
2009; Salisbury, 2000). 
 
Command and control regulation is the “exercise of influence by imposing standards 
backed up criminal sanctions” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:35). This means that non-
compliance of the equipment authorisation regulations is a criminal offence and is 
punishable by law. Command and control regulations involve the setting of standards 
within a rule to control the quality of a product (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:35). This again 
aptly describes the EA regulations as technical standards are used to prescribe the 
minimum requirements for EA.  
 
One of the main criticisms of the command and control structure is its “propensity to 
produce unnecessarily complex and inflexible rules” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:37). This is 
especially so for EA regulations where the structure of the regulation makes innovation 
difficult in a fast moving, technology-driven market.  He (2010) cites command and 
control regulations as being especially sensitive to information deficiencies. A command 
and control EA regime place high informational demand on EC suppliers (as information 
such as test reports are required to prove compliance), creating the possibility of 
informational deficiency for the regulator, which is the receiver of the information. 
Command and control regulations place high informational demands on the applicant as 
well, by requiring a test report based on a performance standard being produced for 
regulatory scrutiny, before the equipment can be authorised. Baldwin and Cave (1999) 
have argued that this regulatory approach “poses a major difficulty for regulators as well, 
since the informational demands are severe” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:38). Command and 
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control regulations are well suited to ensuring public interest principles but at a high 
economic burden. 
 
The British communications regulator OFTEL (at the time) has argued that detailed 
prescriptive rules can act as a barrier to entry and has moved to an open state form of 
regulation (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:37).  Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003:39) also dwell upon 
re-examining the rigid command and control methods of regulation by replacing them 
with financial incentives and general objectives. This view is supported by Ogus (1994) 
who states that this approach then puts the onus on the industry to devise their own 
particular rules to meet the required objectives. Jordana and Levi-Faur (2003) have found 
that there is a worldwide emergence of a less authoritative, less interventionist and more 
participatory regulatory modalities (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003:220). The EU, for example, 
has moved towards a more indirect approach to behavioural changes by facilitating “new 
instruments” of regulation, which couple a high level of discretion with a high degree of 
obligations imposed by the regulator (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2003:220). These new 
instruments still ensure that the public interest is protected, but use less intensive 
mechanisms to achieve the same result. 
 
The pace of technology also dictates the level of regulatory intervention required. 
Technological change is, in essence, the driving force that determines the regulatory 
modality discourse (Wiener, 2004). Horwitz (1989) argues that technology “exacerbates 
the user demands to bypass the basic regulated system” (Horwitz, 1989:221).  He 
(2010:288) goes further to state that in a technologically driven fast paced environment, 
command and control regulations should not be used. It is clear that an innovative 
regulatory strategy that is responsive to the environment is required.  
 
Bruneau (2005) shows that command and control regimes used by regulators lead to net 
losses under trade liberalisation when using design standards and concludes that 
command and control regimes are considered an inefficient form of regulation. 
 
The command and control regulatory strategy, although widely criticised by many 
commentators (Breyer, 1982:12; Baldwin & Cave, 1999:37; He, 2010:287), is still the EA 
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regulatory strategy adopted in South Africa. The literature surveyed paints a very one-
sided and dim view of the command and control regulatory strategy, but of importance 
is the absence of criticism of the strategy in ensuring that social obligations are met. This 
strategy seems to be very effective in ensuring that health and safety requirements are 
adhered to, so there would be merit in conducting further research into the applicability 
of this type of regulatory strategy to enforce these social obligations in terms of EA. 
 
2.8.2 Self-regulation: Verification 
Baldwin and Cave (1999:39) define self-regulation as an organisation developing its own 
set of rules that are monitored and enforced by itself. Self-regulation can be applied 
when it is subject to governmental structuring and oversight (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:39). 
Ogus and Zhang (2005:131) believe that registration (which will be referred to as 
verification in the study) could also be considered a form of self-regulation. They argue 
that there are public interest grounds for introducing registration as it would lead to 
lower administrative costs (Ogus & Zhang, 2005:131). This is an interesting dynamic, as 
lower costs are cited as a public interest objective, not an economic one. It is a difficult 
path, as the implementation of a particular strategy may serve certain public interest 
objectives (such as lowering costs), but may also result in defeating other public interest 
objectives (such as ensuring a safe product). 
 
In a study of more than one thousand Spanish companies, Camisón (2010) concludes that 
“the adoption of more advanced environmental innovations by firms submitted to auto-
regulation allowed both a superior improvement and a higher level of environmental 
performance” (Camisón, 2010: 346).  Kolstad (1986) also conducted a similar study on 
the efficiency of command and control regulations and show that “economic incentive 
regulations” were several times more efficient than command and control regulations. 
Self-regulation would certainly lower administrative costs, but the gap in the literature 
that was surveyed begs the question of whether self-regulation would ensure that all 
public interest goals are still achieved by this strategy of regulation.  
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2.8.3 Self-regulation: Declaration of conformity regimes 
The conformity assessment procedure internationally is moving towards self-declaration. 
The Radio Equipment and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive (which 
was amended in 2014) as previously discussed is a European Commission directive that 
allows for self-declaration and mutual recognition of telecommunication terminal 
equipment (Müller, 1989). This directive allows equipment manufacturers to conduct 
testing to the prescribed standards of the R&TTE directive independently, and then 
declare that they met the standards without having to submit proof of compliance to the 
regulator. The directive allowed European Commission countries to benefit from a single 
equipment market, which was previously fragmented. This would allow European 
Commission countries to compete directly with the larger US and far eastern European 
Commission equipment markets. Another positive attribute was that the directive also 
promoted trade and innovation with the European Commission countries. This form of 
regulation is incentive based and is considered to be an efficient type of regulatory 
approach (Bruneau, 2004:538). 
 
The main issue with this strategy based on the literature surveyed thus far is that this 
strategy seems to still rely on design standards to prove conformity. Another gap in the 
literature that exists is the creation of a regulatory EC equipment authorisation approach 
that uses a declaration of conformity regime based on output standards. A more detailed 
explanation of design vs output standards is discussed next. 
 
2.9 Regulatory strategy and standards 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) identified two core areas that should be investigated when 
regulators incorporate standards into rules. These areas are the types of standards and the 
level of performance. 
 
2.9.1 Type of standards 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) identified two types of standards that can be used by regulators 
by defining the timing of these standards. The first type was a standard that looked at 
prevention stage, which focused on “the act that gives rise to a harmful result” (Baldwin 
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& Cave, 1999:118). These standards are known as “Design Standards” or “Preventative 
Standards” (Bruneau, 2004: 536; Ogus, 1999:225). This is the type of standard that 
applies to the specification or design of equipment during equipment authorisation. The 
second type of standard termed “output standards” and are applied to the “harmful 
result of an activity” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:118; Ogus, 1999:225) and looks at 
implementing sanctions accordingly.  
 
Besanko (1987) cites a good example of standards in the context of air quality regulation. 
An output standard would place a limit on a factory’s emission of sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
per million parts of air, while a design standard would specify the minimum efficiency of 
a stack gas scrubber designed to reduce SO2 emissions (Besanko, 1987:34). Applying this 
to the EA environment, an illustrative example would be a design standard that would 
specify the maximum power output of a radio transmitter, while an output standard 
would specify the electromagnetic compatibility limit of the equipment. 
 
The key difference to these types of standards is the cost and difficulty to enforce. The 
standards that are applied at a preventative stage are relatively inexpensive to enforce 
with readily calculated compliance costs (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:119; Ogus, 1999:225). 
Standards thus represent the degree of state intervention, with the key variable being 
the administrative costs of formulating the standard and monitoring compliance to the 
said standard (Ogus, 1999:166). This type of standards is currently implemented for 
equipment authorisation and provides advantages only to the regulator as the cost is 
borne by the party seeking equipment authorisation.  Baldwin and Cave (1999:118) argue 
that such standards are highly intrusive and may also inhibit innovation and development 
of new more efficient designs of equipment. Ogus (1999:166) concurs with this view and 
finds that firms should be given a choice in the mechanism they adopt to meet regulatory 
requirements, as this encourages innovation in loss abatement techniques. This link 
between regulation and innovation is an important aspect of this study, as it highlights 
the relationship between the regulatory path embarked upon and the impact of this path 
on innovation. The regulatory path is determined by the type of standards that are 
adopted (Burtz & Hummel, 1984). Theories of innovation will be discussed in greater 
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detail further in this study, but it is important to note that allowing a level of discretion 
to the regulated firm has a direct bearing on the innovation exhibited by that firm.  
 
Batabyal (2000) developed a theoretic approach to environmental regulation in a 
manner that decreased inefficiencies and losses caused by regulation. He stated that 
regulation has to be optimally done in a dynamic and stochastic setting (Batabyal, 
2000:115). Holt (2005:190) concurs with this view, suggesting that regulators should 
balance their regulatory objectives to ensure that prices are not driven up. This ties in 
with the key themes of economic efficiency versus public interest perspectives discussed 
in detail earlier. 
 
Output standards in terms of equipment authorisation are applied through 
electromagnetic compatibility emission limits and “demand a given level of delivery at 
the action stage” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:119). These standards focus on the degree of 
risk that a process creates rather than the actual harm done (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:119). 
This type of standard is less technologically restrictive and gives firms an incentive to 
design processes with superior performance levels (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:120). Output 
standards provide advantages for the equipment manufacturer but are more challenging 
and costly to the regulator. Holt (2005:195) suggests quality of service standards as 
output standards with the information on quality provided by the operator, which 
reduces the burden of proof to the regulator. 
 
2.9.2 Level of performance  
Standards setting in the EC equipment context is the process of defining limits in a 
manner that protects the user and the network that it connects to (ITU, 2012:10).  It 
relates to the type of standards that should be used and the level of performance that 
should be demanded. These concepts are central to equipment authorisation, as 
equipment authorisation is a process where standards are used to gauge a certain level 
of safety, EMC and performance of equipment. 
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The level of performance is thus another key concept of this research, as it would help 
determine the type of framework required for equipment authorisation. The level of 
performance is defined as the level at which regulators need to fix standards to control 
risk, while still making the equipment economically feasible (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:120). 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) further explain this concept as one that “seeks to set optimal 
levels of performance on efficiency grounds by a process in which the costs of harm 
avoidance are balanced against the benefits” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:120).  
 
From the literature surveyed in this section, it is apparent that the level of performance 
determines through regulation, the level of performance required by EC equipment. 
Setting a very high level of performance may increase the cost of compliance and hence 
the cost of the equipment.  Ogus (1994) aptly describes the economic consideration of 
regulation that highlights a need for balance, when he states that using the conventional 
tools of microeconomics, any government intervention should choose a method of 
intervention that will correct the failure at the least cost. The studies quoted in this 
section show that much research has been conducted in defining the strategies of 
regulation, albeit predominantly in the environmental sector. The research builds on that 
work in the field of communications regulation with the premise that regulation, in 
general, should be implemented at a level of performance that contributes the least to 
increasing costs.  
 
It is also valuable to note that compliance costs can vary appreciably over a period that 
an activity takes place. Ogus (1994) lists the example of the rules that apply to a factory 
during an active manufacturing phase should not be the same as a time when the factory 
is inactive. In this example, the standards that are set should be cognisant of the different 
degrees of generality that applies to rule formulation (Ogus, 1994:169). These rules can 
be considered to be a sliding scale, with highly precise quantitative rules on one end and 
general rules on the other. Flexible rules would be able to cater for a variety of 
circumstances, but are challenging and costly to maintain as it requires interpretation 
and administration by both the actor and the regulating authority.  Quantitative rigid 
rules, however, reduce discretion and uncertainty as well as the regulator's 
administrative costs. These rules may be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive, either 
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deterring more or less than what is optimally required. There should theoretically exist 
regulatory rules that “…there is an optimal specificity for any given standard where the 
administrative costs are approximately equal to the costs of any potential mismatch” 
(Ogus, 1994:169).  While it should be a regulatory imperative to ensure that rules 
implemented upon a specific environment (such as equipment authorisation) should 
strive to achieve this optimal theoretical specificity, it may prove to be much more 
challenging in a real-world environment.  
 
2.10 Regulation and unique challenges of developing countries 
The focus of various studies in developing countries has been the effect of deregulation on 
competition in the sector. Makhaya and Roberts (2003) argue that privatisation and 
liberalisation in the South African telecommunications market as a whole have led to effective 
competition. This conclusion may, however, be questionable, given the fact that the 
incumbent fixed-line operator has since admitted abuse of its dominant position at that time. 
They do note that the capabilities and skills required by the regulator to regulate such a 
market are relatively scarce, coupled with informational asymmetries, where the regulated 
entity has more market information than the regulator (Makhaya & Roberts, 2003:43). 
Although this study is valuable in highlighting the challenges of a regulator in a developing 
country, it does not provide direction regarding a specific approach to EA regulation in 
developing countries.  
 
Wellenius (1977) looks at the some of the unique challenges of developing countries: 
i) Network roll-out 
Network operators in developing countries may not be able to keep up with the demand for 
telecommunications services at cost related prices due to high growth rates in these markets. 
This then impacts their ability to grow their networks, which in turn negatively affects their 
financial sustainability. Telecommunications companies in developing countries are thus 
faced with several institutional and financial inadequacies.  Wellenius (1977:294) also makes 
a point that challenges the much-researched view on the link between telecommunications 
and development. The consensus in academic literature states that telecommunications has 
a positive impact on economic growth (as discussed in detail elsewhere in this study). The 
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challenge for developing countries is that a significant portion of the population lives in rural 
areas. Operators following an economically sustainable network roll-out model would 
generally target urban regions with a high population density to realise the highest financial 
returns (Wellenius, 1977:294). Rural installations will thus classically be subject to an initial 
loss, should the operator be obliged to roll out services through regulation in these areas. The 
overall profitability and network growth are thus different for developing countries when 
compared to developed countries.  Rural installations, although critical in terms of a public 
interest perspective, does not drive technology adoption. Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) show 
that only a dense urban population with access to an extensive telecommunications network 
are the key drivers of technology innovation and adoption. Innovation and technology are 
well known to be the main aspects in driving economic growth, hence developing countries 
have a complex relationship between driving public access objectives and achieving economic 
growth. 
 
ii) Education 
The level of education of the general populace in developing countries is lower than that of 
developed countries. Telecommunications companies in developing countries are thus at a 
distinct disadvantage when compared to developed countries, as they do not have easy 
access to a pool of high-skilled human resources (Wellenius, 1977:295). This is especially 
pertinent to the engineering and management resources necessary to ensure an efficient and 
effective operator. 
 
iii) Local telecommunication manufacture 
Although developing countries may have a cheaper level of labour costs and raw material 
costs, the technology independence and maturity of developed countries make the local 
manufacture of telecommunications equipment in developing countries a difficult 
proposition (Wellenius, 1977:296). The research and development ability in developed 
countries act as a barrier to entry in the telecommunications manufacture market to 
developing countries.  
 
In a study of 86 developing countries, Gasmi and Virto (2010: 285) have shown that countries 
faced with higher institutional risk and tighter financial constraints are more likely to promote 
63 
 
 
 
policies that encourage investment, with the intention of extracting maximum revenue 
through licence fees.  This regulatory approach in developing countries highlights the 
dominance of an economic perspective rather than a public interest perspective to regulation.  
 
 
2.11 Diffusion of innovation theory, innovation policy and the importance of 
effective EA regulation for innovation 
Theories of innovation and trade can be traced back to Romer (1987), but the underlying 
theory of the diffusion of innovation dates back to 1962 (Roger, 2003). This theory defines 
how innovation is taken up within a social system, with a focus on the time taken for the 
diffusion and the communications channels used. The proposed innovation would have to 
demonstrate a relative advantage over the idea that it supersedes, which could be expressed 
in a social or economic context (Roger, 2003). Santacreu (2015:1) links innovation to the 
growth and shows that technology adoption accounts for 65% of growth in a developing 
country, while 75% of the growth in developed countries is due to domestic innovation. OECD 
(2012:6) presents a stark example highlighting the effect of innovation on economic and social 
development. A comparison is made over a four-decade period of two developing countries, 
Ghana and Korea. The GDP per capita of Korea grew by orders of magnitude as compared 
with Ghana, which essentially remained stagnant. This growth in the GDP of Korea is 
attributed primarily to innovation in technology-related fields.   
 
Innovation theory is closely linked to both social and economic theory, where innovation has 
been shown to positively impact both a country’s GDP and social development as described 
in the example previously. The OECD (2012) report specifically lists flexibility of governmental 
policies as a key determinant in ensuring that developing countries take advantage of the 
benefits brought on by innovation in the digital economy.  Regulatory innovation to support 
such policy flexibility would thus also be required to ensure that economic and social 
development can be accelerated in developing countries. This policy and regulatory support 
through innovative regulation would thus create an enabling environment that supports the 
development of technology (OECD, 2012:8). Chandra (2006) makes the distinction that 
developing countries, in particular, must innovate through policy initiatives to drive economic 
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development. She cautions that although there are many examples of failed attempts by 
government to drive innovation and economic growth through policy reform, history has 
shown that government policy initiatives have still played a crucial role in driving innovation 
and growth in almost every successful country researched (Chandra, 2006:1). 
 
The Porter et al. (2002) scale by which countries are categorised in terms of their economic 
development stages discussed earlier, is of relevance once more. Developing countries are 
generally at a factor-driven stage, characterised by the trade in natural resources and the use 
of unskilled labour. Chandra (2006) lists the example of two sub-Saharan Africa countries 
characterised by markets driven primarily by the production of primary goods created using 
semi-skilled labour. These countries adopted technologies innovated in developing countries, 
which led them to diversify their primary economic output to manufactured goods created 
by a skilled workforce. This remarkable transition occurred over a relatively short period of 
two decades, based on the adoption of technology that took a century to develop in the west 
(Chandra, 2006:3).  This example illustrates the benefits of innovation to developing countries 
from an economic point of view.  
 
We can thus see a direct link between innovation policies (including regulation) and 
technology innovation. This link is of particular importance to the EA environment which is a 
technology-driven environment. Innovation in regulation could lead to innovation in the 
technology of the equipment being offered in a country. As the OECD (2012) report states, 
the prime consideration would be to create an enabling environment for the adoption of new 
technology. This need not necessarily be limited to innovation that is unique and local, but 
rather to tap into “the globally available knowledge and technologies and adapting them to 
local contexts” (OECD, 2012:7). 
 
Innovation policy complements innovation theory, in that it focuses on policy and regulatory 
objectives that remove obstacles to innovation. Innovation in this sense refers to something 
that is new to that particular market and not necessarily new to the world (World Bank, 2010). 
Innovation policy is of particular importance to developing countries as the adoption of 
foreign technology can play a significant role in incremental innovation (OECD, 2012:118). 
Innovation theory and innovation policy thus form a valuable perspective to this study, given 
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the fact that South Africa is largely an importer of EC equipment (WTO, 2014). The EA 
regulatory approach would have a direct bearing on innovation by promoting either an import 
driven technology growth or a domestic equipment manufacturing industry. An efficient and 
innovative policy approach to EA would need to ensure that regulatory obstacles to 
innovation are removed. 
 
An excellent example of innovation within the context of equipment authorisation 
frameworks would be the previously discussed Carterfone decision of 1968 promulgated by 
the FCC in the US. This regulation is regarded as the fundamental consumer rights decision in 
the history of communications, arguably even recognised as the central tenet of all 
competitive telecommunications policy decisions (Wu, 2007:397). The implications of this 
ruling were substantial, impacting even the economy of the US as a whole. Moreover, this 
decision is recognised to have led to a slew of associated innovations in the 
telecommunications industry, most notable being the fax and answering machine as well as 
the modem. The socio-economic impact of the internet on modern society is well 
documented and can be attributed to this policy decision as well. Without such enlightened 
policy decisions of the time, it is doubtful that innovation could have occurred at such a rapid 
pace that we observe today. The Carterfone regulation removed bottlenecks to innovation 
and decentralised innovation (Wu, 2007:398). There is however conflicting research that 
shows that a high level of innovation due to competition exists in the wireless market, thus 
regulation in this market would not be appropriate (Faulhaber & Farber, 2010). What is clear 
though, is that innovation is inexorably linked with EA policy, whether it supports a 
deregulated model or a regulated one.  There are, however, conflicting views regarding the 
deregulated model. Howard and Mazaheri (2009) argue that too little regulatory or policy 
oversight can have a negative effect on technology adoption and may exacerbate the digital 
divide.  Their approach recommends an independent regulator that enters into public-private 
relationships to develop national communications infrastructure as the ideal solution 
(Howard & Mazaheri, 2009:1159). The challenge for developing countries to implement 
policies that grow the economy thus becomes more demanding and further supports the 
position that the theoretical approach to EA regulation in developing countries should be 
tailored to that country.   
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A possible drawback to innovation policy is that it is a holistic approach to government policy 
and intervention. The “whole of government” approach (OECD, 2012:10) means that only a 
focused and coordinated effort by government would yield results such as those cited in the 
Korean example earlier. While this may be regarded as the ideal approach to drive innovation 
in a developing country, it does not necessarily detract from possible gains that may be 
achieved via a more fragmented approach, such as focusing on specific regulation. Innovation 
in EA regulation as an example could be the starting point for a regulatory overhaul, which 
can be later supported by other complementary governmental policies.  The World Bank is 
supportive of adapting regulatory frameworks and lists specific rules that govern technology 
imports (World Bank ,2010). EA is such a regulatory environment that governs new 
equipment technology innovation in a country, by either prohibiting or allowing the use of 
new EC equipment in a particular country. The approach to such technology imports 
suggested by the World Bank (2010) as well as the OECD (2012) would be to set performance 
standards for technology equipment, rather than setting technical requirements. This 
approach is consistent with the discussion around the types of standards (either design or 
output standards) discussed earlier in the research. This endorsement of performance 
standards or output standards is driven by increasing trade and driving economic benefit, 
which thus aligns itself with a more economic theoretical approach. There is very little 
mentioned in the literature surveyed that links innovation policy to the promotion of the 
social agenda. It would seem that innovation policy, at least within the context of EA 
regulation, would drive social considerations indirectly only, via the gains that are evident 
through an increased GDP of a particular country. Innovation policy could thus be essentially 
considered as only an economic-focused approach. 
 
2.12 New trade theory, trade policy and the importance of effective EA regulation 
for trade 
New trade theory is predominantly concerned with international patterns of trade and 
economies of scale. New trade theory suggests that governments have a critical role to play 
in facilitating trade and promoting the growth of key industries (Krugman, 1989). Trade policy 
is an instrument that responds to concerns relating to non-commodity outputs with localised 
effects or international trans-boundary effects. The localised policy would have little effect 
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on trade, while the trans-boundary policies can impact trade significantly (Tothova, 2009:5). 
This is of particular importance to this study as the theory promotes free trade and laissez-
faire government intervention as a mechanism for developing countries to be able to 
compete in a world market. This approach is purely from an economic viewpoint and does 
not address the public interest considerations brought about by a light touch regulatory 
approach.   
 
Edwards and Lawrence (2012:4) point out that if South Africa were to expand its economy by 
6% per year, imports into South Africa would have to increase by double-digit figures. These 
numbers highlight the relationship between economic development and imports. As 
discussed earlier, South Africa is a net importer of EA equipment, and the linkage between 
imports, technology and innovation is an important one. To innovate, South Africa would have 
to have access to the latest technology which can generally only be imported. This once again 
is a process that is highly influenced by the EA framework. 
 
Trade theory is further complicated when the context of developing countries are taken into 
consideration. Were (2015) argues that while there is considerable literature that consistently 
shows that trade has a positive impact on economic growth, its effect is not significant in 
developing countries. Although the research acknowledges the impact of trade on foreign 
direct investment, the structure and pattern of trade is the key determinant of economic 
growth. This structure and pattern of trade are unique to developing countries and once again 
contributes to the earlier discussion around the unique characteristics of developing 
countries. Trade in developing countries are hindered by high transactional costs brought 
about by institutional differences (non-uniform) between trading companies, bureaucracy 
and cumbersome border and customs procedures, poor infrastructure, limited human and 
physical capabilities and poor quality of institutions  (Were, 2015:85). This decreases the 
competitiveness of the country and prevents it from maximising the benefits of trade. In 
terms of EA, the lack of uniform standards for equipment approval amongst developing 
countries in Southern Africa (as an example) is of particular importance. There is thus no 
avenue available to Southern African countries to leverage the economies of scale brought 
about by common standards when purchasing equipment for their countries. Also absent in 
the Southern African environment is the mutual recognition system, such as the R&TTE 
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directive employed in Europe. Mutual recognition agreements also leverage on economies of 
scale when purchasing equipment, but more importantly, it eliminates the duplication of the 
EA process. The structure and pattern of developing countries in the context of EA are thus 
fitting examples of the bureaucracy and institutional differences endemic to developing 
countries. The absence of a mutual recognition system in Southern Africa thus negatively 
impacts inter-regional trade and thus economic growth in the region.  
 
A significant drawback of trade policy for governments is the implementation of sectoral level 
policies. Edwards and Lawrence (2012:11) cite the iPod as an example, which although 
manufactured in China, has components sourced from around the world. Feenstra (1998) 
terms this process as the disintegration of the production process and makes an important 
point when he states that this disintegration of the production process leads to increased 
trade. The explanation put forward is that the intermediate inputs to the finished product 
could cross borders several times during the production process, leading to an increase in 
overall trade volumes (Feenstra, 1998:34).  This global fragmentation of production is 
especially applicable to EC equipment and highlights the difficulty of trade policy, as the target 
for intervention is no longer the product, but the production process of the value chain 
(Edwards & Lawrence, 2012:11). This in turn leads to questions about the EA framework and 
its impact on driving trade and thereby innovation. Given the dynamic nature of the EC market 
and the rapid pace of technology, EA frameworks may not be able to promote trade 
effectively and could even be considered a barrier to trade. In this respect, the proven 
economic gains brought about by innovation and trade would need to be carefully weighed 
up against the social considerations of health and safety. 
 
2.13 Theoretical framework and conceptual framework for EA regulation 
In developing an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation, the current theoretical 
perspective would have to be considered. The key theories of note to the study at this stage, 
are the public interest theory, regulatory strategy theory and the economic theory of 
regulation. An ideal scenario would be to determine the intersection of the two theories 
(public interest and economic theory of regulation) in the EA environment to determine a 
level of performance that can be set at an appropriate level for a developing country using 
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the appropriate type of standards, without comprising the safety or operation of the 
equipment by decreasing the cost of proving compliance. These almost opposing 
requirements inform the design of the study as there is a need for new theoretical 
explanations built on previous knowledge to explain changes in this field. The key concepts of 
the study are therefore by-products of the theoretical framework. These concepts are public 
interest, economic interest, command and control, self-regulation, design standards, output 
standards and level of performance, forming the lens by which the limitations of the current 
regulatory approach will be assessed and are expressed (see Figure 7). 
 
  Figure 7: Theoretical and conceptual framework of the study 
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The key concept from the public interest theory is public interest and the key concept from 
the economic theory of regulation is economic interest. These form the high-level theoretical 
perspective that frames the EA regulatory environment, as they determine the approach to 
regulation based on either public interest or economic principles. 
 
The concept of public interest assumes that regulation can efficiently take care of the public 
interest. The key concept from the economic theory of regulation is that of economic interest, 
which focuses on ensuring that the cost of compliance is not overshadowed but the net 
benefit of the regulation. It also looks to ensure that regulation is efficient with the lowest 
cost of compliance, while conforming to innovation and trade policy objectives. 
 
The next tier is a second level theoretical perspective, which is dependent on the first, as it 
determines the regulatory approach adopted to regulate based on either a social or economic 
approach. The command and control strategy follows a public interest perspective and has 
stringent requirements that need to be met before EA can be granted. These requirements 
come at a high cost, but ensure that the social aspects of regulation are adhered to (e.g. the 
health and safety considerations). It does not focus on the actual cost of compliance to gauge 
whether the net effect of the regulation is more burdensome than helpful. The self-regulation 
strategy has far lower compliance costs due to the less restrictive regulations. There is a lesser 
onus on the EA manufacturer to conduct tests and provide proof as there is with the 
command and control structure. There is, however, a risk that the social obligation may be 
ignored to lower the administrative costs of compliance, thereby endangering health and 
safety. An added complexity to consider is that the lower administrative costs would result in 
lower equipment prices, which may be passed onto the end user. This perspective then 
supports a public interest approach as it makes equipment more accessible in terms of costs 
to the general public.  
 
The final tier is at the functional level and defines the type of standards that are required 
regarding command and control and self-regulation strategies. The functional tier is again 
dependent on the on the previous tier to chart the type of standards adopted. Command and 
control strategies employ design standards in general, which specify the way that the 
equipment has to be manufactured in order to comply with the social aspects. Command and 
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control could also employ output standards. These would be EMC standards in the EA 
environment, where the EMC emissions are regulated.  
Design standards can be onerous to comply with and provides a high level of administrative 
burden on the supplier of EA equipment. The self-regulation strategy employs output 
standards as a measure of compliance. These standards place the burden of proof onto the 
regulator, which decreases administrative costs substantially for the equipment 
manufacturer. These types of standards are the real-world interventions that are ultimately 
a derivative of a theoretical approach to regulating EA.    
 
The final concepts would be the level of performance and administrative efficiency, the 
magnitude of which is dependent on the type of standards applied. This conceptual 
framework will underpin and form the foundation on which research is conducted to create 
an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation. 
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3 Research methods 
This section aims to give an overview of the methods that were used for this research, as well 
as detail the actual research design.  
 
3.1 Overview of the methods 
There are competing approaches to social research based on the philosophical assumptions 
about the purpose of science and the nature of social reality (Neuman, 2006:104). To 
adequately address the problem statement of this research, a qualitative research paradigm 
was adopted. Babbie (1994:370) describes a qualitative analysis as one that “involves the non-
numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering 
underlying meanings and patterns of relationship”. A qualitative research paradigm intends 
to understand a particular social situation via an investigative process, where “…the 
researcher gradually makes sense of a social phenomenon by investigating the object of the 
study”. (Creswell, 2003:198). The social situation explored in this instance is the applicability 
of the current theoretical approach to EA regulation in a developing country.  
 
3.1.1 Research question 
The research method details the process used to elicit data required to answer the 
research question: 
 
In which ways can innovative theoretical approaches to regulation be applied to the 
EA regime of a developing country such as South Africa, in order to address the 
limitations presented by the current theoretical approaches? 
 
The research question implies that the current theoretical framework is limited in 
South Africa and empirical data from experts knowledgeable in the EA field is required 
to generate an alternative substantive theory. Substantive theory assists the 
researcher in developing a theory that is specific to an empirical area of study 
(Charmaz, 2006) and is not generalisable. An exploratory qualitative research 
paradigm was best suited to elicit the required data for this study. Although there was 
an element of document research, interrogation of EA experts was essential to 
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generate an innovative theoretical perspective grounded in the data collected. For this 
reason, a grounded theory method was selected for this research. 
 
3.1.2 Grounded theory method for developing innovative theoretical approaches 
to EA 
The preceding chapters have shown that the current theoretical approach to EA 
authorisation has limitations in terms of the public interest and economic theory 
priorities . A qualitative grounded theory methodology was chosen by the author to 
develop an innovative theoretical approach to EA in a developing country like South 
Africa. Grounded theory is a widely used qualitative research methodology that the 
author believes would be best able to address the research purpose and questions, as 
the extant theoretical approaches to EA regulation have several limitations, and are 
possibly not appropriate to a developing country like South Africa. Grbich (2007:70) 
suggests that grounded theory methodology is appropriate “when there is a need for 
new theoretical explanations built on previous knowledge to explain changes in the 
field”. This view is supported by Charmaz (2006:5) who states that “…grounded theory 
advocates developing theory from research grounded in data rather than deducing 
testable hypotheses from existing theory.” This statement fits well with the research 
conducted here, as the specific theory for a specific circumstance (an innovative EA 
theoretical framework for a developing country) is built using the conceptual 
framework designed earlier in this research – but not on it. Charmaz (2006) further 
notes that the grounded theory researcher looks for a fit between the emerging data 
and the initial research, but does not force these original ideas and theories onto the 
data. The theories that underpin EA thus do not define the output of the study, as the 
study proposes an alternative theoretical framework determined by the data collected 
during the research process. 
 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) define grounded theory as a “qualitative research method 
that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived theory 
about a phenomenon”. Babbie (1994:291) proposes a definition that describes the 
mechanism of analysis employed by grounded theory as ”…the attempt to derive 
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theories from an analysis of the patterns, themes and common categories discovered 
in observational data”. Charmaz (2006:4) best describes the end product of grounded 
theory as having an abstract theoretical understanding of the studied experience. The 
research logic process is thus an inductive one. 
 
Glaser (2009:1) suggests that grounded theory is ideal for a novice PhD researcher, as 
they can see new patterns from the data that more experienced researchers may miss. 
Glaser (2012:5) makes an important statement of grounded theory when he states the 
objective of grounded theory as one that generates a theory within the chosen data 
boundaries. It does not create a new formal theory if the researcher limits his 
theoretical sampling and theoretical completeness within a specified population. This 
definition is relevant to this research, as the objective is to create a theory that is 
cognisant of the current theoretical approaches but is specific to the population of an 
EA regulatory environment of a developing country. The real strength of grounded 
theory lies in its open-ended approach to discovery (Glaser, 2012:5), which is used to 
good effect in this research as it relies on discovering an innovative theory that is 
faithful to the environment of a developing country. 
 
3.2 Research philosophy 
The research method gives to “How” any study would be conducted, but it is equally 
important to decide the “Why” such a study was undertaken. That “Why” is the research 
philosophy.   
 
Overall, Postmodernism and Critical Theory is the interpretative framework adopted in the 
research, as the ontology of the EA environment in a developing country cannot be assumed 
to be fully understood, given the range of viewpoints and perspectives of actors in the 
environment.  To that end, several subject experts in the EA field were interviewed to give a 
broad spectrum of perspectives from people in this sector. The basic concept of 
postmodernism “…is that knowledge claims must be set within the conditions of the world 
today and in the multiple perspectives of class, race, gender and other group affiliations” 
(Creswell, 2012:27). This interpretative framework fits well with the constructivist approach 
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to grounded theory advocated by Charmaz (2003). Charmaz’s approach to grounded theory 
is reflective of a post-modernistic view and provides a modern alternative to classical 
grounded theory. Charmaz (2003:250) looks to provide more accessible methods of grounded 
theory for taking qualitative research into the 21st century. Post-modernism was used to 
describe an environment where scholars had not yet found a clear, specific description of the 
"knowledge-based" economy, including knowledge for the digital economy. As this study is 
focused on research problems typical of the digital era using the grounded theory method, a 
post-modernistic view is appropriate. 
 
Critical Theory advocates social research that critiques society as a whole, to provide a deeper 
understanding of the processes that form human texts and symbolic interpretation 
(Horkheimer, 1982). Critical theory encourages reflective thinking and relates well to the 
constructivist approach to grounded theory, in that multiple views of social reality has to be 
considered. These views require “…an interpretative understanding of the subject’s 
meanings” (Charmaz, 2003:250) which is possible using critical theory and is complementary 
to the post-modernistic interpretative framework of this research.  Data and analysis are co-
constructed from the interaction of the researcher and the research subject, which is very 
much a post-modernistic view of qualitative research and is also supported by a reflective 
understanding of the processes guided by critical thinking. With this frame of reference 
adopted in this study, several philosophical assumptions are made. 
 
The approach to the philosophical assumptions that shape and direct this study are adapted 
from the description of the four philosophical assumptions by Creswell (2003).   
 
3.2.1 Ontological assumptions 
Ontological assumptions are the “idea of multiple realities and report on these 
multiple realities by exploring multiple forms of evidence from different individuals’ 
perspectives and experiences” (Creswell, 2003:20). This study explores innovative 
theoretical approaches to EA regulation. As such, the nature of the knowledge or the 
ontology is subjective, with multiple realities from the perspective and experiences of 
the many respondents that were interviewed.   
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3.2.2 Epistemological assumptions 
Creswell (2012:20) defines epistemological assumptions as the relationship of the 
researcher to the research. The researcher in this instance is an employee of the 
regulator and is involved in the day to day operation of the subject matter. There is 
thus very little “object separateness” (Creswell, 2012:20) between the researcher and 
the subject being researched. This epistemological approach is advantageous to the 
researcher in this study, with regards to grounded theory. Grounded theory dispels 
the positivist notion of being a passive observer in the research process as the 
researcher becomes part of the research process, being immersed in the collection as 
well as the interpretation of data (Charmaz, 2006: 23). The guidelines and regiment of 
grounded theory, however, assist in providing checks for both data collection and 
analysis, to ensure that the data and findings are valid and reliable. 
 
3.2.3 Axiological assumptions 
Axiological assumptions describe the values of the researcher in the research, where 
“Researchers make their values known in the study and actively reports their values 
and biases as well as the value-laden nature of information gathered from the field” 
(Creswell, 2012:20). As discussed in the previous section, the researcher fully declares 
his association with the subject of study and ensured that any personal values or bias 
was actively declared. 
 
3.2.4 Methodological assumptions 
Given that the grounded theory method is the research method adopted for this 
study, a largely inductive mechanism is adopted. Grounded theory formulates theory 
from a given point, and does not test existing theoretical ideas. As such, reasoning in 
an inductive direction is the desired goal and thus the epistemology of the EA 
environment is studied inductively. Neuman (2006) defined inductive reasoning as 
“…observing the empirical world and then reflect on what is taking place, thinking in 
increasingly more abstract ways, moving toward theoretical concepts and 
propositions” (Neuman, 2006:60). The empirical world in this study is limited to the 
EA regulatory environment in South Africa. 
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The unit of analysis, the “what or whom” being studied (Babbie, 1994:94), is the 
approach to EA regulation in a developing country like South Africa. This regulatory 
approach is the individual unit that descriptive and explanatory statements are made 
about. The EC EA theoretical framework has a significant impact on the social reality 
of South Africa, and it is this impact that this study explores.  
 
3.3 Data collection for a grounded theory study  
The data used in this study is obtained predominantly from primary data sources. Badenhorst 
(2007) describes primary data as one that carries the authority of the real world. It provides 
the empirical proof required by the researcher. The data collected using the research design 
as explained earlier required a mechanism to gather and measure the data. Two types of 
research instruments are used to provide the requisite data for this study. The predominant 
instrument is the in-person interviews with the identified respondents as well as a concurrent 
process of document analysis as a secondary source of data. These are starting points for data 
gathering, for as Charmaz (2006:16) points out, “The logic of grounded theory guides your 
methods of data-gathering as well as of theoretical development”. In other words, the 
process of gathering rich data opened other possibilities to gather data, which was not 
evident from the outset of the research. Examples include the various additional legislative 
documents concerning standards, which were brought to the researcher’s attention during 
the interview process. 
 
The types of data that were gathered relate directly to the three sub-questions of the 
research. The data required is presented per section, to detail the type and source of the data. 
Reasons are also presented to justify the choice of informants in generating the necessary 
data. The research instrument to gather the data is then suggested. 
 
3.3.1 Data gathering on limitations of the current theoretical approach 
The first type of data collected is evidence to the extent that the current theoretical 
approach to EA regulation is limited. The data collected was used to confirm the initial 
analysis conducted in the study, which show the real-world problems associated with 
the current regulatory approach to EA regulation. 
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a) Document analysis 
The initial source of data collected was through document analysis.  A wide 
source of records was considered. Preliminary interviews with the principal 
actors in the EA environment (discussed next) was used to probe for further 
sources of document analysis.  
 
An important source of document information was the ICASA EA application 
files.  A sample of 50 EA applications over the years 2010-2017 was originally 
planned for analysis. However, after reviewing the first ten files, it became 
apparent that these files contained a “sanitised” version of the EA process and 
did not provide the type of rich data required for this study. I then requested 
the various informants that I had interviewed to provide me with a written 
record of their correspondence during their EA approval journey. This proven 
to be a rich source of information, as it contained a historical record of the EA 
query, and in many instances articulated the range of interactions conducted 
by the participants during an EA application. This data provided a closer 
representation of the EA process, as the EA application files did not capture 
delays, queries, questions and complaints. 
 
Some EA applications were still reviewed as well. It would have been ideal to 
have access to files over a ten year period, from 2006 to 2016, however, files 
before 2010 could not be easily accessed as they had been archived. Access to 
these archive files was restricted to staff members of the type-approval 
department. The records from 2010 onwards were still valuable and provided 
a second subset of data that provided accurate information on the limitations 
of the current EA framework. Some key areas examined were: 
i. Comments regarding the processing time of EA applications. 
ii. Admin processing comments and observations of EA applications. 
iii. Technical process comments and observations of EA applications. 
iv. Comments made by the administrative officer regarding delays. 
v. Informational deficiencies related to test reports. 
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vi. Costs and comments relating to the cost of the EA process made by the 
applicant. 
vii. Complaints or other comments made either by the applicant or ICASA staff. 
 
ICASA annual reports were studied for statistics on illegal equipment and the 
numbers of equipment authorisations in the years 2006-2016. These 
documents were also reviewed to gain an insight into the overall regulatory 
approach that ICASA had adopted to regulation in general. Relevant Acts, 
policy documents, relevant speeches and regulations applicable to EA were 
analysed to gauge the high-level intention of the current policy and regulatory 
framework. Relevant policy documents regarding the digital economy were 
analysed, again with the intention to understand the high-level policy 
direction. The complete list of documents analysed can be found in Appendix 
C. 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) list document analysis as a useful source for theory 
formulation and state that it provides “…a fantastic range of comparison 
groups, if only the researcher has the ingenuity to discover them” (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967:179). The documents analysed were coded to determine initial 
codes and categories. These codes and categories were then used to form the 
basis of preliminary discussion during the interview stage of data collection.  
 
b) Data gathering on unique characteristics of developing countries 
The second set of data that is required was information on the unique 
characteristics of developing countries, in the context of EA regulation. This 
was gathered via in-person interviews. 
 
c) In-person interviews 
The researcher formed the primary instrument in data collection, using a semi-
structured in-person interview protocol, whose output data was descriptive in 
nature. The main purpose of using a semi-structured design was to facilitate a 
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digression from formulaic questions, allowing the researcher to explore 
further concepts that may unexpectedly arise. These concepts may have not 
necessarily been covered in the interview questions and may be essential to 
the research at hand. Glaser (1998) cautions against preconceived interview 
guides and suggests using open-ended questions that prevent responses from 
interviewees being forced into narrow categories. The interview questions 
were thus open-ended, ensuring that only rich, substantial data was gathered. 
Charmaz (2006) describes this data gathering mechanism as “intensive 
interviewing” and states that it provides “…an open-ended, in-depth 
exploration of an aspect of life about which the interviewee has substantial 
experience, often combined with considerable insight” (Charmaz, 2006:29). 
Hofstee (2006) has similar views when he describes the interview method as 
appropriate for eliciting information from people who are presumed to have 
the information that is required for the study. The informants interviewed (as 
detailed in Table 1) are those closely involved in the equipment authorisation 
process in South Africa and were thus the most appropriate people to provide 
the required information on the EC EA process. 
 
The interviews were used to focus on the interviewees’ perceptions, 
challenges and experiences in a developing country.  These interviews were 
written up into interview transcripts, from which the coding process using 
grounded theory was implemented. 
 
A Skype interview was only used in one instance, where the respondent was 
not available for an in-person interview. All other interviews were face-to-face. 
 
A pilot of the in-person interviews using five respondents was considered but 
was not implemented. The rationale for such a pilot was to correct problems 
with the interview guide.  It is important to note that, given the use of the 
grounded theory method, a pilot is not essential. Grounded theory calls for 
simultaneous data collection and data analysis (Glaser, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). 
This implies that problems with the interview guide can be picked up after the 
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first interview. The pilot adopted in the research can thus be considered as 
initial interviews, where the interview guide was reassessed and edited to 
counter problems experienced after the first few interviews. The first interview 
revealed that the interview guide was too long (resulting in an almost four-
hour long interview) and it was subsequently amended by limiting the number 
of questions. The second interview revealed possible duplications in the 
questions, depending on whether the guide was followed throughout the 
interview. In this instance, however, the interview guide was not amended, 
although the researcher was mindful of the informant’s responses and did not 
ask certain questions if the informant had already volunteered the required 
information. 
 
3.3.2 The population sample selected for in-person interviews 
Creswell (2003:185) found that “purposefully selected sites or individuals” would be 
able to help the researcher understand the problem and research question. For this 
reason, the interviewed sample did not necessarily represent the general public as a 
whole and thus presented a skewed sample of the population. This is acceptable as a 
particular sample of the population was purposely targeted, as they were best able to 
contribute to understanding the research questions at hand, being stakeholders in the 
equipment authorisation process in South Africa. Babbie (1994:185) describes this 
sample as “Selecting Informants”. Informants are people who are well versed in the 
social phenomenon that one wishes to study and are also willing to inform the 
researcher of the knowledge that they possess (Babbie, 1994:185). The significant 
differentiation between informants and other respondents is that informants can talk 
directly about the industry that they work within.  All informants selected were 18 
years or older, and their identities were kept confidential, to ensure that they were 
able to contribute to this research without fear of reprisals freely, should their opinion 
not necessarily reflect an “official” position of the organisation that they may 
represent. To further ensure confidentiality, all references to their names have been 
coded randomly to enhance their anonymity. During the research period, these codes 
were linked to the informant’s name and initials to assist the researcher in easily 
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identifying and assigning quotations and data from the informant. After the data 
chapters were complete, these codes were anonymised using the find and replace 
function of Microsoft Word. 
 
Charmaz (2006) provides a useful guide containing questions that the researcher 
should ask when selecting the informants. The idea is to gather rich data, which is data 
that is not superficial and can provide depth and range to the research. The following 
questions are suggested by Charmaz (2006:19): 
i. Have I collected enough background data about persons, processes, 
and settings to have ready recall and to understand and portray the full 
range of contexts of the study? 
This was achieved by first conducting the document analysis. The 
document analysis assisted greatly in defining the initial range of 
interviewees. Each interview opened up new areas of interest and 
sometimes directed the researcher to consider other sources of data. 
These were both documents and other people within the EA 
environment that were not taken into account when the initial range 
of informants was identified. 
 
ii. Have I gained detailed descriptions of a range of participants' views and 
actions? 
The concern raised in this question was addressed by the use of an 
open-ended interview protocol. As much as Glaser (1998) cautions 
against the use of interview guides to prevent forcing responses into 
preconceived categories, the interview protocol was used to guide the 
particular direction of the research. The research question and the 
three sub-questions were used as broad categories to guide the 
interview direction. This approach was adopted to guard against the 
danger of gathering data in a particular area of interest to the 
detriment of other areas. The interview guide ensured that the open-
ended question approach adopted, allowed for detailed descriptions 
from participants. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in 
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depth to ensure that the participant’s views and actions were captured 
in detail. 
 
iii. Do the data reveal what lies beneath the surface? 
This was possibly one of the more challenging questions to answer. The 
data gathered was based at a practical level, given the interviewee's 
predisposition on providing examples and responses based on their day 
to day interaction with the EA environment. The aim of this study as 
discussed previously was to create an innovative theoretical 
framework, based on the practical considerations of the EA 
environment. Only through repeated analysis and comparison, could 
the required level of abstraction be achieved. The value of the data 
collected could therefore not easily be immediately assessed as being 
representative of the underlying issues. To mitigate this concern and to 
ensure that the line of questioning delved deeply beneath the surface 
of superficial responses, the researcher had to ensure that key points 
and issues were further investigated. Responses that are described as 
“flags” in this research were followed up to make sure that a deeper 
understanding of that particular “flag” was achieved.  
 
iv. Are the data sufficient to reveal changes over time? 
The initial research, before the formal research was conducted, was 
able to provide several trends in EA approval over time. Further 
document analysis assisted in providing a greater level of clarity, by 
illuminating the key issues that underlie these patterns.  These key 
issues reflect changes over a period of more than a decade. The 
subsequent interviews, as well as the interview guide, were then 
guided by the initial research and ensured that the data was sufficiently 
representative of an extended period. 
 
v. Have I gained multiple views of the participants' range of actions? 
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The significant process in this study is the EA regime in South Africa. 
This process involved several participants engaged in a multitude of 
actions. The process was investigated in multiple dimensions, as 
viewed by each participant. For example, the application procedure for 
EA is a process that involved network operators, the regulator, 
equipment suppliers and test laboratories. This particular action was 
studied through multiple views from different informants. Adding a 
further dimension to this process was that each category of informants 
consisted of, at times, several participants who each provided a 
different viewpoint to that particular action. The regulator, for 
example, consisted of several people who were involved in a particular 
action of the EA application procedure, providing viewpoints from an 
administrative to a technical point of view. 
 
vi. Have I gathered data that enable me to develop analytic categories? 
The depth and degree of questioning are the only factors that can 
positively affect the outcome of generating analytical categories from 
the data gathered. To ensure that the type of questioning elicited rich 
data, the guide suggested by Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) was 
adopted. This guide is discussed further in the next section, although of 
importance is the focus on asking “Who, What and Why” questions to 
elicit detailed responses. 
 
vii. What kinds of comparisons can I make between data? How do these 
comparisons generate and inform my ideas? 
The memos generated after the interviews were critical. These memos 
contained the relevant codes that were observed from the data 
gathered and assisted in conceptualising categories. Both the memos 
and the codes therein were used to make comparisons with other 
memos generated at different stages of the data gathering process. 
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The following informants in Table 1 were identified as the most appropriate to gather the rich 
data required for the study.  
 
Table 1: List of informants 
 
 
 
No. List of Informants 
1 Manager: Type Approval (ICASA) 
2 Senior Licensing Officer (ICASA) 
3 RF Specialist (ICASA) 
4 RF Specialist (ICASA) 
5 RF Specialist (ICASA) 
6 Engineering Executive (ICASA) 
7 Regulatory Affairs (Operator 1) 
8 Regulatory Affairs (Operator 2) 
9 Regulatory Affairs (Operator 3) 
10 Regulatory Affairs (Operator 4) 
11 Regulatory Affairs (Operator 5) 
12 Equipment Supplier 1 
13 Equipment Supplier 2 
14 Equipment Supplier 3 
15 Equipment Supplier 4 
16 Equipment Supplier 5 
17 Equipment Supplier 6 
18 Equipment Supplier 7 
19 Standards Specialist 1 (SABS) 
20 Test Laboratory Representative 1 
(SABS) 
21 Test Laboratory Representative 2 
22 Industry Forum Representative 1 
23 SM Licensing ICASA 
24 GM Licensing ICASA 
25 Policy Maker (Government) 1 
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3.3.3 The types of data gathered from the in-person interviews 
The types of data collected from the in-person interviews were based on a guide 
adapted from Charmaz and Mitchell (2001). It should be noted that this guide was 
suggested for an ethnographic study by Charmaz and Mitchell (2001), but the basic 
principle behind these guidelines are valid for any qualitative. These guidelines were 
adopted in creating the interview guide and helped generate the different types of 
open-ended questions: 
 
i.  What is the setting of the action? When and how does the action take place?  
The interview guide set about by first grounding the action in the EA environment, 
including a description of EA in South Africa within a specified period from 2006 - 
2016.  The key processes in the EA environment were also identified and the 
mechanisms defined. The process was described by different actors involved in the 
same activity, assisting in ensuring multiple viewpoints. 
 
ii. What is going on? What is the overall activity that is being studied, the relatively 
long-term behaviour about which the participants organise themselves? What acts 
specifically compromise this activity?  
Generating questions to elicit the above, was not a straightforward process. The 
“what” refers to the deeper social and physiological processes that are occurring 
within the environment of study. Glaser and Strauss (1967) call for the basic social 
process to be defined in the field, and rate this definition as fundamental to the 
grounded theory method. More contemporary approaches to grounded theory 
suggest that this approach may lead to “forcing the data”, and this method was 
abandoned (Charmaz, 2006: 20). The interview guide, therefore, did not seek to 
define the social process implicitly. The act of regulation itself was explored 
further, in terms of the overall intention of the regulation -i.e. either a public 
interest approach or an economic approach. This assisted in framing the research 
regarding the extant theory but was not used as a basis to force a particular 
category into the data gathered.  
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iii. What is the distribution over space and time of participants over this locale?  
The interview guide grounded the focus of data collection to a fixed period and 
category. Although this research was intended to apply to developing countries in 
general, the data gathered was limited to the South African environment. It 
became apparent during the interviews that participants saw South Africa as a 
unique market, bordering between a developed and developing country 
concerning the EA environment. The aim was to develop a substantive EA theory 
in the South African environment. The research was grounded in South Africa 
based on the empirical data collected. An increased distribution of participants 
may have assisted in providing a general theory, but is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
 
iv. How are members stratified and how is membership achieved and organised?  
This interview guide determined the organisation of the EA market in terms of 
suppliers, operators and the regulator. This approach clarified the key players and 
their expectations regarding EA regulation. The stratification process was also 
necessary as there were further organisational tiers within an identified area. As 
an example, the equipment supplier market was further broken down into the 
original equipment manufacturers and suppliers of equipment. This nuanced 
distinction was important to define, as the expectation of each group in relation 
to a regulatory approach varied. 
 
v. What do actors pay attention to? What is important, preoccupying, and critical?  
The interview guide focused in detail on the limitations of the current theoretical 
EA approach, by considering what the actors considered as critical to the success 
of a new approach, given the environment being observed. Some of the key codes 
developed early in this study were achieved by investigating the factors considered 
critical by actors. Constant comparison with data from different interviews was 
essential in creating the code-families and attaining a sufficient level of abstraction 
when defining the key categories. Processes deemed critical by informants 
provided a perspective from their particular viewpoint, hence the key categories 
developed through multiple points of view yielded rich data. The downside of the 
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process was an increased area of focus. For example, after the initial interviews 
with the essential personnel dealing with the EA process at the regulator, other 
interesting areas of focus developed. This led to more questions being posed at 
the next set of interviews, without a decrease in the initial round of questions. As 
such, the length of each interview began increasing. The rich data that was 
gathered, however, outweighed the voluminous amount of additional material 
that needed to be processed. 
 
vi. What do the actors pointedly ignore that other persons might pay attention to?  
The guide focused on areas that actors ignore in the current theoretical approach, 
which may have importance to the broader EA environment. What some actors 
ignored sometimes proved more valuable than what was discussed. Once again, 
the perspective of the particular actor determined what they ignored. A good 
example was the concept of public interest, which was ignored by manufacturers 
and suppliers alike but was considered critical to the regulator as well as the 
policymaker. 
 
vii. What symbols do actors invoke to understand their worlds, the participants and 
processes within them, and the objects and events they encounter? What names 
do they attach to objects, events, persons, roles, settings and equipment?  
The guide looked at the common definitions in the EA process, to determine a 
commonly understood baseline for the epistemology of the EA environment. This 
assisted in the development of the initial coding by asking the informant to 
describe how they viewed specific processes. This added a level of complexity, as 
the process outlined by a particular actor using a particular symbol was in many 
instances explained differently by another informant. The constant comparison 
process assisted here, by comparing the codes and the implied definition, thereby 
allowing a generic category to be developed that best described that particular 
process. 
 
viii. What practices, skills, stratagems, and methods of operation do actors employ?  
The guide looked to determine the method of operation employed by all actors in 
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their day-to-day functions, given the current regulatory approach. Such activities 
were also defined by documents studied during the document analysis phase. 
These practical mechanisms were necessary for defining the unique characteristics 
of the environment under study, as the method of operation adopted by the actors 
were delimited by the considerations in South Africa. As an example, it was 
apparent that OEM suppliers had easy access to international test reports required 
for EA approval, while some local suppliers did not have access to these reports.  
The strategy adopted by the local suppliers was thus to apply for a simplified EA 
process, which did not require evidentiary reports. 
 
ix. What theories, motives, excuses, justifications or other explanations do actors use 
is accounting for their participation? How do they explain to each other, not to 
outside investigators, what do they do and how do they do it?  
The guide looked to determining the macro environment that exists for actors 
participating in the EA process. The question posed specifically looked to establish 
the motivation for actors to justify their participation, from an internal point of 
view. The idea was to identify an internal perspective, not just a company’s 
“official line”. This was difficult to assess when dealing with the suppliers and 
network operators, as their motivations were driven by their organisational 
perspective. The valuable data revolved around identifying an internal 
perspective, by probing informant’s responses to strip away responses based 
solely on corporate culture. The stratification of the environment played a major 
role here, as it assisted in defining the motivating factors at different levels. The 
regulator and policy maker’s motivations were simpler to gauge as they are based 
on published legislation.  
 
 
x. What goals do actors seek? When, from their perspective, is an act well or poorly 
done? How do they judge action-by what standards, developed and applied by 
whom?  
This guide looked at the expectations of the actors in developing an innovative 
theoretical approach. Their expectations regarding what would be considered an 
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easier approach was framed against the way they would assess that approach. The 
success criteria defined by actors in terms of what they would consider an 
innovative approach to EA regulation, varied by the motivation of each actor as 
described earlier. This question also looked at the limitations of the current 
approach and was also used to probe alternative approaches that the actors would 
consider innovative and successful.  
 
xi. What rewards do various actors gain from their participation?  
The final area of inquiry looked at the reward derived by the actors in investing 
the EA process, both under the current theoretical approach and a new innovative 
approach.  The rewards varied according to the motivation factors of the actor. 
The perceived rewards also provided insight into the intention of the various 
actors and provided an ideal mechanism to frame the different categories of actors 
against the existing theoretical framework, defined as part of the literature 
reviewed.    
 
The type of data and the questions asked in this section formed the basis of the 
data chapters four to six. Broad themes derived either from the interview guide or 
themes emergent from the gathered data formed the sub-sections of the data 
chapters. The data chapters followed the research questions, and each chapter 
corresponded to the research sub-question.  While the data collection involved 
distinct data gathering and data analysis phases, the next section of data analysis 
was conducted, in many instances, parallel to the data collection phase. This is a 
grounded theory trait, where simultaneous data collection and data analysis is 
required to develop the key categories of the research.   
 
3.3.4 Data gathering for generating a substantive theory 
The set of data for theory building, which accounts for the data gathered in terms of 
the unique characteristics of a developing country in creating a practical, innovative 
theoretical approach to EA regulation, encompassed all the data collected from both 
the interviews and the document research. The Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) adapted 
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structure would again be used to gather data concurrently with the data collection 
detailed in the last section. The difference here was a focus on theory building. While 
chapters four to six reported on the collected data categorised into broad themes, 
chapter seven leveraged the same data and focused solely on theory building.  
 
The use of grounded theory in this study was adopted as the general theories of public 
interest and the economic theory of regulation only broadly form the theoretical basis 
for EA regulation. The narrow focus of this thesis in developing an innovative approach 
to EA regulation, in the context of a developing country, required seeing beyond the 
existing theory discussed in the literature that was surveyed. The approach adopted 
in this thesis was to start with the platform of the extant theories that apply to this 
study and explore practical approaches to regulation that are generated as a product 
of a qualitative study. These practical approaches formed the first broad themes for 
theory generation. 
 
3.4 Data analysis  
The interviews and document analysis form the starting point of the data gathering. The next 
step was the data analysis. The data analysis describes how the raw data is transformed into 
a meaningful representation that can be interpreted. Mouton (1996) defines analysis as “the 
resolution of a complex whole into its parts” (Mouton, 1996:161). This section, therefore, 
details how the vast amount of data that was collected from the in-person interviews and 
document analysis, was interpreted. Glaser (2009:1) lists four techniques of classical 
grounded theory that was used in this study. These are coding (open and theoretical), 
constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation (Glaser, 
2009:1).The difference between grounded theory and other methodologies is that grounded 
theory calls for simultaneous data collection and data analysis (Glaser, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). 
The data collected was thus analysed after each interview, to create areas of focus for further 
interviews. 
 
The research design of using in-person interviews is subject to bias. Hofstee (2006) pointed 
out that in-person interviews and questionnaires are both excellent methods to elicit data for 
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research, but these methods are difficult to analyse and prone to bias. To address this point, 
a systematic and rigorous data analysis procedure was adopted. 
 
Qualitative data has often been criticised for having data analysis that was not explicit or open 
to inspection (Neuman, 2006:457). To remain clear of this pitfall, this study used a three-step 
systematic approach to data coding suggested by Neuman (2006). This method would involve 
contrasting, comparing, replicating, cataloguing and classifying the object of the study 
(Creswell, 2003:198). Charmaz (2006:43) similarly defines coding as “…categorizing segments 
of data with a short name that simultaneously summarises and accounts for each piece of 
data”. To facilitate this process, the data from the study were classified into general themes, 
ideas and concepts using open coding, axial coding and selective coding. This allows the 
researcher to easily retrieve materials that were essential to the study (Babbie, 1994). The 
key objective of data analysis was to move from viewing the data as concrete elements to 
making analytical interpretations of that data, in order to generate a level of abstraction that 
allows the emergence of a nascent theory that explains the data. 
 
3.4.1 The use of the ATLAS.Ti software to analyse data 
As a consequence of the volume of data gathered during this research journey, the 
researcher decided to use a computer program to assist with the data gathering and 
data analysis. The high cost of proprietary software initially led the researcher to 
investigate the use of an open-source freeware program.  A popular freeware program 
was tested with the results of the first interview. The researcher felt that the program 
was not intuitive enough and did not provide the range of functions that were 
required to sort and categorise large volumes of data. Given the importance of 
applying the grounded theory method in analysing data in this study, the researcher 
decided to invest in a commercial software program that had a proven record in 
grounded theory studies. 
 
 The ATLAS.Ti program is a commercial program that seemed to be popular among 
qualitative data analysis researchers. An impressive feature of the software was its 
ability to analyse qualitative data, without the time-consuming (and sometimes costly) 
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requirement of first transcribing interview data into text format. ATLAS.Ti bypasses 
this step by allowing the researcher to classify audio and video data directly. It also 
supports textual analysis directly on-screen.  The author attempted using this function 
of the software during the coding of the first interview, and although this was 
successfully achieved, the process was cumbersome and did not associate the code 
with a quote in text format. Notable quotations from this interview had to be manually 
attached to the corresponding code, making the coding process more complex than it 
would have been had the coding been done from an interview transcript.  
 
For subsequent interviews, a free online text to speech transcription software called 
VoiceNote II was used. This process assisted in accelerating the transcription of the 
audio interviews, but it still required extensive editing and correction. VoiceNote II did 
not allow for the audio file to be loaded into the software before being transcribed 
into text. This meant that the sound recording had to be played into a microphone for 
the VoiceNote II program to conduct the transcription. Unfortunately, the quality of 
the recording (due to excessive background noise) led to a poor transcription of the 
interview. The solution that worked best was to listen to the recording via 
headphones, pause the recording, and then dictate the text into a microphone for the 
program to transcribe. The process of transcribing the entire interview was, to some 
extent, a duplication of the interview notes. The interview notes and interview 
transcripts were then combined to ensure that the interview data was faithfully 
captured.  This method proved to be the most successful and was used for the majority 
of the interviews.  
 
The most important feature of Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) software is the ability 
to manage codes, given the time-consuming and often inaccurate nature of capturing 
data. QDA programmers claim that only a computer can guarantee completeness and 
accuracy of the codes derived from the data (Huber & Gürtler, 2013). It would have 
been challenging for the researcher to manage a large number of codes and associated 
data, without a QDA program. 
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The second functionality of the QDA program that appealed to the research was the 
ability to create memos that relate to a data set. These memos are then tagged with 
the associated data segment and can be easily retrieved at a later stage. As discussed 
earlier, memo writing is a critical aspect of the grounded theory method of qualitative 
data analysis and the ability of the ATLAS.Ti program to assimilate these memos with 
the associated data was very useful. 
 
Glaser (2003) does not support the use of computer-aided qualitative data analysis 
software as he is of the opinion that such software is helpful in describing the key 
categories, and does not assist in conceptualisation. While Glaser’s (2003) comments 
are valid, it has to be balanced against the obvious value of software programs in 
classifying and storing large volumes of data. The ATLAS.Ti software used in this 
research was primarily used as a tool to manage the initial coding taken directly from 
the interview recordings. The subsequent processes of constant comparison, 
theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation was largely a manual process.  
 
 
3.4.2 The approach to formulating an emergent theory for EA in developing 
countries 
The data analysis was coded into theory using the flowchart developed by Charmaz 
(2006) in Figure Eight. 
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Figure 8: The Grounded theory process (Adapted from Charmaz, 2006) 
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3.4.2.1 Coding 
The process in Figure Eight describes the general two-step process that is used by grounded 
theory. The first step is the involves naming each line or segment of data while the second 
phase involves a more focused selective phase that uses the most frequent initial codes to 
integrate and organise large amounts of data collected (Charmaz, 2006:46). The memos 
referred to in Figure Eight are extended notes from the data gathering process (i.e. the 
interviews). 
 
Coding assists the researcher in sorting out the data and assigning a name to a particular 
category of data. This name is then used to compare that particular data set with other sets 
of data. The coding is done directly after the interview and before the next interview can take 
place. In this way, the coding can provide insights into areas of exploration in subsequent 
interviews. Coding also assists with understanding the current situation based on the data 
obtained. Charmaz (2006:3) describes is as understanding “…what is happening on the scene 
when they code the data”.  There are three types of coding mechanisms that were adopted. 
These are open coding, axial coding and selective coding.  These steps may look very much 
like a standard qualitative analysis process, which in essence it is. Grounded theory can easily 
be used to complement other approaches to qualitative data analysis (Charmaz, 2006), and 
the approach to coding in qualitative data analysis is adapted from Neuman (2006). 
 
The following steps were followed to analyse the interview data: 
 
(i) Open or initial coding 
Neuman (2006:461) defines open coding as “A first coding of qualitative data in which a 
researcher examines the data to condense them into preliminary analytic categories or 
codes.” This mechanism was adopted to analyse the interview data. Charmaz (2006) 
describes the process of open coding as initial coding, in which codes are developed to fit 
the data recorded 
a) The recorded interviews were first recorded in electronic format (i.e. recorded as an 
mp3 digital audio file). 
97 
 
 
 
b) Interview notes were also captured during the interviews that followed the questions 
of the interview guide. 
c) The audio file was comprehensively analysed to identify themes, keywords, central 
processes and key events that were present in the response. This data was captured 
as a text document added to the interview notes.  
d) Initial codes were then assigned to condense the data into specific categories. The first 
interview’s audio file was coded directly and found to be unwieldy to work with, as 
quotations from the informants could not be extracted. Subsequent coding was 
conducted using the interview note text file. All coding and data management was 
achieved using the Atlas Ti program. Figure Nine is an example of this process. 
 
 
Figure 9: A screenshot showing the data-coding process 
 
 
 
 
 
The mechanism used here was to appropriately name each code and highlight them 
using the qualitative data analysis program. This program allowed excerpts of the 
interview to be highlighted in the interview audio file and assigned a particular code. 
It also ensures that the quotation is linked to a particular code, “grounding” the code 
as supporting evidence. Refer to Figure 10 for an example of the quotations linked to 
the code “Trust” used in the study. 
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Figure 10: Quotations linked to the code "Trust." 
 
 
 
e) Additional codes were added at any time, with the ability to change initial codes 
should subsequent analysis support the change. Charmaz (2006) suggests line by line 
coding, but this proved to be impractical, and it was the author’s view that coding by 
concept provided an excellent reflection of the data. 
f) Codes were also linked to the memos (described in the next section) to build up the 
evidence to support the narrative of the memo. Figure 11 shows the same code “trust” 
discussed earlier, with the additional linkages to the memos relating to “trust”. 
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Figure 11: The code "Trust" with the related memos and quotations 
 
 
 
g) This process resulted in a significant number of codes, as each interview or document 
was analysed from the beginning to the end and segments of data coded 
appropriately. The initial interviews and document analysis resulted in a large number 
of unique codes that needed to be entered manually into Atlas Ti. As the code list 
grew, previously used codes could be selected from a drop-down list, that kept track 
of all the codes captured by the author for the project. This allowed for different data 
segments and quotations to be linked with a particular code, grounding this code in 
the data gathered. This process was time-consuming in the initial interviews but 
became easier as the list of codes became saturated, and fewer unique new codes 
were added. Figure 12 shows an example of the drop-down menu of Atlas.Ti. The 
complete list of codes can be found in Appendix F. 
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Figure 12: Coding drop-down menu of Atlas Ti 
 
 
The author found that open coding assisted as an intermediate step to selective coding 
and helped in creating the broad categories and themes before the more abstract 
selective coding process was implemented. Open coding worked well with the grounded 
theory method as it assisted in the constant comparison process of linking themes from a 
particular set of data to themes found elsewhere during the data collection strategy. 
 
 
(ii) Axial coding 
The second step of data analysis involved axial coding. Neuman (2006:462) defines axial 
coding as “A second stage of coding of qualitative data in which a researcher organises the 
codes, links them, and discovers key analytic categories”. The following steps were followed 
to analyse the interview data further to develop code families, which are the key analytical 
categories (These steps are adapted from Neuman, 2006:461): 
a) All themes, keywords, central processes and key events that were identified 
in the initial open coding was listed. 
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b) The initial codes were then reviewed and examined, focusing on the 
identification of code families. 
c) Code families were developed by interrogating the data for causes, 
consequences, conditions, interactions, strategies and processes. This is the 
most important process in this stage as it stimulates thinking about linkages 
between concepts and themes. 
d) Code families developed here were strengthened by citing multiple instances 
of empirical evidence. 
 
(iii) Selective coding 
The final step in this process is selective coding. Neuman (2006:464) defines selective coding 
as “A last stage in coding qualitative data in which a researcher examines previous codes to 
identify and select data that will support the conceptual coding categories that were 
developed”. Selective coding is not dissimilar to focused coding as the aim is to develop a 
higher level of abstraction from the data source. Charmaz (2006) refers to selective coding as 
focused coding. These focused codes are raised to conceptual categories, called key 
categories, through the process of memo writing, which is discussed later in greater detail. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967:37) define the term “category” as a conceptual element in theory.  
 
The code families and codes that were identified from the data in steps one and two are 
scanned. The objective was to selectively identify cases that illustrate key categories. 
Comparisons and contrasts were then be made, generalising around several categories. 
 
The coding process shown in steps (i) – (iii),  ensured a data analysis process that was rigorous, 
well-defined and open to inspection. 
 
3.4.2.2 Constant comparison 
The next technique of data analysis (after coding) of grounded theory would involve 
constant comparison (Glaser, 2009:1). The constant comparison technique involves 
finding differences and similarities in the data to establish analytical distinctions (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). In the study, this was achieved by analysing the data from interviews in 
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a particular category (i.e. equipment manufacturers) and then revisiting that data before 
conducting another interview in that category.  
 
Memos are required for constant comparison and are the primary analytical notes that 
were written about the codes and comparisons developed in the previous stage. The 
author developed memos to reflect on key analytical categories that emerged from the 
data. Charmaz (2006:72) describes memos as: 
…the pivotal intermediate step between data collection and writing drafts of paper. 
Memo writing constitutes a crucial method in grounded theory because it prompts you to 
analyse your data and codes early in the research process.  
Memos were used in the research to highlight specific categories of data to facilitate the 
process of abstraction. This enhances and forms a better analytical understanding of the 
data. Nineteen memos (see Figure 13) were written after the initial data from all 
interviews and document research was captured. Constant comparison with other memos 
and were made, and it is at this stage that tentative analytical categories were formed. 
Using the Atlas Ti tool, the codes that supported the memo, as well as the associated 
quotations from the data, were linked to the memo.  
 
Figure 13: List of initial memos 
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Not all memos that were written for the research were presented formally. Charmaz (2006) 
describes memo writing as a personal exercise that allows one to free write ideas and 
categories. Memos are not necessarily the first and only construction of the categories 
gleaned from the data. It was an iterative process and sometimes took several revisits before 
tentative ideas coalesced into firm categories. These initial memos were only used to capture 
the initial thoughts and direction of the data and were for the researcher’s personal use only. 
As such, these initial memos were not necessarily written using a high standard of academic 
prose. It was a rather simple and immediate take on the data at hand. This allowed the 
researcher to freely explore ideas (including conjecture) around the emerging categories, 
without being overly concerned with refining the raw data. Further advanced memos were 
then developed by interrogating these initial memos by (These steps are adapted from 
Charmaz, 2006:82): 
i) Defining each code or category by its analytical properties  
ii) Spelling out and detailing processed subsumed by the codes or categories 
iii) Making comparisons between data and data, data and codes, codes and codes, codes and 
categories, categories and categories. 
iv) Bringing raw data into the memo. 
v) Providing sufficient empirical evidence to support definitions of the category and analytic 
claims about it. 
vi) Offering conjecture to check in the field settings(s). 
vii) Identifying gaps in the analysis. 
viii) Interrogating a code or category by asking questions of it. 
 
Successive levels of analysis enabled these categories to coalesce and become more 
theoretical as levels of abstraction are built directly from the data. The work “…culminates in 
a grounded theory, or an abstract theoretical understanding of the studied experience” 
(Charmaz, 2006:4).  
 
The final grounded theory technique used was theoretical sampling and saturation. 
“Theoretical sampling means seeking pertinent data to develop your emerging theory” 
(Charmaz, 2006:96).  
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Theoretical sampling was used to develop an emergent theory from the data,  code-families 
and key categories gathered through the research process. It involved strategically and 
systematically analysing and refining the key categories developed during the study, but it 
also assisted in defining the direction required to collect further data to saturate the 
categories that were developed. This entailed re-coding certain interviews to gather data to 
support the nascent theoretical categories that were developed. This back and forth process 
kept the researcher from becoming stuck in unfocused analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and 
was instrumental in taking the research process forward.  
 
The theoretical sampling process also again interrogated data collected from the document 
analysis to refine and support key categories in the emerging theory until no new categories 
emerged. This is known as saturating the theory in grounded theory. Glaser’s (2009) 
perspective on theoretical saturation highlights the pitfalls of a simplistic reading of this 
process when he states that theoretical sampling is not just seeing the same pattern repeating 
itself, but rather conceptualising the comparisons of incidents which yield new properties 
until no new properties emerge.   
 
At the end of the theoretical sampling and saturation process, a substantive theory on EA 
regulation in a developing country emerged. 
 
3.5 Developments in grounded theory 
A brief discussion earlier in this research alluded to the fact that grounded theory has 
consistently been developing. This development has resulted in somewhat different 
approaches to the application of grounded theory from both Glaser and Strauss (1967), who 
co-authored the seminal work in this field – the 1967 book,   The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory.  
 
Glaser is considered to have remained closer to the original text when describing his method 
of data analysis, and defined grounded theory as “…a method of discovery, treated categories 
as emergent from the data, relied on direct and, often, narrow empiricism, and analysed a 
basic social process” (Charmaz, 2006:8).  
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Strauss, however, had reformulated his original version to explicitly explain the data analysis 
process, with more emphasis on verification of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Glaser 
(1992) completely rejects this notion, claiming that this approach contradicts the 
fundamental foundation of grounded theory.  
 
The research is built upon the Straussian approach to grounded theory, as it is contemporary 
and assists in generating a substantive theory relevant to the environment of study. The 
author has found that the guidelines suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998) were helpful, 
rather than being formulaic and restrictive.  
 
3.6 Validity and reliability 
The validity of a study describes “a measure that accurately reflects the concept it is intended 
to measure” (Babbie, 1994:143). Given the ontology was investigated through multiple 
realities from the perspective and experiences of the many respondents, the findings of this 
study would be valid. Further, two sets of data were used (document research and interviews) 
to further accurately represent the EA environment. 
 
Neuman (2006) refers to measurement validity as how truthful or authentic the social reality 
is as described by the interviewee. To provide a valid account of social life as portrayed by the 
interviewee, the researcher must capture the account of the interview that is reflective of the 
people being studied. This is achieved in this study by recording the interviews, taking down 
notes and transcribing the interviews, before the data is analysed. 
 
The reliability of a study would suggest “…that the same data would be collected each time 
in repeated observations of the same phenomena” (Babbie, 1994:141). As the grounded 
theory method was used, the findings of the study are empirically grounded, and thus 
repeatable. Grounded theory also follows a rigorous and well-defined research process, 
which also aids in repeatability. 
 
The reliability and validity of the data are key points when measuring and analysing data 
during the research process. Neuman (2006:188) argued that both reliability and validity 
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“…are salient because constructs are often ambiguous, diffuse and not directly observable”. 
Representative reliability is an important measure, and the measurement reliability across 
different social groups of interviewees involved should yield consistent results (Neuman, 
2006:189). The social groups were represented by the regulator, equipment manufacturers, 
standards bodies and communications network operators. The response from all groups was 
recorded accurately and consistently, allowing the study representative reliability. Babbie 
(1994:141) concurs with Neuman’s (2006) definition of reliability, and goes further to add that 
the quality of the measurement method is the important aspect that would allow for the same 
data to be collected each time, in repeated observations of the same phenomenon.  
 
Mouton (1996) makes an interesting argument when he states that the affiliation of the 
researcher affects the responses received. He argues that an influential organisation would 
motivate respondents to answer questions more seriously and truthfully. He further states 
that respondents to an unknown organisation would react more negatively to the interview 
situation. This was advantageous in the study, as the researcher is a staff member of the 
regulatory authority in South Africa, which is a well-known organisation in the country. 
 
Babbie’s (1994) comments on reliability imply that the measurement method should be 
carefully considered. Neuman (2006:190) however, cites other ways in which to improve the 
reliability of the data. These methods do not dispute the approach suggest by Babbie (1994), 
but rather they complement it. Neuman’s (2006:190) suggestions to improve the reliability of 
the data are: 
i. Clearly conceptualise the constructs: This has been discussed as part of the 
measurement and analysis. The key concepts stem from the well-
documented grounded theory method. 
ii. Use a precise level of measurement: Given the constant comparison 
technique adopted by this research as part of the grounded theory 
methodology, the measurement of code-families are constantly compared 
to other code-families from different memos. This assists in maintaining a 
level of consistency in the measurement. 
iii. Use multiple indicators: This study uses both interview and document 
research. These different indicators provide a level of reliability of the data. 
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Further, a varied range of stakeholders formed part of the interview data, 
thus reflecting multiple indicators. 
 
3.7 Limitations 
Hofstee (2006:116) notes that it is vital to list the most significant limitations that would affect 
either the reliability of the research findings. As much as the research investigates an 
innovative theoretical framework to EA in developing countries, the focus of the study was 
limited to South Africa as a study site. All interviews were conducted with respondents that 
are within this sector. As this was a self-funded study, the financial considerations of 
extending this research to additional developing countries would have been prohibitive. The 
unique characteristics of a developing country that apply to EA in South Africa should apply 
to any developing country as a whole, however, the substantive theory developed from this 
study is based specifically on the South African environment. Further limitations are discussed 
in Chapter 8. 
 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
It is the duty of the researcher to have “…a moral and professional obligation to be ethical, 
even when research subjects are unaware of or unconscious about ethics” (Neuman, 
2006:129).  The main ethical concern in this study that was the identity of the respondents. 
Hofstee (2006:116) looks to the researcher to identify concerns and to put into place specific 
procedures to mitigate that concern. As the researcher is an employee of the regulator, and 
the subject matter concerns the theoretical framework of regulations promulgated by the 
regulator, respondents needed to be able to comment without fear of reprisal from the 
regulator. The specific procedure that was followed to achieve this was to ensure that all 
names cited in the study were changed to protect the identity of the respondents. The 
recordings of the interviews and the identities of the interviewees was stored in password 
encrypted files, available only to the researcher and his supervisor. Any references to the 
respondent were changed to a generic and non-traceable abbreviation.  
 
Another ethical consideration is the sensitivity of the information provided by the 
respondents. The interview questions solicited information about sensitive issues, such as the 
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costs incurred in the process of obtaining equipment authorisation in South Africa. This 
information may be confidential to the company, and should not be divulged to third parties. 
The specific procedures explained in dealing with confidentiality addressed this ethical 
concern. Anyone reading the research would not be able to trace the individual or company 
that provided the information. 
 
Another important ethical issue in social research is that of informed consent. Babbie 
(1994:64) defines informed consent as “A norm in which subject base their voluntary 
participation in research projects based on a full understanding of the possible risks involved”. 
The risk mitigation measures described above that was used to protect the identity of the 
respondents was explained to the respondents. They were also be made aware that they 
could withdraw from the interview at any time. These measures ensured that the researcher 
had the respondents informed consent at all times. 
 
 3.9 Structure of the interview guide 
The types of data required for this study discussed earlier was obtained using an interview 
guide, that set the general parameters of the questions to be asked was also created. While 
Glaser (1992) and Charmaz (2006) cautions against the use of a rigid interview protocol and 
questions when using the grounded theory method, they also recommend planning the types 
of questions that will be asked. Charmaz (2006) suggests the use of an interview guide with 
open-ended questions, especially for novice researchers, to cover a broad range of 
experiences while still being narrow enough to gather the specific data required for 
developing a theoretical framework.   
 
The interview guide that was adopted for the research stems from the research question and 
sub-questions of the study.  Each area was interrogated to gather as much data as possible 
from the interviewee, in addition to follow-up questions that evolved as a result of the 
responses received. The follow-up questions were mainly directed at the particular area of 
expertise of the informant being interviewed, usually about an interesting point or topic that 
was raised as part of the informant’s response.  There was thus no guide for these type of 
questions as they flowed from the narrative of the interview.  
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The initial interviews tended to follow the guide more rigidly than the subsequent interviews 
and these early interviews provided further areas of focus and interest to the research. 
Although the formal interview guide was valuable in proving suggestions on the type of data 
to be collected, the suggestions on other areas of research proved to be useful in facilitating 
rich data. 
 
The guide in Appendix A contains overlaps in the questions, which was included purposefully 
to focus on certain themes on earlier threads.  
 
This section aimed to develop a research methodology that is appropriate to the problem 
statement, the purpose of the research and the research questions. The method developed 
in this section was able to chart the way and ensure that these factors are addressed. A robust 
research design was used to mitigate against some of the concerns of qualitative research, 
ensuring the research data can be measured, analysed and interpreted. The grounded theory 
method suggested for this research also ensured that the research was grounded in the 
environment being studied, and ensured the validity of the completed research. 
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Chapter Four: An overview of the current theoretical approach  
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide data with respect to the first research sub-question of 
this study: 
 
 In which ways does the current theoretical approach to regulation pose challenges to 
the EA regulatory approach? 
 
The approach adopted in this chapter is to examine the current legal and regulatory 
framework through a document review while trying to ascertain the aim and objective of the 
framework above. This approach provides an excellent grounding by contrasting the 
published goals of the current EA framework with data gathered from experts in the EA field 
regarding the same. The first step sets the scene by identifying the key role players in the EA 
environment, followed by gaining an understanding of the objectives of the EA framework.  
Both positive and negative aspects of the current framework are researched to highlight the 
key challenges that the EA community face in relation to the current EA regulatory approach. 
Key issues such as competition, innovation, technology, quality, trade, consumer protection 
and standards are highlighted.  Certain subsections of this chapter, predominantly those with 
larger volumes of data, contain figures that graphically illustrate the relationship between key 
concepts and themes. Although key themes of developing country effects are raised during 
this chapter, they are noted and further discussed in chapter five of this research. 
 
 
4.2  Determining the key players in the EA environment 
Nearly all commentators were of the opinion that the key player in the EA environment was 
the regulator. OEMs, standards bodies and test laboratories were noted of secondary 
importance. OZ4P provided a useful description of the standards bodies, by tiering them into 
international, regional and local standards. The European Telecommunications Standards 
Associations (ETSI), CISPR and ITU were listed as the international standards bodies, 
Communications Regulators' Association of Southern Africa (CRASA) and the West Africa 
Telecommunication Regulators Assembly (WATRA) were listed as the regional standards 
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bodies and the SABS was listed as the local standards body. ICASA was noted to be involved 
with standardisation activities at every level with all agencies listed.  
 
RN2A however, felt that the manufacturers are the most important along with importers and 
service providers as well. Laboratories were also important although it was notable that RN2A 
did not list the regulator as a key stakeholder. TLS3T included other regulatory bodies in South 
Africa such as the Railway Safety Regulatory and the South African Maritime Safety 
Association (SAMSA) as other relevant stakeholders due to their reliance on standards 
developed for the EA process. 
 
Accreditation bodies, although mentioned by just three respondents, was also noted to be of 
importance. 
  
4.3 The focus of EA  
RM1K listed conformity with regulated standards as the key focus of EA, flowed by 
interoperability and efficient use of resources (such as the frequency spectrum) as other 
notable areas of focus of EA. While RN2A concurred that the focus of EA should be to comply 
with the required standards, he further added that EA should ensure that the product 
approved is of high quality. 
 
 Consumers were listed last as a focus area for the regulator. Harmful effects and the 
regulation of these effects was the next area, with special mention made to the health effects 
of RF radiation as regulated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) Guidelines. Safety 
(regarding consumer safety) was listed as “to some extent” the focus of EA. 
 
RN2A also noted that the means of determining EA approval should be compatible with 
ICASA’s mandate. As ICASA’s mandate is derived from the ECA, all EC equipment must be 
subjected to EA. The Act itself, however, does not specify how this should be done and the 
point was raised that ICASA needs to define the mechanism to prove compliance clearly. 
 
112 
 
 
 
An interesting observation made from the data gathered from the informants was the 
ordering of the priorities of EA for the regulator in comparison to the network operators and 
suppliers. The regulator seemed to list public interest perspectives such as the safety of EC 
equipment after listing performance and interference issues. Performance, interoperability 
and interference issues are key issues related to the EA process, but these can be related 
predominantly to economic considerations. It should be noted that the regulator did not 
exclude the public interest objectives from the EA process, but these objectives did not seem 
to be the priority of the regulator. 
 
A key focus of EA that was not being implemented by ICASA was the focus on Specific 
Absorption Rate (SAR). RQ7L noted that: 
 
Both safety and performance are important as RF equipment radiates energy. Although as SA, 
we have not focused on the specific absorption rate of the equipment. The health effects are 
paramount. Other markets have already focused on this. (RQ7L) 
 
SAR testing measures the impact of Radio Frequency (RF) radiation on human tissue, and such 
testing is predominantly applicable to cellular telephones. RQ7L was of the opinion that such 
testing, although currently within the scope of the Department of Health, should be included 
as part of the EA requirements for RF devices in South Africa. RQ7L noted further that ICASA 
has a mandate to protect consumers, who may be unaware of the hazardous effects of RF 
radiation. ICASA is thus remiss in its stipulated mandate of consumer protection by not 
including this test as part of the EA requirements. This exclusion means that it is possible that 
RF equipment already approved for use in South Africa, could have detrimental effects to 
human health. 
 
A final objective of the EA process, although not frequently referenced by the informants, was 
the importance of EA in frequency coordination. OS5J listed frequency coordination as of 
importance to shared frequency bands in particular, which ultimately relates to the 
prevention of interference.  
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4.4 The EA process currently operational in South Africa 
RM1K noted that every manufacturer must have their equipment authorised before it can be 
sold in South Africa. RN2A went further to describe it as a “command and control” process in 
which certain documentation is required. To prove compliance, ICASA indicates which 
equipment and standard are required for approval. ICASA has a simplified process to control 
the process (especially after the equipment has been approved). ICASA did not believe that a 
self-declaration process would work as this may lead to inferior and sub-standard equipment. 
RN2A was specific that the regulator does not trust the manufacturer: 
 
We need the test reports due to the fact that you don't know or believe what the 
manufacturer tells you. (RN2A). 
 
The general view is that the current EA process is highly inefficient, ineffective as the EA 
procedure is highly cumbersome (RM1K, RN2A, RG5N, SM1E, SD2M, OR1A, OB2G, OK3H). 
Labour intensive was another way that the current process was described. The EC market was 
seen as a dynamic industry with new features and new technology coming to market at a very 
quick rate. The current processing time has increased from 15 days to 30 days over the past 
few years, and this has been attributed directly to the growing volume of applications 
received. (RM1K, RG5N). Technology is constantly changing, and any delays cause 
unnecessary burden and unnecessary costs to the equipment supplier.  
 
Technology itself has negatively impacted the EA processing time. As the number of different 
technologies increases on a single EC device, a verification of these technologies is required 
as part of the EA process (RG5N). This verification increases the time taken to process an EA 
application as RF engineers at the regulator would have to evaluate each additional test 
report technically. The human resource capacity within the regulator has not increased, 
although the workload per staff member dealing with EA authorisation has.  
 
RN2A was of the opinion that a new software system is required to ensure quicker turnaround 
times as he felt that the global objective of EA was moving to faster processing times. This 
would involve processing applications timeously, maintaining proper records, enabling easier 
access to applications and the ability to track the application process.  The overall consensus 
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was that some system is of paramount importance to manage the EA approval process as it 
is a laborious process.  
 
The shortfalls inherent with the current EA process has inevitably led to a number of 
unsatisfied customers and increasing complaints. These shortfalls seem to have compounded 
the problem of the processing time, as dealing with complaints in itself takes time.  ICASA 
staff appear to be certain that a software system would be able to resolve this problem (RN2A, 
RS3R, RG5N). 
 
4.5 Examining the EA legislative framework in South Africa 
There are several legislative imperatives which govern the EA framework. The framework is 
made up of various Acts and Regulations (see Figure 14). These legislative imperatives, such 
as sector-specific Acts are sometimes broad in scope as they pertain to a wide range of 
regulatory measures. The data collected in this section examines only those clauses that apply 
to the EA environment, either directly or indirectly. For regulations unique to the EA process, 
the entire text is discussed. The approach followed in this section is to list the actual text 
applicable to EA along with further data (predominantly from the interviews) which provides 
an interpretation of that particular clause. 
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Figure 14: EA legal framework 
 
 
4.6 The Electronic Communications Act 
The Electronic Communications Act (ECA) was first promulgated in 2005 (Act 36 of 2005) and 
amended in April 2014 (Act 1 of 2014). The analysis of the ECA is an important starting point, 
as it drives the regulatory approach from a high-level perspective, given the statutory 
mandate of the Act in providing governance of EC sector.   
The primary objective of the Electronic Communications Act is to: 
“…provide for the regulation of electronic communications in the Republic in the public 
interest” (ECA, 2015). 
The Act is clear in its intention from the outset, which is to further public interest objectives 
through the regulation of electronic communications. The regulatory approach for all 
regulation in the electronic communications sphere seems to be driven by this over-arching 
mandate of public interest (RS3R). A study of the ECA provided key discussion points that 
were used to determine the direction of the interviews, in relation to the research sub-
questions.  The first sub-question of this research, being:  
Regulations
Supporting Acts
Primary Legal 
Framework 
(Sections 36, 37)
Electronic Communications 
(Act 36 of 2005)
Standards Act (8 of 2008)
Type Approval Regulations 
(Notice 871 of 2013) 
The Official List of 
Regulated Standards for 
technical equipment and 
communications equipment 
(Regulation 896 of 2015)
Labelling Regulations (88 of 
2013)
ICASA Act (Act 13 of 2000)
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 In which ways does the current theoretical approach to regulation pose challenges to the EA 
regulatory approach?  
This research sub-question presented an opportunity to test the actor’s view of the current 
EA approach against the stated objectives of the ECA. Regarding the grounded theory method 
of qualitative data analysis, initial codes should be developed to guide the area of discussion.  
The data gathered studying the legislative framework assisted in developing the initial codes 
that were used later in the analysis phase. 
In all, there exists 26 individual objectives and several sub-objectives of the ECA. Each 
objective was analysed to determine its pertinence to the EA process and the subsequent EA 
regulations that were promulgated. 
The following sub-objectives were deemed appropriate to EA. It should be noted that the list 
below is not exhaustive, given the broad scope of the sub-objectives. Only the sub-objectives 
relating directly to the EA process has been listed: 
a) promote and facilitate the convergence of telecommunications, broadcasting, 
information technologies and other services contemplated in this Act; 
The important wording to note is the emphasis on convergence. Convergence of 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and Information Technologies indicate a 
requirement for a multidisciplinary, technology-neutral EC equipment.  
b) promote and facilitate the development of interoperable and interconnected 
electronic networks, the provision of the services contemplated in the Act and to create 
a technologically neutral licencing framework; 
The focus of this clause is perhaps most relevant to EA, as this paragraph emphasises 
interoperability and technology neutrality. Technology neutrality determines the 
standardisation environment of EA, as only open standards rather than proprietary 
standards should form the basis of EA. Interoperability is the next key driver, as EA 
equipment has to be interoperable across multiple networks. The Carterfone ruling 
discussed earlier has interoperability at its core, as it facilitated the use of third-party 
equipment on a national telecommunication network (Wu, 2007). The focus of this 
ruling was the issue of interoperability of third-party equipment on a network using a 
defined set of standards. This set of standards would ensure operability to that 
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network, as long as the third party equipment conformed fully to the standard. 
Essentially, the ECA thus facilitates a “Carterfone” like environment in South Africa. 
c) encourage investment and innovation in the communications sector; 
Investment and innovation were defined as key concepts of the study during the 
literature review of EA. The economic impact of innovation and investment has also 
been discussed in detail (Bauer, 2010; Rogers, 2003; Santacreu, 2015). The ECA 
underlines the importance of these key concepts by listing them as individual 
objectives. The link between EA and investment as well as EA and innovation has also 
been discussed earlier. The concepts of investment and innovation were therefore 
included as part of the interview protocol. 
d) ensure efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum; 
This objective applies to the setting of technical standards. Radio frequency efficiency 
is largely dependent on radio equipment and this, in turn, is regulated through the EA 
process. Technical efficiency is thus an important concept and has been addressed 
independently from administrative efficiency. 
e) promote competition within the ICT sector; 
Competition has been extensively discussed as part of the literature review. Questions 
about competition were included and were considered an important theme of the 
research. The ability of EA regulation to facilitate competition is the primary area that 
was probed.  
f) encourage research and development within the ICT sector; 
This objective is related to the clause on innovation. Research and development 
support innovation, which has been identified as a key concept that was probed in the 
research. 
g) ensure the provision of a variety of quality electronic communications services at 
reasonable prices; 
The objectives of EA include ensuring that the EC equipment being approved meets 
the minimum standards of quality and interoperability as defined by the regulator. 
This is achieved by testing EA equipment in against safety, electromagnetic 
compatibility and performance standards (ITU, 2012:9). The objectives of quality in 
terms of EC equipment is thus facilitated by EA regulations and the concept of quality 
was explored during the interviews. 
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h) promote the interests of consumers with regard to the price, quality and the variety of 
electronic communications services; 
This objective relates to several initial codes that were adopted as primary areas of 
inquiry. The first was the concept of public interest, i.e. EA regulations that are 
promulgated to protect consumers. The second is the quality of EC equipment, in 
which the concept of quality was recorded. The third and final concept was that of 
competition as it relates to the variety of electronic communications services.  
i) ensure information security and network reliability; 
Information security and network reliability with regards to the EA process is once 
again addressed by the standards process. The performance standards required for 
EA ensures that network reliability, in particular, is dealt with via performance 
standards. Network security is an extension of performance standards and reflects a 
single aspect of the range of topics that can be included as performance standards. 
This, therefore, raises an important issue of the level of the performance standard. 
Setting a very high level of performance (e.g. specifying additional information 
security requirements for EA equipment) may result in an excellent product. There will 
always be an associated cost, and the level of performance needs to be balanced at 
optimal efficiency (Barke, 1995; Baldwin & Cave, 1999:120).  
j) promote stability in the ICT sector. 
The final objective is fairly broad and is once again pertinent to the EA regulatory 
approach. A credible EA framework provides stability in the EC equipment industry. A 
stable EC environment is linked to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and FDI is positively 
influenced by the existence of a credible regulatory framework (Kirkpatrick et al., 
2006:166). The interpretation of “credible” is, however, problematic and relates to 
the requirements of a developing country.  Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) seem to suggest 
that the mere existence of a “credible” framework is sufficient to attract FDI. The area 
of inquiry that this objective initiated was the perception of the current EA framework 
in the context of providing stability in a developing country. 
 
The Minister with a portfolio linked to the information communications technology sector is 
tasked with issuing policy directives in terms of Section 3 of the ECA. ICASA is responsible for 
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issuing regulations in terms of the ECA. Section 35 and 36 of Chapter 6, in particular, relates 
to EA of EC equipment: 
 
Approval of type 
35. (1) No person may use, supply, sell, offer for sale or lease or hire any type of electronic 
communications equipment or electronic communications facility, including radio apparatus, 
used or to be used in connection with the provision of electronic communications, unless such 
equipment, electronic communications facility or radio apparatus has, subject to subsection 
(2), been approved by the Authority. 
This clause is the overarching legal framework governing EA approval in South Africa. It is an 
all-encompassing clause regulating the use of all EC equipment as it refers to any equipment 
that would be used in connection with the provision of electronic communications.  The 
notable exception to this is the provision for ICASA to exempt equipment in terms of sub-
section (2). This section of the ECA does not provide any direction with regards to the intent 
of the EA framework, but rather broadly mandates the approval of equipment in general. This 
approach is expected given the high-level direction that the Act is intended to provide.  
(2)The Authority may prescribe— 
(a) the types of equipment, electronic communications facilities and radio apparatus, the use 
of which does not require approval where such equipment, electronic communications 
facilities and radio apparatus has been approved for use by the European Telecommunications 
Standards Associations or other competent standards body where the equipment complies 
with type approval standards prescribed by the Authority; and 
The section of the ECA seems to be more indicative of the intention of the EA regulations.  It 
makes provision for ICASA to exempt EC equipment that has been approved for use by ETSI 
or “other competent bodies”. It is clear that the ECA, by virtue of this clause, tries to prevent 
a duplication of the approval process should the EC equipment be approved elsewhere. This 
clause is problematic for two reasons. The first is the reference to ETSI. ETSI “…produces 
globally-applicable standards for Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), 
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including fixed, mobile, radio, converged broadcast and Internet technologies17”. ETSI is thus 
not an approval body but a standards body. ETSI would produce the standards that the EC 
equipment would be required to adhere to, but would not conduct any EC equipment 
approval itself. EC equipment approvals are generally the responsibility of the national 
regulatory authority. Although the clause attempts to provide an alternative mechanism to 
the mandated EA approval process, the decision to list ETSI as an approving authority is 
incorrect (SN4M). 
The second reason that this clause proves to be problematic is the reference to “other 
competent bodies” as these agencies are not defined. Given that ETSI was defined as a 
competent body, subsequent reference to other such bodies renders them unable to perform 
the approval function for the same reason that ETSI cannot conduct EA approvals (TLS2L). This 
clause maintains that ICASA would be required to prescribe the necessary standards to which 
exempted equipment should comply with. As discussed earlier, standards bodies like ETSI 
would be the custodian of prescribing (and creating) the standards that EC equipment would 
need to comply with. ICASA’s responsibility would be to ensure that the EC equipment is 
mandated by regulation to meet the standards as defined by ETSI.   
This apparent confusion in the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders involved 
in the EA process is an area of concern that was also included as part of the discussion during 
the interview process. Such a disconnect at the highest order of regulatory oversight could be 
considered as the starting point for any associated challenges endured by the current EA 
regulatory framework (RG5N). The key concept here would be the confusion around the roles 
and responsibilities of the key stakeholders along, along with a resulting duplication of 
resources.  
 
(b) circumstances under which the use of equipment, electronic communications facilities, 
radio apparatus and subscriber equipment does not require approval, including uses for 
research and development, demonstrations of prototypes and testing. 
                                                          
17 For more information, refer to the ETSI website at http://www.etsi.org/about  
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This clause seems to be more useful  than the preceding clause in the context of being 
implementable. It allows ICASA the latitude to promulgate regulations that exempt categories 
or type of EC equipment from the EA process. The key concept in this clause would be the 
focus on innovation. By allowing ICASA to exempt equipment being used for research and 
development purposes as well as for prototyping and testing, the ECA seems to be pro-
innovation (RM1K). This approach however, raises the issue of a “disconnect” between the 
policy objectives of the ECA and the EA regulatory environment managed by ICASA. ICASA 
only once exempted equipment from the EA process (RN2A) and has thus not fully enacted 
this provision of the ECA. The operative word of this clause is that ICASA “may” prescribe 
circumstances that exempt EC equipment from EA and not ICASA “shall” prescribe. That fine 
distinction allows ICASA a level of discretion in choosing whether to implement such a clause 
or not. It thus speaks to the intention of the ECA, which seems to be ambivalent on whether 
the EA process can be bypassed or not (OH1M). If the intention was to facilitate trade and 
encourage innovation unreservedly, the clause should explicitly instruct ICASA to prescribe 
the circumstances in which EA would not be required. It would seem that the ECA 
acknowledges the fact that innovation through research and development is important to the 
EC equipment sector, but has not done enough to facilitate it (OH1M). 
 
Technical standards for equipment and electronic communications facilities 
36. (1) The Authority may, subject to the provisions of the Standards Act, 1993 (Act No. 29 of 
1993), prescribe standards for the performance and operation of any equipment or electronic 
communication facility, including radio apparatus. 
This clause is clear in its intention of appointing ICASA as the sole custodian of EC equipment. 
The confluence of standards and EA is evident here, with this clause deferring to the 
provisions of the Standards Act of 199318. The Standards Act deals primarily with the 
responsibilities of the SABS in relation to standards. This clause once again points to the issue 
of roles and responsibilities. ICASA’s roles regarding standards is a regulatory one. ICASA does 
                                                          
18 For more information, please visit http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/sa1993112/ This link enables the 
download of the entire Standards Act, although the introductory page is sufficient for discerning the objectives 
of the Act. 
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not generate standards but can enforce standards through regulation. While this clause is 
clear in defining ICASA’s role as “prescribing” standards, the reference to the Standards Act 
raises the possibility of role confusion (TLS2L). SABS’s role in the standardisation process is 
not in conflict with ICASA’s role in prescribing such standards. The Standards Act was 
therefore added to the list of documents to be reviewed to investigate whether such role 
confusion existed and can be found elsewhere in this document.  
(2) Any such standard must be aimed at— 
(a) protecting the integrity of the electronic communications network; 
(b) ensuring the proper functioning of connected equipment or electronic communications 
facilities; 
(c) ensuring interoperability, interconnectability and harmonisation; and 
(d) avoiding harmful interference with the electronic communications network. 
Earlier during the review of the objectives of the ECA, the public interest perspective was 
clearly visible. This point of view is not included in this section of the ECA. This section deals 
exclusively with the performance aspects of EA. EA approval consists of three key categories, 
being performance, safety and electromagnetic compatibility (ITU, 2012:9). The aims listed in 
this clause are only applicable to performance and electromagnetic compatibility. Safety 
standards are notable in their absence, and only the technical performance characteristics 
are mandated by legislation in the ECA. The public interest perspectives described earlier has 
not been captured through the lack of safety standards. It could be argued that the line 
“proper functioning of connected equipment or electronic communications facilities” may 
imply that safety standards are inherently included. This argument, however, is dubious as 
interoperability and electromagnetic standards are uniquely identified while safety standards 
are not. This data is key in determining the policy objectives of EA in South Africa.  
The standards led emphasis on functionality of EA equipment raises questions on what the 
focus of EA regulation in a developing country should be, given that the focus in South Africa 
is biased towards the protection of the network and the prevention of interference (RN9B). 
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(3) (a) The regulations made in terms of subsection (1) may, for the purposes of this section 
and without publishing the text of the technical standard, incorporate any technical standard 
by reference to— 
(i) the number, title and year of issue of the technical standard; or 
(ii) other particulars by which the particular standard can be identified. 
(b) Any technical standard incorporated as contemplated in paragraph (a) is considered to be 
a regulation to the extent that the technical standard is not contrary to the regulations. 
Clause 3 allows for the technical standard to be listed through a unique naming mechanism, 
without the entire text of the standard being incorporated into regulation. RD8M noted that 
this clause raises two areas of discussion. The first is that, given the fast-moving nature of the 
EC equipment environment, standards are continually being updated to reflect changes in 
technology. By allowing only a reference to a standard, this clause thus allows regulations to 
be changed much more easily by amending the title of the standard in the regulation, rather 
than amending the entire text. The second area of discussion revolves around incorporating 
standards into text. Although this clause substantially simplifies the regulation of standards, 
it still incorporates the use of standards into regulation. The important question raised here 
is the appropriateness of embedding standards into legal documents, given the 
aforementioned pace of change of this environment (RD3MA). 
 
(c) Whenever any technical standard is, at any time after its incorporation in terms of 
paragraph (a), amended or substituted by a competent national body, the regulation in terms 
of which such technical standard was incorporated in the regulations must, unless otherwise 
stated therein, be considered to refer to such technical standard as so amended or substituted, 
as the case may be. 
(d) The Authority must keep the text of each— 
(i) technical standard incorporated in the regulations in terms of paragraph (a); and 
(ii) amendment or substitution of the text. 
124 
 
 
 
(e) The text of each incorporated technical standard must be open to inspection by the public 
during the normal office hours of the Authority. 
(f) The Authority may, at the request of any person and on payment of such fee as may be 
prescribed, furnish him or her with a copy of the text 
These sections of Clause 3 attempt to mitigate some of the problems that may arise as a result 
of changing standards. The clause seems to acknowledge the possibility of the standards 
prescribed by regulation being out of sync with the latest version of the said standards. The 
solution proposed by the ECA simply mandates that the most recent version of the standard 
be deemed to be the regulated one, even though the regulation may refer to an earlier 
version. This “catch-all” approach may prove problematic as there may be instances where 
the latest version of the standard is not applicable to a country (OS5J). The clause further 
prescribes an additional administrative workload to the ICASA, by mandating the regulator to 
keep a record of the difference between the text contained within the latest version of the 
standard with the wording contained in the version of the standard that has been mandated 
by regulation (RG5N). This additional function raises issues around efficiency, capacity and 
appropriateness of the EA regulatory framework specific to the adoption of standards (RG5N, 
TLS2L, OB2G). There is another element of inconsistency in section (f) of this clause as it gives 
ICASA the authority to charge a fee to provide a copy of the amended text. The preceding 
clauses of this section of the ECA made reference to standards prescribed by competent 
bodies as well as standards prescribed in conjunction with the Standards Act.  It is thus 
reasonable to assume that these standards are not owned or developed by ICASA, and thus 
ICASA would not have the authority to sell such standards or text of such standards (RN2A).  
 
4.7 The Standards Act 
The Standards Act (Act. 8 of 2008) was primarily promulgated to guide the functions of the 
South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) and to promote the development of national 
standards for South Africa. The following clauses are of value to the EA process in South Africa.  
WHEREAS it is desirable to— 
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• provide for the continuation of the SABS as the peak national standardisation institution in 
South Africa responsible for the development, maintenance and promotion of South African 
National Standards; 
This clause reiterates support for the SABS as the primary institution responsible for standards 
in South Africa. There is be no conflict between the provisions of the ECA and the Standards 
Act with regards to EA, as the Standards Act is acknowledged to be the primary repository for 
standards and standards related functions (TLS3T).  
• ensure provision of an internationally recognised standardisation system that continue to 
support the needs of South African enterprises competing in a fast-paced global economy; and 
This clause provides pertinent information with regards to the objectives of the Standards 
Act. The first would be the provision of a standardisation system. As discussed elsewhere in 
this research, economies of scale brought about by standardised equipment allow for lower 
prices of EC equipment. TLS3T notes that the formation of a standardisation system within 
South Africa is a major step in this regard. The next point, being the goal of having an 
internationally recognised standardisation system, reflects a larger objective of aligning the 
South African standards environment to the international context.  
The clause also recognises the fast-paced global economy, which has already been identified 
as a critical factor in the EA environment. The standardisation system is aimed at supporting 
this fast-paced global environment, although the particular focus in this clause alludes to the 
world economy and seems to be centred on a commercial focus. 
 
• promote South African National Standards as a means to facilitate international trade and 
enhancing South Africa's economic performance and transformation, 
The clause above builds upon the focus on international recognition with the aim of 
facilitating trade and enhancing economic performance and transformation. Trade is thus an 
important concept and was included as part of the initial area of exploration during the 
interview process. The overall focus of this clause is an economic one, with standards serving 
as a basis to facilitate trade and investment to support economic growth. 
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Incorporation of South African National Standards in laws  
28. (1) A South African National Standard, or any provision thereof, that has been published 
in terms of this Act in respect of any commodity, product or service which may affect public 
safety, health, or environmental protection, may be incorporated in any law. 
(2) The South African National Standard, or any provision thereof, contemplated in 35 
subsection (1) may be incorporated by referring to— 
(a) the title and the number; or 
(b) the title, the number and the year or edition number. 
The ECA is consistent with the Standards Act in terms of incorporating standards into law. The 
ECA prescribes the process described in section 28(2)(b), with the provision of referring to the 
latest version of the standard should the standard be updated.  The focus of this clause seems 
to be around standards that affect public health and safety or environmental protection. The 
assumption which appears to be made here is that only these types of standards would be 
incorporated into legal documents such as regulations.  
 
4.8 The type approval regulations 
The Type Approval Regulations (Notice 871 of 2013) was primarily promulgated to streamline 
the type approval process in terms of the ICASA Act as well as to specify a new fee framework 
with respect to type approval applications (RM1K).  
RN2A considered Section 2(3) of the type approval regulation as the most interesting since it 
specifies the distinctly the purpose of the type approval regulations as: 
“Protect the integrity of public networks, the consumer and to avoid harmful interference.” 
The public interest perspective of consumer protection is listed for the first time in a 
regulatory document. The ICASA Act did not contain any references to consumer protection, 
only to network protection.  
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Section (4): Supplier registration 
The regulation calls for all suppliers of telecommunications equipment to be registered by 
ICASA. There is no cost for this registration. 
 
Section (6): Simplified Type Approval procedure 
RN9B considers section 6 of the type-approval regulation as a critical one as it deviates from 
the principle of insistence on type approval for every product per supplier. Section (3) of the 
regulation states that: 
(1) Any Equipment used or to be used in connection with the provision of electronic 
communications, unless explicitly exempted by the Authority, is subject to Type Approval by 
the Authority. 
(2) All Equipment for which a valid ICASA Type Approval Certificate was issued prior to the 
promulgation of these Regulations will remain valid pursuant to these Regulations. 
A strict interpretation of this section would mean that even if the equipment has been 
approved by ICASA by a particular supplier, any subsequent providers of that equipment 
would still need to apply for their own approval.  
The previous section dealt with the registration of suppliers. The type approval certification 
thus issued to the supplier and not based on the equipment. Section (6) of the regulation 
attempts to remedy this duplication of the type approval process by providing an alternative 
approval route. This section states that: 
(1) A Supplier may request that Equipment that appears on the Authority's Type Approval 
Register be subject to a Simplified Type Approval process. 
(2) The Supplier must ensure that the Equipment applied for is identical to the Equipment that 
is already type approved and appears on the Type Approval Register. 
(3) This process does not require the submission of test reports, however, a representative 
sample may be required; 
(4) Regulation 5(3) to 5(6) shall apply with regard to Simplified Type Approval process/es. 
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While this clause of the regulation significantly reduces the administrative burden to the 
equipment supplier, it does not eliminate it entirely. The supplier, should they wish to supply 
equipment that has previously been approved by ICASA, would have to still apply for type 
approval once again. The simplification of this process relates to the removal of the 
requirement for test reports. The removal of the test report requirement significantly reduces 
the financial and administrative burden to the supplier of the equipment (SN4M, SD2M, 
SM1E). 
 
Section (7):  Applicable standards 
(1) The Authority recognises only standards issued by a competent standardisation body.  
RN2A stated that ICASA publishes a list of standards as a regulation, called “The Official List 
of Regulated Standards for technical equipment and communications equipment” 
(Regulation 896 of 2015), commonly referred to as the “Official List”. ICASA considers 
standards from various standards bodies such as ETSI, before mandating via regulation the 
standards required for type approval. Should ICASA select a standard from a competent 
standards authority, the only check regarding standards that ICASA would conduct during the 
EA process would be whether the test report submitted shows conformance to the standard.  
 
(2) The applicable technical standards for Equipment are found in the Technical Regulations. 
This technical regulation is the “Official List” described above. This clause gives regulatory 
effect to the technical standards. The administrative detail of the type approval process is 
stipulated in this regulation, while referencing the technical detail can be found in the Official 
List. Both the details contained in the technical regulation as well as the details listed in this 
administrative regulation are required to describe the type approval process in South Africa 
fully (RM4J). 
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(3) In the event where Equipment requiring Type Approval was tested to a standard which is 
not in the Technical Regulations, then such a standard must be technically identical to that 
determined by the Authority for such Equipment. 
This clause gives a certain amount of leeway with regards to the standard required for type 
approval. By specifying the term “technically identical”, this clause does not contradict the 
technical requirements needed for type approval. It provides for standards that may contain 
the text and limits of measurement of a particular standard, but not necessarily the identical 
name of that standard (RN6B).  
 
Section (8): Test reports 
(1) The Authority will accept only test reports that are issued by any ATL. 
As previously discussed, the standards required for type approval is defined by ICASA and 
listed as part of Official List regulation.  The requirement for test reports tested to these 
regulated standards is that they should be issued by an Accredited Test Laboratory (ATL). ATLs 
conduct testing of equipment to the prescribed standards defined by ICASA. ICASA then has 
to ascertain whether a test report submitted by an equipment supplier is authored by an 
accredited testing facility (RD8M).  
 
(2) Applicants must submit a test report in full and are not allowed to remove or modify any 
portion of the  
test report. 
The mechanism of the submission is not clearly defined and the equipment supplier could 
either send a hard copy of the report or provide a digital copy of the report (RD8M). Hard 
copies of the reports would prove problematic going forward, given the size of a test report, 
storage considerations and the environmental impact of printing such as a document.  In 
terms of administrative efficiency, soft copies of the report would be the preferred option. 
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(3) A test report is only valid if it was prepared for the Equipment for which approval is being 
applied for and if no modifications have been made to the Equipment following the completion 
of the test report. 
This clause, although well-intentioned, is problematic for ICASA to enforce (RQ7L). The clause 
stipulates that the equipment being ultimately sold by the supplier should be essentially 
identical in all respects to the equipment that was tested for the type approval process. The 
obvious challenge to this clause is proving a discrepancy, should one exist.  
The onus rests with ICASA to test a random sample of the retail equipment and compare it to 
the original test report. Such testing is expensive and would result in additional administrative 
costs to the EA process (RG5N). 
 
Section (9): Provisional Type Approval 
The regulations allow for a provisional type approval for test and experimental purposes: 
(1) Subject to Section 35(2)(b) read with Section 32(1) of the Act, the Authority may award a 
Provisional Type Approval Permit, for a period of up to 6 months for the following purposes: 
(a) Use of Equipment for a trial, demonstration or research purpose on a non-commercial 
basis; and 
The clause supports innovation by permitting the use of equipment (on a non-commercial 
basis) for testing and research. The important point to note here is that provisional type 
approval does not require a test report, which supports innovation (RM1K). Prototype EC 
equipment would not necessarily have type approval and would require a waiver of the type 
approval requirements to be allowed into South Africa for testing purposes. 
The quantity of equipment allowable under this clause is a notable omission from this section. 
Although it may prove challenging for the regulator to determine an absolute number of 
equipment permitted in terms of the provisional type approval, the open-ended nature of 
this clause makes it problematic to regulate the quantity of equipment condoned from 
requiring EA (OH1M). It is dubious that the time frame of six months would be sufficient to 
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allow for an extended testing scenario, however, given the fast pace of technological change, 
six months may be adequate (OH1M). 
(a) Testing the Equipment in an ATL in South Africa. 
This clause allows for the local testing of EC equipment in South Africa, to obtain EA 
certification. It encourages local trade and innovation is proactive in removing technical 
barriers to trade (RM1K). It is, however, noteworthy that the emphasis is on an accredited 
test laboratory and not any test laboratory in South Africa. This clause could prove 
problematic in the scenario where a South African network operator tests equipment in an 
in-house (non-accredited) test facility for that operator’s internal network testing (OB2G). 
Although section 9 (1)(a) can be argued to cover such an eventuality, the prescription of an 
accredited test facility seems superfluous.  
 
4.9 Overall view 
The EA regulations were seen as being too broad (OS5J, OH1M). Not enough emphasis was 
placed on allowing ICASA to exempt certain types of equipment from EA, as allowed in terms 
of the overall legislation - the ECA. Informants felt that there was a need to define a narrow 
scope for equipment that would require approval (SM1E, SD2M, OK3H, OB2G, OS5J, OH1M). 
 
4.10 Industry and regulatory perspective regarding the objectives of EA 
While the previous section dealt with the objective of EA from a legal perspective, the next 
section will provide a regulatory perspective based on the informants interviewed. 
 
All respondents were unanimous in their view that EA was a vital process. RM1K stated 
emphatically that the core objective of EA was to ensure the integrity and Quality of Service 
of EC equipment being sold in the South African market.  Integrity and safety were also listed 
as secondary objectives as well. RM1K felt that the importance of EA was primarily to give 
consumers confidence in the EC equipment in that it should not have any harmful effects and 
should be safe to use.  Confidence was noted as a key theme, especially amongst the 
regulatory staff at ICASA. This confidence was both in the EA process itself and in the 
equipment approved via the EA process (RG5N, RS3R, RM1K, OS5J, RN6B, RM4J). The quality 
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and consumer protection aspects were most often included at the end of the explanation by 
the informants. 
 
RN2A listed the efficiency of spectrum utilisation, interference protection and maintenance 
of equipment as further objectives of EA. The rationale behind this line of thought was that 
EA saves network operators money by preventing network breakdowns caused by sub-
standard equipment (RM5S). Their network is thus protected from harm and should ensure a 
high quality of Service (QoS). RM4J echoed these sentiments, by noting that without EA, there 
would be “chaos in the market”. EA allowed for devices to coexist in shared frequency bands, 
by rigorous testing to standards drafted to prevent interference. By following rules and limits 
determined by these criteria, a myriad of devices can operate without the risk of interference. 
RS3R cited an example of a license-free band that is largely dependent on EA to prevent 
interference. In Nigeria, the 2.4 GHz licence free band is so chaotic that new market entrants 
do not want to enter the market using this band, as they cannot conduct commercial 
operations with an appropriate level of comfort that the service would work. On the other 
hand, a well-regulated 5.8 GHz band (which is also a licence free shared band) works very well 
in South Africa due to the coordination assisted predominantly by the EA process. The band 
is so well managed that even high power links (which can cause widespread interference) can 
work in the same band with other lower power devices. 
 
RM1K reiterated that a one-word core objective to describe the EA process would be 
“Integrity”.  The end-user perspective must be taken into account as the consumer must 
believe that the product meets all the stipulated requirements when the ICASA sticker is 
affixed to that device. The same would apply to network operators as well. 
 
RG5N summed up the “confidence” view on the objectives of EA by stating that: 
 
The main objective is to build confidence in the use of equipment. Whosoever uses the 
equipment must be confident that the equipment causes no harm, regarding safety and 
interference. (RG5N). 
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The ICASA EA process is meant to instil confidence to consumers who see the ICASA logo on 
the device. The ICASA logo affixed to any EC equipment would mean that that device has been 
rigorously checked by ICASA, who has applied due diligence in assessing the equipment 
regarding its functionality and safety (RG5N). 
 
Staff that are dealing with EA approvals clearly noted that the objective of EA was 
conformance only to essential or functional requirements (RN6B, RQ7L, RD8M, RM4J, TLS3T). 
This essential requirement extended only to technical requirements of the device, i.e. the 
basic set of standards that certify the operation of the equipment. He (2010), discussed earlier 
in the literature, noted that command and control regulations are susceptible to 
informational deficiencies. The issue of testing and the production of test reports highlights 
this as a real world example, where ICASA is unable to make decisions without the information 
supplied to it by third parties.  As much as the burden of proof within the current EA regime 
lies with the EA applicant, the regulator is completely reliant on external sources of 
information to enable it to make a decision (RN6B, RQ7L, RD8M, RM4J). 
 
Creating a local market for equipment manufacturers was also seen as an objective of EA 
(RQ7L). South Africa’s reliance on imports for the supply of EC equipment was considered to 
be a risk. South Africa would not possess the intellectual capital associated with the imported 
equipment, and the overall impact on the economy would be limited when compared to 
locally produced EC equipment. The objective of the EA regime should thus be to: 
 
The intent should be to create a space for our manufacturers. The country would gain as we 
would develop more products for our country. We would not need to import as much. We can 
create exactly what we need as we would be catering solely for the SA market. (RQ7L) 
 
Job creation, intellectual capital and support to the local economy were some of the benefits 
listed with promoting a local manufacturing sector.  TLJ1H cautioned that in most instances 
where local manufacturing exists in South Africa, it is not manufacturing in the “proper” sense 
but rather assembly. TVs were listed as an example in which assembly of the various modules, 
manufactured worldwide, are assembled to form the end product. In such cases, even though 
the final product is manufactured in South Africa, very little to no intellectual capital would 
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reside in the country. TLJ1H, however, conceded that the benefits of local assembly were 
numerous should be ultimately encouraged and supported. Figure 15 summarises the broad 
responses of the Objectives of EA. 
 
Figure 15: Objectives of EA 
 
 
 
 
 
4.11 Investigating the current EA process  
RM1K felt that the current EA process achieves only 60-70 percent of the objectives of EA. 
There are still devices that make it onto the market without type approval. A lack of post-
market surveillance prevents the confidence level from being higher. There is also an issue of 
a “golden sample” where the testing of one sample of EC equipment results in EA. This sample 
may not be representative of the entire production of that particular model of equipment. 
RM1K and RN2A also conceded that inefficiencies in post-market surveillance also 
contributed to the low confidence in the EA process.  
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Confidence is thus a recurring theme in the data gathered in all sections of this research. The 
issue of confidence will be discussed in terms of confidence in the EA process itself, 
confidence in the testing facilities, confidence in the test reporting and confidence in the post-
monitoring abilities of the current EA regime. The issue of confidence thus raises serious 
concerns about the efficacy of the current EA process in terms of achieving its stated 
objectives.  
 
The biggest single drawback that was listed by the majority of informants was ICASA’s inability 
to confirm the validity of a test report, through an independent verification mechanism such 
as retesting the product. Test laboratories in South Africa do not have either the skill or 
equipment to test the majority of international standards that are regulated in South Africa 
(OB2G). The problem compounds if the equipment is tested at an internal accredited lab, as 
the equipment supplier is essentially attesting to the validity of their product.  
 
ICASA has low confidence in this process, but has no option but to accept these reports, given 
that they are from so-call “accredited” laboratories. The concept of accredited laboratories is 
thus proving troublesome to ICASA’s equipment authorisation efforts (RN6B).  
 
RN2A & RM1K suggest bi-lateral cooperation required with International test laboratories to 
improve the levels of trust and confidence. Trust in the process is thus a common theme.  
Even if ICASA is not satisfied with the test documentation, they do not have the grounds to 
decline an application if people follow the rules. This is a challenge for ICASA as they have 
stated that it is not feasible for them to build their own test facilities.  Some solutions 
suggested for this problem include the use of current facilities that exist in the country and to 
consolidate these facilities to upskill them to be able to perform the necessary testing. The 
second solution involves collaboration with test facilities external to the country. 
 
PP1L recounted an example that illustrates the sub-optimal utilisation of existing test 
facilities, where the then Department of Communications (DoC) provided 30 million rands in 
funding to the SABS for them to establish a regional conformance testing facility. The staff at 
the SABS were trained internationally to gain the requisite skills required to operate this test 
facility. The objective of the DoC was for SABS to operate this facility as a commercial venture 
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by expanding into SADC countries. The failure of SABS to broaden the reach of this facility 
resulted in the laboratory ceasing operations after just a few years of existence. The political 
goal of reducing the cost to communicate was not achieved and the cost of testing remains 
high. The facility was recently afforded a second opportunity to become commercially viable, 
as the current Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) process requires EA approval for the set-top 
boxes. SABS was able to repurpose this facility to test these set-top boxes, but the cost of 
testing is still high, and the DoC views this initiative as a failure. The aim of government was 
to reduce the costs to communicate in South Africa, and the high testing costs are contrary 
to their objective.  
 
Industry experts, however, believe that the requirements for testing in itself is an exercise in 
duplication, which is a significant contributor to the problems associated with the EA process. 
OB2G noted that the EA process at ICASA is not a testing process but a verification process. 
Verifying equipment already tested internationally was thus a duplication of effort and a 
waste of time and resources. OH1M stated that: 
 
 There is no need to submit the actual test reports as a significant percentage of devices 
approved in Europe for example, have already been scrutinised to determine their alignment 
to the relevant standards. Requesting the actual test reports essentially duplicates this 
process – which further adds to the delays in [the] type approval process. All that time and 
effort to get hold of a test report to prove compliance that has already been established – it 
does not make sense and is a wasteful and expensive exercise. Does ICASA really deny 
approval equipment already show to comply with standards ? – that will be interesting to 
determine! (OH1M). 
 
Radio Frequency specialists employed at ICASA involved in the technical evaluation of EA 
approval disagree with this assessment and note two ways in which additional checks are 
conducted. They state that ICASA conducts an assessment of the test facility issuing a test 
report, to determine its authenticity (RN6B, RM4J). This process lends credibility and 
confidence in the test results obtained from the test facility as well as confidence that the 
tested product conforms to the requisite standards required for the EA process. The second 
check involves a technical evaluation of the test report, checking the actual test parameters 
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in a standard needed for EA approval to the measured result. Only if the device under test 
passes all technical requirements as stipulated in the standard, will the radio frequency 
specialist consider the equipment for EA approval.  
 
SD2M stated in no uncertain terms that the objective of EA should be based on a business 
case and not a “government case”. EA should support the sale of EA equipment, given the 
fast-moving pace of technology. Technology has commoditised the EC equipment market, 
and thus the life cycle of EC equipment can be very short. Delays in the EA process can render 
an entire model range obsolete and thus the business case objectives of ensuring quicker 
times to market are of utmost importance. Figure 16 provides a diagrammatic representation 
of the key themes. 
 
Figure 16: Key themes 
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4.12 Exploring the positive aspects of the current EA process  
The general opinion of the current process was the fact that a working EA regime exists in the 
first place, is grounds enough to consider it a positive attribute, irrespective of the flaws that 
exist (OR1A, RN2A, RM1K). ICASA has control and a reasonable level of confidence and control 
of devices that enter the country and has applied the applicable standards to these devices. 
The current EA regime has also kept the market vibrant. 
 
Operators were more specific, agreeing that the EA process instils confidence that the 
equipment conforms to the minimum mandatory standards required by the EA approval 
process (OS5J, OB2G). 
 
RM1K felt that the current regime is mostly in line with international regimes, but conceded 
that the SA EA regime is too rigid in comparison to international first world regimes. ICASA is 
conducting a benchmark study currently to compare the SA EA regime to international best 
practice, although it may be several months until that information is available. The focus of 
this study would be looking into exempting devices from equipment authorisation. Other 
developed markets have a less rigid self-declaration EA regime that is based on the trust level 
of that country. Self-declaration relates to a local manufacturing market according to RM1K, 
although there are not any manufacturers left in the South African market. The theme of trust 
was again noted here- no trust level that exists currently in the South African EA market as 
there is no feedback mechanism to verify international test reports.  
 
The issue of resources available to the regulator to bring manufacturers to order, especially 
for international companies was also mentioned. As these businesses are based elsewhere in 
the world, ICASA does not have the resources to prosecute them for non-compliance. It is 
therefore easier to apply penalties to South African registered companies. In terms of the EA 
regulations, all EC equipment suppliers would have to be registered as a local entity in South 
Africa before EA can be granted. This was therefore seen as a positive regulatory requirement 
(RQ7L). The positive aspects of the current framework is sumamrised in Figure 17. 
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There are currently no penalties for non-conformance for self-declaration such as those found 
in Europe, where the penalties are very high and can hold directors of companies personally 
criminally liable. The lack of self-declaratory regime was thus considered a positive for the 
South African environment (RD8M). 
 
Figure 17: Positive Aspects of Current Framework 
 
4.13 Investigating the link between EA and technology 
Technology was identified as having a major impact on EA and has rendered some of the 
objectives of EA irrelevant. New EC devices have built-in technology that has made some of 
the requirements of EA moot. RM1K & OS5J listed software defined radios as a classic example 
of technology advancement. These software-defined radios can select an appropriate 
frequency of operation to prevent interference, without any external user input. The 
traditional type approval process could become too cumbersome and difficult to adopt as 
there would be too many certificates will be required to describe a single piece of equipment 
as technology advances.  
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Reasonable Aligned to International Best practiceFramework Exists
• Current framework more appealing than a regulatory vacuum
• Too rigid
• Consider Exemptions
• Consider Self-Declaration
Companies can be held to accountLocal Registration
• Easier to enforce regulations on locally registered companies
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Other commentators stated that technology due to standards development is ahead of the 
EA process. It is difficult to approve equipment as the standards required to approve such 
equipment have not yet been adopted by South Africa. The comment was made that it is 
almost impossible to stay abreast of the standards development process (RN2A). South Africa 
seems to be reactive to technology, which leads to delays in the deployment of certain 
technologies due to the rigid requirements of the EA process. The current EA process 
prescribes rules “up front”, so it makes the EA process difficult for new technology if such 
rules have not been defined.  
 
TLS2L also added that the standardisation process in South Africa itself is much too long and 
listed the example of an international safety standard that was published six years ago which 
has yet to be adopted by South Africa. TLS2L attributes this delay predominantly to South 
Africa’s lack of active participation in the international standardisation arena. Had South 
Africa contributed to the development of the safety standard in question, there would not 
have been a need to adapt the standard for local adoption. The process that had to be 
followed to adopt this safety standard for domestic use was the primary reason for the long 
delay in adoption. TLS2L remarked that this is not an issue for first world countries, as their 
standardisation experts are sponsored by industry and can contribute and develop EC 
equipment standards from the inception of such standardisation projects.  
 
TLS2L suggested that South Africa adopt a similar Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to 
alleviate some of the funding problems faced by South African experts in attending such 
International standardisation fora. TLJ1H estimates that South Africa is two to three models 
behind Europe with regards to the adoption of technology for EC equipment. Proof of that is 
evident when trying to download the latest drivers for new equipment to the South African 
market, only to find that the equipment has been marked as being “end of life” products or 
even noted as being obsolete and no longer supported. 
 
OK3H disagreed with TLJ1H and stated that South Africa has kept up with technology, despite 
the challenges faced with the EA process. South Africa has deployed the latest 4G cellular 
technologies in both the network and consumer equipment and is part of the planning for 5G 
technologies as well. South Africa has thus not lagged into deploying the latest technologies, 
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with network operators investing significantly in network infrastructure, albeit with the 
predominant purpose of exacting higher voice and data revenues. These discussions highlight 
the key theme of ‘technology impacting EA’. 
 
The pace of technology also has a market perspective, with “first mover” advantage being 
paramount to equipment suppliers (OZ4P). “First Mover” advantage would allow a vendor 
first access to a particular market and can have a significant economic impact to that vendor. 
The EA process largely determines this benefit and any delays in the EA process erodes the 
associated impact. It is thus critical to operators, and suppliers in particular, that the EA 
process is as efficient as possible. 
 
EA testing has also been impacted by technology. OH1M noted that testing protocols have 
moved from being manual to being automated. This has significantly improved testing times 
as well as the volumes of tests that could be conducted within a period. Increased test 
volumes decrease testing costs and have made the testing cheaper in the process. The move 
from analogue to digital test technologies has also ensured more accurate and less expensive 
test equipment, which has ultimately helped decrease testing costs. 
 
Technology has also impacted the efficiency of the EA process in South Africa. RD3M stated 
that the rapid pace of technology has increased the total number of products that are in the 
market, which in turn has increased the amount of EC equipment requiring approval. 
Technology is based on economies of scale, with the large volumes of products being sold 
with small markups. Larger suppliers are sometimes forced by manufacturers to agree to 
Minimum order Quantities (MoQ) for the purchase of EC equipment before they would even 
consider selling a product to them (SM1E). 
 
These increased equipment quantities have placed a significant strain on the resources of the 
regulator, as the volume of work for EA has grown dramatically. This volume has not had a 
corresponding adjustment in terms of the resources available to manage the EA process, 
ultimately leading to longer lead times in the approval process. Longer lead times are 
detrimental to the EC market as the pace of technology means that the product lifecycle is 
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very short (OB2G). A six month turnaround time for EA application processing was seen as far 
too long and damaging to the EC equipment industry. 
 
Technology has also created new risks for EC equipment. As EC equipment has evolved, the 
“Internet of Things” (IoT) has meant that more devices are now connected to the web and 
could thus be hacked. OB2G noted that EA should ensure the cybersecurity of EC equipment 
such as network equipment, by making sure that no “back door” access or malicious code is 
inserted into the firmware of the device.  
 
IoT devices will grow exponentially in the next few years. This is the future area of demand 
and EA must cater for this requirement (OB2G).  
 
Previously, an individual had just one device (possible just a cellular phone), in future, we 
would have perhaps five devices each and each they must talk to each other(cellular phone, 
tablet, smartwatch, fitness trackers etc.). The new EA framework must be able to 
accommodate this change (OK3H). 
 
The concept of technology being commoditised was raised by the equipment suppliers 
(SD2M, SM1E, SN4M). The primary aim of technology as a commodity would be the ability to 
quickly and easily trade this commodity. This shift in consumer thinking towards technology 
has made it much more difficult for equipment suppliers to differentiate their products and 
keep abreast of the market. In their quest to capitalise on their first mover advantage by 
constantly updating and upgrading their equipment, equipment suppliers are extremely 
susceptible to delays in getting the product to market. Delays in the EA process was seen as 
a significant risk to the EC equipment suppliers. When compared to the worldwide EA 
approval time, SM1E thought that the South African EA approvals process was cripplingly 
long: 
 
Toshiba, for example, will test the device to every conceivable test that is required. They will 
then send it via FTP to every country that they sell in.  Three weeks later, they would have 
approvals from all countries. ICASA approval would take 10 or more weeks. So Toshiba would 
not roll out the equipment worldwide until regulatory approvals for all countries was 
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acquired. The ICASA approval then delayed the release of the product worldwide. Toshiba 
eventually decided no more new products will go to South Africa, especially since the NRCS 
process took six months (SM1E). 
 
An approval process that takes longer than three months runs the risk of the product 
becoming obsolete. SA then risks becoming a dumping ground for obsolete equipment. The 
EA process thus unwittingly supports the dumping of obsolete equipment in the country 
(SM1E). 
 
RS3R offered a differing interpretation on the impact of technology on EA. The EA process 
should be independent of technology and thus technology neutral. The EC Act stipulates that 
the licensing of equipment should be technology neutral and this clause would be directly 
applicable to EA. EA should only be a mechanism of approval, and the technology 
considerations should be separated from the legal framework. This approach would avoid the 
pitfall of regulation always falling behind technology. A depiction of the key themes of EA and 
technology is presented in Figure 18. 
Figure 18: EA and technology 
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4.14 Problems with the current EA process 
The overarching theme during this discussion was that EA has a major impact on the economy 
and as such, the cumbersome nature and inefficiencies in the EA process leads to a financial 
burden to the OEMs. EA is seen as an additional cost of conformity as there are additional 
testing required, as well as costs for submission of EA. These costs add to the initial cost of 
the equipment, driving up the basic cost of the equipment. OEMs would need to recover these 
costs by subsequently increasing the pricing of the equipment, which in turn negatively 
affects the consumer.  
 
RN2A noted that it is unfortunate that problems caused by an incomplete or incorrectly 
approved equipment is generally only picked up after an interference complaint. ICASA does 
not have a proactive mechanism for continuous compliance, hence coordination with the 
ICASA regional offices are required to address any defective equipment. Feedback and 
internal coordination were thus identified as key points.  The lack of facilities to verify 
compliance was once again mentioned). Inspections are not done at a manufacturer level, 
only at the retail level (TLS3T). ICASA conducts only an administrative check, not a functional 
check (RN6B). 
 
OR1A noted that a major international telecommunications operator conducted EA approvals 
centrally in Germany, for all regions that equipment would be shipped to for use on their 
networks, including South Africa. This internal approval system is rigorous and entails internal 
as well as external testing, to ensure that only equipment of the highest standard is approved 
for use on its networks. The ICASA approval process is a duplication of this effort and was 
seen as a simple “tick box” exercise that did not add further value in proving conformity and 
interoperability. RM5S & IOG4P supported this view and stated that the regulatory framework 
for EA itself was flawed, as the current regulations limit EA to an individual or a company, not 
to the equipment. This was seen as a major oversight as the type approval should be based 
on the equipment only, not the supplier applying for it. The issue of a duplication of efforts is 
then further evident, as a product that has been approved to a particular supplier would 
require further approval for any subsequent suppliers. If this product was already approved 
internationally, the duplication of the approval process is therefore compounded further. 
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Resources required to conduct these test are not available to the regulator. Collaboration 
with CSIR, Innovation Hub, Houteq19 was suggested as solutions to serve ICASA strategically 
to coordinate these efforts and use to its benefit. This coordination in turn should encourage 
local production of equipment. Local equipment however still requires international testing, 
which the puts the manufacturer at a disadvantage as the testing costs are too high. The net 
result is a restriction of innovation in the country (RN2A, RQ7L, RN6B, RD3M).  
 
Several suppliers noted that communication or the lack thereof seems to be one of the major 
issues of the current EA process (SN4M, SD2M, IOW2E, OR1A, SM1E, OB2G). The EA process 
on its own is technically complex and demanding in terms of the requirements. A perceived 
lack of communication from the regulator compounds the difficulty associated with this 
process and makes obtaining EA approval a difficult task for suppliers. ICASA was seen to 
communicate infrequently with its key stakeholders in the EA process, or sometimes not to 
communicate at all. The ICASA website, seen by many suppliers as the first port of call for 
information, was considered to be a nightmare to navigate. The website was not updated 
regularly and did not provide sufficient detail of the EA process. There seem to be no 
documents available that provided an easy to use guide to the EA process. EA applicants were 
advised to consult various Acts and regulations, which were not user-friendly. Simple queries 
about the EA process meant that suppliers had to call through to ICASA, leading to long waits 
before they were able to talk to an ICASA staff member. ICASA staff were seen to be difficult 
to get hold off, with calls and emails going answered. This has resulted in a significant amount 
of frustration on the part of the EA applicants, further straining the relationship between the 
ICASA and its stakeholders. ICASA is further not active on social media, making emails and 
phone calls the only avenue available to EA applicants to contact the regulator. In-person 
meetings were thus the norm with applicants, sometimes waiting for an entire day to meet 
an ICASA staff member, which was a source of extreme frustration to the applicant. This 
frustration was compounded when the query was a simple one that could have been easily 
solved via email or telephone.  
 
                                                          
19 These are testing facilities in South Africa 
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Information and access to information were also an issue to the regulator. TLS3T & RM5S 
noted that enforcement officials at the regulator required up-to-date access to EA approval 
information, to properly enact enforcement activities such as confiscating non-type approved 
equipment. The current type approval scenario made this impossible, as the EA approval 
databases were not consolidated and not remotely accessible. This remote access was critical 
when the enforcement officials went on enforcement drives to retail stores to check for illegal 
equipment. To further complicate matters, equipment sold via third parties and not the EA 
certificate holder, was an almost impossible task to trace. Figure 19 breaks down the 
problems associated with the current EA process into three key themes: 
 
Figure 19: Problems with the current EA process 
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counterfeit equipment, amongst other problems. The current EA process cannot guarantee 
that the actual product is the same as the tested sample (RM4J, RQ7L, RN6B, RN2A, RG5N, 
TLS3T). ICASA does not confirm from a sample of the mass production run of the equipment 
that it is the same as the tested sample. No proof of compliance is required in terms of the 
current regulations as well. This raised the issue of trust here once again. EC equipment 
suppliers are not motivated to ensure that the retail equipment matches the tested sample 
as they are aware of the regulator's inability to test such compliance. This has emboldened 
some suppliers to either focus only on regulatory conformance through a “golden sample” or 
to submit false test reports (RN6B). These suppliers do not fear any reprisals from the 
regulator for such actions as the burden of proof lies with the regulator. Should ICASA develop 
the ability to conduct post-market verifications, the issue of trust between ICASA and the EC 
equipment suppliers would be addressed. The EC equipment supplier would be less likely to 
sell equipment that did not meet the regulatory requirements, because of sanctions that the 
regulator could levy due to non-conformance as a result of post-market testing.  ICASA would 
thus be more likely to trust the information provided by such suppliers.  
 
RM5S recalled only a single instance where ICASA had conducted post-market testing. The 
case revolved around a complaint from an amateur radio club about a gate motor that was 
radiating into the amateur radio band. ICASA removed and tested this gate motor (which was 
type approved), and the tests revealed it to be operating within the standards. This EMC 
testing was conducted at a private test laboratory in South Africa, and ICASA covered the full 
cost of this private testing. The complaint from the amateur radio club was thus dismissed. 
Collaboration with local and international test facilities was suggested as a mechanism to 
assist with proving compliance. OB2G & RS3R were adamant that the regulator or even the 
country as a whole, did not require its own test facilities as collaboration with other test 
facilities would be adequate to conduct post-market testing.   
 
The simplified process EA process used in South Africa (where manufacturers provide the 
initial test reports which other suppliers can use for subsequent approvals) was also listed as 
a challenge as people do not see the need to approve a previously approved product. RN2A 
pointed out that a stable EC equipment market was required where manufacturers can 
compete and that this was still difficult to implement in South Africa.  
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Solving the golden sample problem will have a direct impact on the quality of the product, as 
continuous compliance to the approved EA standards through post-market testing would 
ensure that the manufactured product conforms to the regulated standards. The regulated 
standards ensure that the equipment meets quality standards, hence the continuous testing 
of post-market devices will be very advantageous (OH1M).  
The level of fines imposed should serve as a sufficient deterrent to suppliers should they not 
conform to the EA approval standards. Such fines could be used to fund future post-market 
surveillance and could hence be self-funding. The European Union program of post market 
testing was suggested as a benchmark as “…there is no need to reinvent the wheel” (OH1M). 
RM5S suggested an alternative funding mechanism, by suggesting that the burden of proof 
of compliance should be moved to the equipment supplier, thereby passing the cost of testing 
away from the regulator to the vendor. The penalties for non-compliance should be similar 
to the EU model, where criminal action can be taken against individuals such as directors of a 
company, should non-compliance be noted. With such harsh and stringent penalties, the 
likelihood of suppliers providing golden samples should be greatly reduced. 
 
SABS have faced a similar problem and have identified the acceptance of third party test 
reports as a major risk (TLS2L). To that end, SABS no longer accepts third party test reports 
and tests all products submitted to SABS for certification. These products may include 
everything from toasters to motor vehicles for all their divisional clusters (electro-technical, 
automotive, mechanical and biochemical, mining and minerals). SABS have entered into 
agreements with test laboratories both local and internationally to test products that they 
are unable to test themselves. SABS negotiates this testing on a case by case basis and 
determines how much (if any) verification testing that they can do. Ultimately, the complete 
test report is issued only by SABS, irrespective of the where the testing was done. The supplier 
bears the entire cost of such testing. As SABS can randomly select the sample for testing, this 
approach eliminates the golden sample problem entirely. The major drawback to this process 
is the additional time required for testing. Equipment suppliers have expressed frustration 
with the “new” approach of SABS, citing significant financial loss due to the long lead times 
(IOW2E, SM1E, SD2M). SABS themselves concede that this approach is challenging regarding 
the availability of resources and advise their customers that there is a several-month-long 
backlog in the testing department (TLS2L). 
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TLJ1H noted that, even if the product submitted for testing is identical in all respects to the 
commercially available product, there is no guarantee that it would remain the same during 
its lifecycle. Most EC equipment generally face certain changes during the lifespan of that 
equipment, with changes in components that could impact the RF characteristics of the 
device. An example would be a microprocessor that may become obsolete, leading to the 
supplier replacing it with a newer version for subsequent production runs of that equipment. 
EC suppliers rarely retest the equipment or revalidate the EA approval. Such changes can have 
a significant impact on the emissions of the product. Even simple changes such as a firmware 
update can impact emissions. The same applies to software changes – a change from an 
Android version 1 operating system to an Android version 3 may impact issues such as battery 
management, which ultimately impacts the emissions from the device. These changes in 
emissions mean that the equipment no longer conforms to the original specification to which 
it received EA approval. Figure 20 depicts the golden sample issue as a summation of five key 
variables. 
Figure 20: Golden sample issue 
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4.16 Understanding the cumbersome nature of the EA process 
The current EA process was described as being cumbersome, flawed and arduous by several 
commentators (RN2A, OS5J, OK3H, OR1A, RG5N, SD2M, SM1E, IOG4P). The cumbersome 
nature of the process coupled with the lack of resources at the disposal of the regulator has 
created the general impression that ICASA is essentially a bottleneck in the entire EA 
ecosystem. The majority of informants agreed that a more efficient EA process was required. 
Quicker turnaround times were identified as a key action point to alleviate at least the 
bottlenecks in the actual approval process.  
 
One of the factors that has led to suppliers becoming increasing frustrated was ICASA’s 
response time to technical queries (SD2M). When dealing with technical reports in general, 
many suppliers have their principal vendors based overseas. With US vendors, in particular, 
any query sent to them by the South African supplier results unfailingly in a 24 hour wait 
period in an ideal scenario. This is owing to the time difference between South Africa and the 
US. The same applies to a request for reports from a factory in China, which results in another 
24-hour delay.  Thus even simple queries would take at least 48 hours to resolve.  
 
“We can have a disjointed conversion with no real response, especially when trying to 
explain ICASA’s request to a non-English speaker” (SD2M).  
 
SM1E highlighted a similar language barrier and stated that Chinese and Japanese 
manufacturers, in particular, had a difficult time understanding EA queries. 
 
Given the difficulty in sourcing the required information required by ICASA, suppliers are 
aggrieved when a timely response from the regulator is not received.  
 
Some commentators are of the opinion that in addition to the EA process being cumbersome, 
it is also an unnecessary duplication. RD3M notes that: 
 
These devices have already been approved in other countries, so why should these products 
be approved here again in South Africa?  It is very seldom that SA will not approve a device. 
For RF devices, there has never been a case where a device approval has been rejected. It is a 
151 
 
 
 
waste of time doing the type approval here again. The supplier should just declare that they 
meet the requirements and we should grant the approval.  
 
The duplication as described by RD3M highlights a significant inefficiency of the process, as 
EC equipment approved for use in the EU for example, would require approval for use in South 
Africa. This requirement in itself does not appear unreasonable, however the fact that ICASA 
has seemingly never made an executive decision to disallow an EC device based on technical 
considerations, raises questions about the relevance and necessity of a further technical 
evaluation. The focus of conducting a technical evaluation is significant regarding resource 
allocation, as the output of six technical staff members of the regulator is channelled to a 
single administrative person. The issues around efficiencies discussed earlier are linked to the 
issues of resources and dedicating resources to a process that could be subverted was seen 
as inefficient (RD3M).  
 
Other informants have been more sceptical, referring to the EA process as a “rubber-
stamping” exercise with the primary aim of generating revenue for the regulator (OR1A). 
OB2G also noted that the EA process is “almost a rubber stamping process” and pointed out 
that the quality of the product is verified by the test laboratory where it is physically tested 
to the appropriate performance and interoperability standards. The regulator merely reviews 
the test reports from these laboratories without conducting any further testing. OB2G raised 
the question whether ICASA has ever rejected an EA approval that met all the test laboratory 
requirements. RD3M earlier noted not ever recalling a single instance where an RF device was 
rejected for approval by ICASA, after meeting all the test requirements during laboratory 
testing.  
 
Despite evidence pointing to ICASA being the source of these bottlenecks, staff at the 
regulator were adamant that despite all the resource constraints, there should be no 
compromise with regards to fulfilling the core objectives of EA.  Instead, the suggestion was 
to drive additional capacity to the sector. RG5N suggested a three-pronged approach to this: 
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Table 2: Approach to drive additional capacity to the EC sector 
Approach Detail 
Request the South African government to 
help build testing capacity within South 
Africa.  
 
These could be in the form of policy 
initiatives that must be put in place to drive 
a local EC equipment industry, coupled with 
a local test facility for the local testing of 
standards 
 
Request the South African government to 
provide subsidies 
This initiative should extend to subsidise 
costs, especially costs related to the testing 
of equipment by SMMEs.  
 
Request National Treasury to allow ICASA to 
retain a portion of fees collected 
ICASA is financially constrained and allowing 
the regulator to keep a portion of collected 
revenue would alleviate several resource 
issues. 
 
 
The EA process further impacts the equipment supply market by encumbering the supply 
value chain. SD2M noted that the requirement to affix labels to both the product and the 
packaging in terms of the EA labelling regulations has at times forced EC equipment suppliers 
to physically open sealed equipment packing to affix the ICASA label onto the equipment. This 
action can invalidate the warranty offered by the international equipment manufacturer as 
well as adds significant labour costs. Figure 21 highlights the key issues that describe the 
cumbersome EA process. 
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Figure 21: The cumbersome EA process 
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equipment (OS5J). South Africa would thus have to deploy more resources than a developed 
country to ensure that the quality of EC equipment conforms to the EA regulations.  
 
 
4.18 Does the EA impact the cost of doing business? 
The current EA approach is generally considered as not being able to deal with the current 
situation that exists in South Africa. The network operators and equipment suppliers, in 
particular, have raised concerns that the costs of approval ultimately impact the cost of the 
product (OR1A, OK2H, RG5N, SD2M & OB2G). Also of concern were the knock-on cost effects 
of delays caused by the EA approval process which are sometimes not easily visible. Such 
additional costs include storage costs for equipment waiting at Customs at the South African 
borders, while that supplier waits for EA. These delays, unfortunately, cause further friction 
between the EA applicants and the Regulator. 
 
The EA team at ICASA agree that they are constantly “putting out fires” dealing with irate 
customers and do not have an opportunity to work strategically. ICASA has put in place 
mechanisms to monitor data relevant to EA performance at ICASA, to try to address the 
bottleneck caused by the EA process strategically. RM1K disclosed a long-term solution that 
ICASA was working on to address the informational deficiencies of the current EA regime. This 
solution involved a new software management system that would largely automate the EA 
process and would include a web-based system for ease of use. The idea of this system would 
be to reduce human intervention and apply algorithms make certain decisions during the EA 
process. RM1K stressed that the idea was not to remove human intervention completely, but 
rather to reduce it. 
 
While the expenses incurred across the entire EA value chain may be high, OK3H was of the 
view that the cost of the EA process itself is not prohibitive. The value derived from the EA 
process outweighs the cost associated with the process. EA also prevents dumping of 
equipment (outdated EC equipment being sold at low prices) and the costs associated with 
such an activity is difficult to quantify, hence a cost-benefit analysis of the EA process would 
certainly yield a result that supports the continuation of such a regime.  
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Perhaps one of the biggest reasons that EA increases conformance costs can be attributed to 
the South African Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) itself (RS3R). South Africa is 
peculiar, in that the network impedance of the country PSTN is not the same as the rest of 
the world. This peculiarity means that EC equipment that is used in Europe cannot be simply 
employed in South Africa. It has to be tested to South African standards and technical 
requirements for the mere fact of the impendence being different. This impedance difference 
has a major impact on getting economy of scale benefits for pricing, as the devices need to 
be modified to match South African requirements. South Africa a very small market and has 
only a 1% market for EC equipment of the global market when compared to 30-40% of the 
world market for a developed region like Europe (RS3R).  
 
RS3R thought that the deviation was regrettable as it causes South Africa to be unique. South 
Africa is, therefore, forced to adopt standards for the EA process that is not region or even 
country specific. This in turn drives up the cost of EC equipment as the country does not 
benefit from the economies of scale, had we aligned to Europe. Standards must conform to a 
larger market, such as Europe, as South Africa is in the same ITU region. The European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) is the regulatory body 
for Europe and contains about forty countries, which includes a vast majority of the EU 
market. The more South Africa can align itself to these markets, the more it can benefit from 
economies of scale in the marketplace. Most major EC manufacturers produce equipment for 
more than 60 countries and will only deviate from international standards if the market is 
large enough to warrant such a deviation (SM1E).   
4.19 The current EA process and competition 
RM1K & RM4J agreed that the current process did not impact competition negatively, but did 
not implicitly state that it supported competition. The current EA process treated all 
applicants in the same fashion and did not favour specific people or entities. OEMs were dealt 
with in a similar fashion to SMMEs. OK3H was aware of other EA regimes were OEMs were 
given a higher level of priority than other applicants but stated that this does not occur in 
South Africa. 
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RN2A, RD3M, RS3R & OH1M felt that the current EA process does support competition as it 
is not an exclusive process and it facilitates products from various Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMS), which in turn drives down prices. This opens the EA process to 
anyone.  
The inclusive nature of the current EA process was seen as a valuable and non-discriminatory 
by most informants. The focus of the EA process is based on technical parameters, and EA 
approval would be granted to any entity that can demonstrate as such. The “simplified” 
process extends this approach, by allowing any supplier to approve previously approved EC 
equipment, allowing multiple providers of the same product and thus enhancing competition.  
 
RS3R noted that frequency coordination, made possible by EA, ensured that a multitude of 
devices could operate without interference within a shared frequency. This coordination 
ensures that any number of manufacturers can develop equipment for use in shared bands, 
thereby promoting competition. Without EA, only a selected number of concurrent users 
would be able to use a particular frequency, significantly reducing competition in the EC 
equipment market. 
 
OB2G was of the view that EA should be neutral and not support or inhibit competition. EA 
should create a level playing field for all actors involved in the process. EA should always be 
transparent and non-discriminatory and treat all applicants in the same manner.  
 
While the earlier discussion around competition centred on competition in the equipment 
supply market, OK3H suggested an alternative view and noted that EA was essential to 
promoting competition at an industry level especially with regards to number portability. 
Number portability allows consumers to switch from one network provider to another, 
without losing their number. This process may have some technical complexities, as the 
frequency allocation to the various cellular operators in South Africa varies, with operators 
using combinations of the 900MHz, 1800 MHz and 2100MHz bands for different services such 
as 3G, HSPA and LTE. This frequency allocation means that for a seamless and problem free 
port from one operator top another, the consumer handset must be able to operate 
faultlessly in all assigned bands for all types of services. EA is thus critical to ensure this 
seamless transition, with cellular operators conducting in-house testing of handsets, in 
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conjunction with the EA process, to ensure interoperability between networks. EA is thus 
essential in promoting competition in the cellular market by ensuring handset conformance 
and compatibility to all the cellular frequency bands in use in South Africa. 
 
4.20 The current EA process and innovation 
None of the respondents would strongly support the notion that the current EA regime 
supported innovation. The general feeling was the opposite, that the current EA process 
inhibited innovation.  RM1K was aware of small companies that were very innovative in South 
Africa but were put off by the high costs of EA compliance. The EA process was felt to be too 
cumbersome, and the high cost of conformity deterred innovation by cash-strapped start-up 
companies.  
 
RN2A, in particular, was also of the opinion that the current EA process did not support 
innovation and suggested that a strong collaborative effort is required to ensure that 
Research and Development (R&D) technology is passed onto South African manufacturers. 
ICASA itself does not conduct visits to manufacturers for them to understand the entire 
product life-cycle. RN2A saw this as a future-looking scenario. The lack of local testing facilities 
was also mentioned as contributing limiting innovation in the local EA environment as local 
content is not encouraged since it is easier to import equipment than produce it locally. 
 
4.21 The current EA approach and trade 
The view from the regulatory staff of ICASA, in general, was that the current EA regime did 
support trade in South Africa, but not on a regional scale within Southern Africa. Although no 
intra-regional agreements exist with regards to the mutual recognition of EA in the SADC 
region, OH1M & OR1A were of the view that many SADC countries accepted the ICASA 
approval framework without further testing or certification. The current EA approach has thus 
unwittingly contributed to facilitating regional trade at SADC level, without any supporting 
governmental policy structures.   
 
There are however regional and international imperatives to establish conformity and 
interoperability frameworks within developing countries intending to expand trade 
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opportunities within ITU member countries (ITU, 2016). RG5N noted that that ITU provides 
this support and has also produced a guideline document for developing countries that assists 
developing countries in setting up their Conformance and Interoperability (C&I) test facility. 
ITU (2016:36) notes that: 
 
i) Conformity assessment builds consumers’ trust and confidence in tested products and 
consequently strengthens business environment. 
ii) Interoperability results in economy benefits from business stability, scalability and cost 
reduction of systems, equipment and tariffs 
iii) C&I increase market opportunities, encourage trade and removal of technical barriers, 
spreading ICT services availability and affordability 
iv) ITU assists Member States in developing capacity and develop skill sets in establishing 
regulatory frameworks/policies on C&I 
 
The themes of trust, confidence, trade, capacity development, skills development, 
affordability and cost reduction are common themes that appear in the data gathered from 
the informants interviewed as well as the literature reviewed. RG5N’s suggests that South 
Africa adopt the fundamental principles of the ITU guidelines regarding the C&I framework, 
but adapt it to suit our requirements. The ITU (2014) framework makes the assumption that 
such a framework does not exist in a developing country and provides detailed guidance on 
how to create one. Given that South Africa already has a fairly advanced framework in place, 
RG5N suggests that ICASA pays specific attention to the guidance applicable to the 
development of mutual recognition agreements with test facilities and other regulatory 
authorities. Mutual recognition agreements would promote regional and international trade, 
reduce compliance costs, reduce time to market and reduce the regulatory burden on the 
regulator, without compromising on the objectives of EA.  
 
The questions around trade raised another important issue, being the ‘brand awareness’ of 
the EA process.  It seems the ICASA approval process in South Africa lacked any significant 
consumer awareness. It was only the larger retailers that were aware of the ICASA EA process, 
and ICASA receives numerous calls and emails from such retailers to verify the EA status of 
equipment that they stock. With that being said, RM1K felt that there exists a level of ‘respect’ 
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for the ICASA sticker and ICASA brand, but this was in contrast to their reluctance to comply 
with another layer of “red-tape”. ICASA staff, in general, did not believe that the ICASA sticker 
had an adequate brand value, compliance to the ICASA EA process was driven by fear rather 
than an in-depth understanding of the EA process. ICASA was aware of several suppliers that 
still actively avoids or tries to avoid the EA process. 
 
TLJ1H noted that the EC market was highly competitive and sensitive to escalating costs. 
Multinational companies like Sony have already exited the South African market, with Canon 
possibly following suit. High compliance costs will only serve to hasten their exit from the SA 
market. Suppliers leaving the EC market in turn adversely impacts competition and prices, as 
well as limits the foreign direct investment into South Africa. The EA process thus is not 
conducive to investment, given the high compliance costs and long turn-around times. 
 
RN2A, however, held a differing view that the current EA process does support trade as the 
process does not create technical barriers to trade. Verification and testing should thus not 
be seen as a barrier to trade as it is a crucial means to verify conformance and trade would 
not be helped if the product does not function as it should. 
 
OB2G held a differing opinion and stated that: 
“The current EA does not support nor stagnate; it is not its function or purpose. It 
should be agnostic. Competition and trade would happen as a consequence”. 
This statement is similar to OB2G’s opinion of EA and competition, in that EA should as a 
consequence support trade and competition, but not have this as its focus.  
 
4.22 The current EA approach and quality  
Informants broadly supported the notion that the current EA process facilitates quality EC 
products. The assessment of an EA application is conducted in great detail, and the product 
is subjected to rigorous testing e.g. safety testing and drop testing. The fact that ICASA relies 
on test reports to confirm compliance, linked this section to trust as well. ICASA staff 
conceded that there is more emphasis on the operation of the device rather than the quality 
of the device. They felt that the quality of the device should be tested by the South African 
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Bureau of Standards (SABS). ICASA seemed to have more confidence in products certified by 
laboratories that they trust, although they are obliged to accept test reports from any 
accredited test facility. 
 
RM1K did, however, note that the Quality of Service (QoS) as opposed to the device quality, 
was still a function of the EA process and managed by ICASA. This raised the issue of 
duplication of roles and functions. 
 
RM4J disagreed with the assessment that the current EA process impacted on the quality of 
the product as ICASA lacked the mechanism to verify such a claim. As ICASA did not test 
products already in the market, they had to rely on complaints to gauge the impact of the EA 
process on the quality of equipment. Interference complaints were the most common type 
of complaints that the regulator dealt with, although these complaints were not necessarily 
an indication of the quality of the equipment as there could be a multitude of factors that 
impact interference. Inferior products could also simply not be reported, so the regulator did 
not possess an empirical method to categorically measure and report the impact of the 
current EA regime on the quality of the EC equipment. 
 
4.23 Investigating the current regulatory approach to EA 
All commentators unanimously described the current approach as largely command and 
control as ICASA controls the entire value chain of the process. There is currently no self-
declaration allowed for EA.  
 
OS5J listed an example typical to operators, where the equipment being type approved is 
used only by the network operator. In this case, any failure of the equipment will have 
significant detrimental effects on the operator’s network, leading to loss of productivity and 
as associated financial burden. The network operator in this instance is thus sufficiently self-
motivated to ensure that the EC equipment meets the required specification of the EA 
approval process. For cases such as this, it was suggested that the network operator is allowed 
to “self-declare” conformance to the EA standards, without the associated process of proving 
test reports as proof of compliance. In this case, the argument of conformance assessment to 
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prove conformance would be moot, as any penalties that may be incurred by the operator 
for non-conformance to the regulated standards would not approach the economic and 
reputational damage that the operator would incur itself through non-compliance.  
 
The larger OEMs are also acutely aware of their brand value and brand reputation. OB2G 
listed an example of role reversal: 
There is a shift where Apple would now validate the operators’ network, instead of the 
network validated the device. It is a reversal of roles. Apple, for example, refused to validate 
LTE on their phones unless they could be comfortable that the network could support the 
device. 
The larger OEMs want to ensure that their product performs seamlessly on the operator’s 
network and conduct interoperability testing extensively in this regard. In the example listed 
with Apple, the operator took a decision to make certain features unavailable on their device 
until they were confident of the network’s ability to support the device technology. This was 
and still is the domain of the network operator, who routinely conduct further interoperability 
tests with EC equipment before offering them for sale on their networks. Both these types of 
testing (by the operator and OEM) are additional tests to the EA mandated requirements. 
OB2G further stated that as much as 40% of the ICASA approved EC devices submitted to the 
network operator, fail interoperability testing and are not sold by the operator. OR1A 
supported that statistic and noted that the ICASA approval did not guarantee the functionality 
of the device. Operators conduct a “health check” of the device and not necessarily a “deep 
dive” test of the equipment (OR1A). Such functional testing has repeated showed that 
international approvals, although a necessary first step to permitting equipment to operate 
on a network, did not necessarily indicate that the equipment is fit for use on a South African 
network. OR1A noted that it would be important for the regulator to have access to such test 
facilitates if only to verify the functionality of the equipment. 
 
 
4.24 The current EA approach to standards 
ICASA has a list of standards regulations that details the technical requirements of EC 
equipment EA.  ICASA considers this document a “living document” that is updated annually 
if necessary and is of the opinion that it contributes to the local standards development and 
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process. ICASA defines the standards and declares the compulsory standards required for 
approval. ICASA sometimes needs to explain the standards requirements to suppliers, but it 
is generally clear to the laboratories (RN2A, RM1K, RD8M, RN6B).   
 
RM1K raises a key point of ‘differentiated suppliers’, where the current approach appears to 
work well with the larger suppliers. The level of trust (regarding test report acceptance) that 
ICASA assigns to the larger suppliers seems to higher than what is assigned to the smaller 
suppliers (RM1K, RN2A, RG5N, RN6B). It should be noted that the list of standards that ICASA 
applies to the EA process is not exhaustive. ICASA generally uses ETSI, CISPR and IEC standards 
as a benchmark, although ICASA may accept other standards, bearing in mind the frequency 
arrangement of the standard submitted. 
 
4.25 The current EA approach and consumer protection 
RM1K felt that the current EA approach provided just a 60-70% confidence level in protecting 
consumers. ICASA could not guarantee that every device confirms to the full functionality as 
required by the EA process. However, the process does show the ICASA label, and the 
consumer can make a decision to purchase or not. ICASA penalises suppliers that do not affix 
the ICASA sticker, but unfortunately, there seems not be a mechanism actually to verify the 
authenticity of the label. 
 
OH1M raised a point that the consumers look for the ICASA EA certification, and the 
certification process has enough rigor built into it to ensure quality EC equipment, hence the 
EA process does lend itself to consumer protection.  SN4M supported this position and stated 
that EA approval serves as a mechanism to prove quality, as the EC equipment is subjected to 
varies levels of compliance checks, which ensures that the final product is of a high quality. 
This in turn serves as a consumer protection mechanism by ensuring that only quality 
equipment can be sold to the consumer. 
 
4.26 Choosing a level of performance of standards  
RM1K noted that the actual standard is not interrogated by ICASA and that conformance to 
the entire standard is required. Each item of the standard is not considered individually, just 
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the overall standard. There is a zero tolerance approach to standards. This highlights a key 
issue to ICASA’s approach to EA regulation, in that conformance to the standards and the 
integrity of the EA process seems to be paramount (RS3R, RG5N, RN6B, RD8M, RN2A, RM1K). 
ICASA believes that if the equipment complies with the prescribed standards for EA approval, 
then there should not be a problem with the equipment. ICASA is aware that the level 
required for compliance is high, as high as any first world country. ICASA also notes that it is 
mindful of the fact that it is expensive to comply with all these standards, but is steadfast that 
such standards cannot be relaxed. In this sense, ICASA does not factor in any mitigating factors 
to the cost of the device. The sole focus is to ensure conformance of the device without 
compromise (RN9B, RQ7L, RG5N, RN2A).  
 
RS3R cautioned that South Africa should only apply a standard insofar as to ensure 
functionality, as anything more would increase costs. With constant improvements in 
technology, modern digital communications incorporate error correction techniques that do 
not prohibit errors, as these errors can be corrected by the intelligence built into the EC 
device. Standards, therefore, should not be applied in a perfect sense to achieve 100% 
accuracy in the functioning of certain equipment, as this would result in higher device costs. 
 
In some instances, the level of performance in some standards is higher than the international 
benchmark. TLS2L cites the example of assessing the IEC/ISO 17025, which is a quality 
management standard for test laboratories. The South African specification has additional “R” 
documents (SANAS Regulatory documents), which sets higher standards than what are 
required by other international test laboratories. International laboratories do not need to 
comply with these “R” documents. Thus this additional requirement serves to improve the 
overall level of quality of local testing done in South Africa. TLS2L stated: 
 
We even have East African Laboratories that request SANAS assessments, for which they had 
previously been assessed by European assessors. These assessors now no longer want to assist 
due to strife and turmoil in these African countries. They are now turning to us to assist. These 
countries have told us that SANAS is too strict and that the European guys are much easier. 
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When these additional requirements are explained to the test facilities, they understand and 
see the value of these additional requirements and then actually support it. 
 
Another natural progression of the EA approval process is related to technology. ICASA staff 
noted that, as technology advances, new equipment has several Radio Frequency (RF) 
performance standards applicable to a single device.  The amount of RF devices per 
equipment has increased, (for example, a single cellular telephone can have a GSM radio, a 
CDMA radio, a Wi-Fi radio module and a GPS radio module.) hence it is becoming more 
expensive to conduct EA testing. Manufacturers, however, seem happy to comply with these 
standards as they see the value in compliance (OR1A, OK3H, OB2G). 
 
Figure 22 is a depiction of the level of standards value chain based on the evidence gathered.  
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Figure 22: Level of Standards 
 
 
 
4.27 The current EA framework in terms of credible and stability  
Respondents generally thought that the current EA framework was credible, but not fully in 
the sense of standards as no testing is done locally. ICASA has to rely on third party test 
reports and cannot independently verify the authenticity of these reports. Reports can be 
forged, hence the confidence level and credibility is not 100%. ICASA cannot guarantee that 
all equipment that makes it onto the market is type approved, and this impacts the stability 
of the market (OB2G, OK3H, RN2A, RQ7L, RM4J). This raises the trust and verification issues 
once again.  
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RN2A cited the example of the “simplified” type approval process, in which a supplier may 
request approval of a previously approved device, without the requirement of providing the 
requisite test reports. In this process, RD3M & RN9B noted that there was significant fraud 
detected, almost exclusively dealing with smaller suppliers. These suppliers attempted to 
claim access to test reports that did not correspond to the device that they were trying to 
approve, as well as falsely declaring equivalence between their product and a previously 
approved product. These incidences of fraud seems to have further entrenched ICASA’s 
position regarding the level of trust with smaller suppliers (RM1K, RN2A, RQ7L, RM4J). ICASA 
does not believe that the market is sufficiently mature to allow a self-declaratory regime 
based on the issues of trust. 
  
RN2A was of the opinion that the EA process is clear and precise, as it details the method of 
approach of the Authority. RN2A, however, again raised the issue of a ‘differentiation of 
suppliers’. It seems to ICASA that it is easier for manufacturers and laboratories to understand 
and comply with the EA process, but more challenging for importers and retailers, in particular 
with technical standards. There seems to be a lack of technical personnel within these 
suppliers that do not understand the requirements and do not provide the necessary 
documents required for EA approval. This lack of understanding then adds to unnecessary 
delays in the EA process.  
 
OZ4P provided further input by explaining the key reason for the differentiation of suppliers. 
Small and medium suppliers do not have access to in-house test facilities that the larger 
suppliers generally have. They are forced to rely on independent test facilities to provide test 
results for conformance purposes, which is further compounded by the fast product life cycle 
of EC equipment. OR1A, IOG4P & OB2G supported this view and pointed out that the cellular 
operators conduct their own testing on products for to be used on operator networks, to 
ensure conformance and interoperability. This testing is in addition to the international 
testing that the manufacturer conducts.  
 
Equipment suppliers agree that the EA process itself is clear, but is a matter of interpretation. 
They hold the position that it seems easier for technical people to understand the EA process. 
An example of when a wrong standard has been applied by the supplier as a submission for 
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EA, which then adds to the costs of conformance and compounds the complexity of the 
process for non-technical people.  Constant liaising with ICASA to clarify the interpretation of 
the EA approval rules adds to the administrative burden, and ICASA seems not to encourage 
this dialogue (SD2M, OR1A, OB2G, OK3H). 
 
4.28 Conclusion 
There were several insightful themes that are already evident from the data thus far. There is 
a train of thought that extends to the way in which suppliers should be considered which 
posits that all suppliers are not equal. The second emergent theme centres around the validity 
of data sources made available to the regulator.  Using the extensive data gathered in this 
chapter, it is also evident that the investigation into the shortfall of current theoretical 
approach spanned several different areas. The data collected from the review of the 
legislative framework was also useful in understanding the intent of these documents. A 
thematic approach was adopted in reporting the data, and this method will be used in the 
next chapter as well. Keys themes and initial codes have been noted and will be further 
interrogated in Chapter 7.  
 
 
168 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: The characteristics of a developing country 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide data for the second research sub-question of this study: 
 
Why are the characteristics of a developing country unique and how can these 
characteristics be considered when developing an innovative theoretical approach to 
regulating EA? 
 
This chapter lists and investigates the attributes of a developing country and first determines 
whether these characteristics are unique and secondly investigates the impact that such 
attributes would have, when considering an innovative theoretical approach to EA. The 
nature of innovation is also studied, with a specific focus on differentiating between 
technology innovation and developing regulatory innovation.  Innovation is a key theme of 
this chapter and has wide-ranging implications when contemplating future regulatory 
regimes.  The generalisability of a developing country is studied further in relation to the 
published literature, providing data on an alternative approach to dealing with developing 
country factors. The final section investigates the balanced approach between developing 
country imperatives and an innovative approach to EA regulation. 
 
5.2 Characteristics of developing countries 
RM1K asserted that there are characteristics unique to a developing country and listed 
literacy and skill sets as examples. South Africa still consumes products from other countries 
and lacks in industrial development.  RM1K used the phrase ‘technological colony’ as an 
economic term to describe the impact that Europe has on South Africa’s EC equipment 
industry. RM1K further listed high unemployment and low economic growth as well as 
poverty as unique characteristics of developing countries. 
 
RN2A and RG5N also noted unique features of a developed country, where reliable 
manufacturers and a proper framework for EA exist. They noted that developed countries 
have heavy penalties for non-conformance and that suppliers are required to manage their 
own EA process. This self-management is opposed to the South African environment where 
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this process is largely driven and managed by the regulator. This subtle shift in responsibility 
is significant, as the costs of proving non-conformance lie with the regulator. The regulator 
would ordinarily have no basis to declare the quality of a piece of equipment, other than the 
test reports submitted by the supplier. The relationship in first world countries is based on 
trust first, rather than proof of compliance upfront. Proof or verification is required only when 
there is a problem. The penalties for non-compliance seem to serve developed countries as 
an adequate deterrent to prevent false declaration.  This approach is not a viable option for 
developing countries as they do not have access to test facilities or funds to conduct 
compliance testing. In developing countries, the regulator has thus to take problems taken 
back to the country of the manufacturer (usually a developed country) rather than solving 
them in-house.  This inability to solve problems locally perpetuates to the ‘technology colony’ 
mindset between developed and developing countries. 
 
Other commentators suggested a solution to this issue (albeit a long term one), as implement 
in-house testing and to build relationships with other test facilities (OR1A, OB2G, SD2M). This 
approach is in keeping with the emerging theme of cooperation and collaboration.  The 
rationale for suppliers to support such collaborative attempts seems to be rooted in a self-
interest motive rather than a public interest objective Suppliers are concerned with 
reputational damage and seems aligned towards not jeopardising their reputation. TLS2L 
goes as far as to state that competition between testing facilities in a developing country such 
as South Africa should not exist, as testing facilities must pool their resources for all of them 
to survive. As the testing abilities available locally in South Africa are fragmented, no single 
laboratory can conduct all the required EC equipment testing. Testing laboratories must then 
share the test burden based on the ability to be fully capable of meeting the testing needs of 
the country.  
 
There are, however, several unscrupulous dealers in the South African market for counterfeit 
equipment. These dealers highlight the previous theme of ‘differentiation of suppliers’, where 
the perceived lower end of the supply market may be prone violate EA rules as they are 
inelastic to increasing costs (RQ7L, RN6B, RD3M). Pricing and costs are thus important issues, 
and manufacturers must be able to provide products to a developing market at the lowest 
possible prices.  
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There seems to be a key distinction between South Africa as a developing country and a 
developed country, as the South African market size warrants us access to the latest EC 
equipment technology, but the country generally does not acquire the research capability and 
intellectual capital that accompany such products. Patents sit in other countries, and the only 
mechanism we can achieve such R&D is via backwards integration (essentially developing a 
product design by copying the design of the final physical product). The ultimate aim would 
be to source research capability into the country along with manufacturing, as just 
manufacturing alone will not helpful (RQ7L, SD2M, TLJ1H).   
 
 
5.3 Challenges in the EA process in relation to the developmental state of South 
Africa 
RM1K listed literacy as a key challenge faced by ICASA in the EA process.  ICASA licensees at 
times do not understand the EA process and find the requirements difficult to comprehend.  
Some of these people are very innovative and understand the industry well, and would like 
to comply with the EA requirements, but cannot do so due to low levels of literacy. It is 
sometimes beyond their level of comprehension to adhere to the regulations that guide the 
type approval process in South Africa. 
 
 The economic conditions were also listed as a critical factor, as equipment suppliers cannot 
afford the cost of conformance. Local production of EC equipment is stymied by the high cost 
of conformance.  The economic consideration is two-fold, applying to new suppliers who are 
prevented from entering the EC market as well as to established suppliers, who are forced to 
close down due to the high costs of testing (RQ7L, RN6B, OB2G, RG5N, IOG4P). RD3M, 
however, disagreed with this assessment as the introduction of the “simplified method” of 
EA approval has meant that test reports are no longer a problem for devices that have been 
previously approved by ICASA. Testing costs are not applicable as a supplier can simply follow 
the administrative requirements and be granted EA. 
 
Technological innovation has had the unintended consequence of contributing to the cost of 
EA approval. Cellular telephones were listed as an example. In the past, these phone had to 
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be tested to just a GSM standard. With the advent of technology, these phones now need 
testing to CDMA standards, 3G standards, 4G and LTE standards. Each additional technology 
increases the testing burden required for EA conformance (OB2G, OR1A). 
  
Lack of governmental support for research facilities was listed as being a priority for the 
government as there is a perception of not having enough innovation within the country 
(PP1L). The key point made here was that South Africa did not lack the facilities to innovate, 
but did not collaborate to maximise on the resources that are already present within the 
country.  The Innovation Hub was listed as a resource to maximise. Ultimately, it was 
suggested that although South Africa faced many developing country challenges, it could still 
do more via a better mechanism of monitoring, evaluating, collaborating and measuring 
(RG5N).  An example of such collaboration that was listed included the MoU signed with the 
South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) as a test facility to conduct limited approvals on 
behalf of ICASA (RN2A, RM1K).  
 
TLJ1H, however, saw this collaboration as an example of what not to do. While ICASA is 
responsible for intentional RF transmitters, SABS (in terms of the MoU) handles all non-
intentional RF emissions. SABS has recently changed their approval process and will not 
accept test reports from accredited test laboratories and insists upon conducting local testing 
for all products. Their lead times increased from 20 days to 240 days. Such long lead times are 
untenable to the equipment suppliers, and the introduction of this process has resulted in 
some suppliers considering selling their products illegally. Suppliers, especially in the IT and 
EC environment, have product life-cycles of three months. Long turn-around times thus make 
launching such products not viable for the South African market, as suppliers are not willing 
to support a product that is obsolete. IOG4P went as far as to say that the EA process is the 
fundamental reason for so many smaller suppliers illegally selling their products. 
 
SABS also considers all the equipment in the same manner, and  the consequence is that a 
cheap five dollar phone charger is subject to the same tests as a large flat screen television 
(TLJ1H).  The cost of testing amounts to about R600 000 per product. Economies of scale then 
dictate the final cost of the product, as these conformity costs are passed onto the consumer. 
TLJ1H notes an example of an oscilloscope, which would see no more than 10- 15 sales in total 
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during that product’s lifespan. The testing costs are divided amongst the expected sales, 
thereby greatly increasing the unit cost of each device.  
 
Collaboration is not limited to testing facilities. SN4M noted that suppliers are happy to 
collaborate with the regulator to ensure that the regulator is aware of the latest technological 
trends. This could be implemented through suppliers hosting regular workshops with the 
regulator, to ensure that the regulator is forward thinking and ready for the types of 
technology that would be launched in the country within a 6 to 12 month period. This 
collaboration would allow the regulator to prepare with respect to the standardisation 
framework required to allow new products into the South African market. Such preparation 
would complement the regulator's efforts in collaborating with other standardisation bodies 
both regionally and internationally and may even result in South Africa introducing new 
standardisation agenda items (SN4M). 
 
The importance of EA in a developing country seems to be not well understood. RM5S noted 
that this was particularly an issue for enforcement, as ICASA inspectors are required to obtain 
a court order before inspecting EC equipment. In most cases, ICASA inspectors request police 
escorts to execute such warrants. The South African Police have a backlog of high profile cases 
such as murder and robberies. EA enforcement does not feature prominently in terms of 
importance to them. Even obtaining search warrants are problematic if the Judge that was 
approached by ICASA inspectors to issue the warrant, was not familiar with the provisions of 
the ECA.  
 
IOG4P also agreed that the prominence of EA seems to be overshadowed by other regulatory 
imperatives, although it should be regarded as one of the fundamental functions of the 
regulator. ICASA itself seems not to value the importance of EA: 
 
ICASA does not recognise the work done in interference and type approval (when looking at 
the strategic plan) and looks at EA as some sort of stepchild. All other spectrum issues cannot 
be implemented without EA. (IOG4P). 
 
Figure 23 breaks down the EA process in terms of developing country problems and priorities. 
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Figure 23: EA and Developing country challenges 
 
 
5.4 Generalisability of developing country concerns 
RM1K was of the view that some of these challenges are common, while others are unique. 
Unemployment and low growth were suggested as examples. South Africa, when compared 
to larger developing countries such as India, Brazil and China, has a very low level of growth 
while these countries have markedly higher levels of growth.  The policies of the current 
administration of the country are not conducive to growth, and as such, does not drive 
growth. The political landscape thus is a major factor in driving growth.  
 
Other commentators listed India, South Korea and Egypt as alternatives where these 
countries have evolved beyond the development stage. South Korea was listed as an ideal 
example of a developing country that used technology and innovation to progress to a 
developed country status. India, although a developing country, was listed as a powerhouse 
of software development.  Egypt, also a developing country, had excellent test laboratory 
infrastructure. (RN2A, RM1K, RG5N). 
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The overall takeaway from this discussion was that there is a need to exploit the skills inherent 
in a developing country through governmental policy. Collaboration either locally or 
internationally, was suggested as an ideal mechanism to overcome some of the developing 
country challenges. In that respect, South Africa was seen as somewhat of a “big brother” in 
Africa, from which other developing countries in Africa requested support. Zambia has 
currently requested a MoU with ICASA with regards to promoting regional collaboration.  
 
Such requests highlight a seemingly fraught relationship between trust and collaboration, as 
although South Africa is keen to engage in such bilateral collaboration, it is also uncertain 
whether the integrity of the EA process can be maintained by all parties. A Bi-lateral 
agreement is thus a problem for South Africa in terms of the level of trust with its regional 
counterparts (RN9B, RS3R). SN4M mentioned that: 
 
The last time I was helping guys from (name removed). They worked very slowly and were not 
sure of the requirements for different products. I had to show them what test reports applied 
to the various categories of equipment as well as assure them that the reports I had submitted 
were indeed the correct ones. The ICASA procedure is way better than them. I had to help 
them and show them the process. We are very far in comparison to other African countries. 
 
Other SADC countries are still in the process of developing EA regimes, but it is uncertain 
whether the results from such a system can be trusted, even when such an EA regime is fully 
functional. Trust is thus a key element to the regulator, not only regarding information 
supplied by EC equipment manufacturers, but to other EA regimes as well.  
 
South Africa is, however, aware of the opportunity for leveraging trade for its benefit (e.g. 
through taxes and intellectual property) by entering into such bi-lateral agreements and 
seems to be sincere in building such relationships based on trust and rigour. South Africa is 
also aware that other member states would not jeopardise these relationships knowingly, 
although the lack of expertise and testing facilities may render such agreements unworkable 
(PP1L).  
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Collaboration between local stakeholders in the regulatory environment would also be 
required. OK3H & TLS2L raised a concern that the equipment suppliers are sometimes 
exposed to a “double jeopardy” scenario. Equipment suppliers pay taxes on the power supply 
as well as for the device and EA approval. The EA approval is handled by ICASA while the 
National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications (NCRS) is responsible for the approval of the 
power supply and issues a Letter of Authority (LOA) in this regard. There seems to be 
confusion in that area as the power supply of any EC device is attached to the unit and part 
of the instrument, hence there should be no separation between the power supply and the 
device. This additional “tax” is ultimately passed onto the consumer and in turn, affects the 
affordability of the equipment. The solution suggested would be a level of collaboration 
between ICASA, SARS and NRCS to prevent duplication and double taxation. Further 
compounding this problem was the added disadvantage of time lost submitting to two 
different regulatory authorities. TLS2L noted that just the NRCS itself could take up to nine 
months to issue an LOA, which further adds to the two to six month processing time required 
for ICASA EA approval. The time lost in adhering to regulatory considerations could amount 
to a year before the product can be legally sold in South Africa. 
 
South Africa was also seen as being unique in terms of development (RM4J). The level of 
facilities and infrastructure in the EA environment that South Africa has access to surpasses 
any other country in the SADC region. In that sense, South Africa’s development state was 
considered closer to a developed country than a developing country. IOG4P noted that the 
EA regimes in some SADC countries were poor, making the South African regime seem 
impressive by comparison. South Africa has a distinct urban-rural divide, where the urban 
areas enjoy facilities on par with developed countries while the rural areas face the same 
problems in general as developing countries (OB2G, PP1L).  The distinctive urban-rural split is 
evident by the high GINI coefficient of South Africa. OB2G added that: 
We have a very high GINI coefficient which has led to political and racial tensions in our 
country. I would not describe us as a developing country. We are a transformative country. 
We are not 1st world, but neither are we 3rd world. We are somewhere in between. In my 
research dealing with Fibre to the home, I have found that Europe is lagging when compared 
to other Eastern Bloc Countries when it comes to fibre to the home connections. We can be 
compared to these Eastern Bloc countries. We can leapfrog developed countries by not 
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holding on to legacy technology. Although we lag behind, we can see this as an opportunity 
to leapfrog a generation of old technology. 
 
South Africa’s unique developmental attributes can be used to the country’s advantage, by 
leapfrogging legacy technologies and adopting the latest technologies such as fibre to the 
home. Also worth noting was the comments made by OB2G & TLJ1H that the urban-rural split 
is prevalent in many developed countries as well, with the US listed as an example. 
 
The population of South Africa was also listed as another unique feature that impacted on its 
developing country status. South Africa contained a substantial percentage of the population 
that was economically active enough to create a market for EC equipment, irrespective of the 
majority of the population that was not. This skewed demographic has contributed to the 
country being exposed to both developed and developing EC market conditions. RM4J 
cautioned the regulator from categorising South Africa’s developing country status, and noted 
that although it seems that the need for EA diminished the more a country was developed, 
this trend would not apply to South Africa.  
 
 
5.5 Contributors to developmental challenges 
The regulatory staff at ICASA listed politics as the predominant challenge. The policy 
environment and educational regime are also not conducive to growing the economy. RM1K 
noted that South Africa is almost the worst performing country in Maths and Sciences from a 
survey of 140 countries conducted by the World Economic Forum. The current capacity in the 
educational system does not support the skills and ability in engineering, which is crucial in 
the EC equipment industry. Engineering skills are required to drive innovation.   
 
The challenges faced by developing countries are well documented as is the impact of ICTs on 
development. There seems to be a lack of a concerted policy or governmental support for 
ICTs in South Africa (OZ4P). While the government can understandably prioritise access to 
basic services such as education and health services as key governmental priorities, access to 
ICT services is of vital importance. Policy attempts in the ICT arena seem to have been largely 
unsuccessful, and an important science and technology project such as the Square Kilometre 
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Array (SKA) serve as examples where ICTs contribute directly to the GDP of the country. The 
SKA example also highlights a case of revenue leaving the country, as testing for equipment 
used in the SKA project is in many instances outsourced, as South Africa does not have the 
requisite testing facilities.  
 
Also of interest was that ICASA staff stated that not everything is related to funds or the lack 
thereof. There is a consensus that the EMC market in South Africa as an example, is 
sufficiently large enough to be self-sustaining. It was felt that the testing environment in 
South Africa as a whole is largely EMC as this is the focus and market.  There thus exists a 
demand for EMC services and testing laboratories in South Africa have developed a 
commercial model for this. The innovative solution suggested was to leverage the existing 
abilities of the laboratories already existing in South Africa, and provide them with funding to 
expand to other services. ICASA was suggested as the entity best suited to drive this initiative 
for the country (RN6B, RN2A, RQ7L). OZ4P also noted that the value of incumbent test 
facilities could not be overstated, as gaining accreditation as a recognised test facility has 
proven to be a tough task. Existing test facilities were also seen as difficult to move or relocate, 
as their location is based on favourable radio frequency environments that are conducive to 
interference-free testing. This further cements the importance of leveraging on existing 
testing facilities that exist in South Africa. 
 
The impact of labour costs in a developing country was discussed, with OH1M claiming that 
labour costs do not form a significant percentage of the total cost of EC equipment. Most 
commentators were of the opinion that labour costs for imported equipment (especially from 
far eastern countries like China) was lower than the international market rate. This was not 
seen as a significant obstacle for South Africa to compete with, given that South Africa’s 
labour costs could be considered to be lower than the international average. These two 
factors (South Africa’s low labour costs and the low percentage that labour costs contribute 
to the overall cost of EC equipment) implies that South Africa as a developing country is not 
be unduly affected by issues of costs related to labour within the EC equipment market 
perspective. High testing costs at overseas test laboratories could be used to South Africa’s 
advantage if we can competitively price such services. TLJ1H listed the Restriction of 
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Hazardous Substances (RoHS) testing which costs about R 300 000 overseas and could be 
done in South Africa at 25 % less, provided the laboratory can secure repeat business.  
 
General infrastructure such as road, electricity, water and sanitation was mentioned as a 
challenge to developing an EA regime, should these facilities not exist. This was however not 
mentioned as appropriate to the South African context. South Africa was described as having 
a marked urban versus rural divide (OS5J), which was a developmental challenge in its own 
right, however, this challenge was not seen to be relevant to EA environment as adequate 
urban facilities existed to support an EA regime (OZ4P, PP1L).    
 
 
5.6 Differentiation of suppliers – a consideration for a developing country? 
RM1K thought that the Department of Trade and Industry, as well as the Department of 
Science and Technology, need to look at introducing measures to encourage local industry 
and make the EA process less cumbersome. Support for SMMEs is required through subsidies. 
All ICASA staff interviewed with just one exception, clearly stressed that the ICASA 
requirements for EA could not be watered down. EA was seen as critical for conformance 
through standards.  Also interesting was that most operators and suppliers agreed with that 
assessment as well (OR1A, OB2G, OK3H, SD2M). This interesting finding highlights the 
importance of setting standards at the international levels, irrespective of the fact that South 
Africa is categorised as a developing country.  
 
RM1K further suggested that the EC equipment market in South Africa is predominantly 
controlled by entities with “deep pockets”. This in turn creates an opportunity and market for 
“grey market” products that are imported into the country through the “official suppliers”.  
This ‘differentiation of suppliers’ theme has been discussed earlier, and the idea is extended 
to the regulatory framework that exists in South Africa. ICASA staff affirmed that although 
there are several international EC equipment suppliers in South Africa, these suppliers are all 
required to have a relationship with a local South African registered reseller or to be 
registered as a company in South Africa itself.  These clauses ensure that these companies 
pay taxes in South Africa and create employment locally. RM1K related an incident that 
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occurred at the 2016 World Mobile Congress in Barcelona, where RM1K was approached by 
representatives from several different equipment suppliers, and the general reaction from 
these suppliers was that the EA process in South Africa was difficult to adhere to. These 
companies would therefore not invest in South Africa purely based on business economics. 
These companies alluded to the fact that they needed to be quick to the market and be as 
cheap to the market as possible. These suppliers would rather choose an easier market than 
invest in South Africa. This approach, in turn, creates a niche market for the second tier of 
vendors who can import equipment into the country, without being the “official supplier” of 
the equipment. 
 
Other regulatory staff members would support the idea of crafting different rules to 
distinguish the level of suppliers further. As ICASA believes that compliance is ultimately the 
most important factor to EA, the issue lies in the mechanism to prove compliance. Several 
commentators thus suggest that the EA regulations differentiate the way that suppliers are 
dealt with, allowing a greater level of autonomy to the larger suppliers while at the same time 
ensuring that a high degree of compliance for smaller suppliers remains (RN2A, RN6B, RQ7L, 
RD8M, OZ4P, SN4M, SM1E, IOG4P).  One possible approach could involve creating a “trust 
matrix” for suppliers based on several categories: 
i. Potential reputational damage for the vendor. The argument here was that 
reputational damage due to non-compliance could be viewed as the ultimate penalty 
for non-compliance with EA rules. The reputational damage is linked to the 
organisation’s credibility and the term used in Figure 24 is “Organisational Credibility”. 
ii. Differentiation between Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and resellers. This 
again relates to the reputational damage to the brand value. OEMs would be 
considered more likely to be trustworthy, given the brand value of their product. Test 
Laboratories would also have high informational credibility, but would not necessarily 
have a reputation to protect in the country where the equipment is being sold. 
iii. Tiering of resellers. Resellers were sometimes licensed by the OEM to sell products 
exclusively under licence in a country. Such licensing restrictions would serve to 
protect the brand value of the EC equipment, thereby increasing perceived level of 
trust with that reseller. The informational credibility in this instance would not be as 
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high as an OEM, given that test reports could be sourced through other channels other 
than the OEM. 
 
 
Figure 24: Trust Matrix 
 
 
SM1E had once approached both ICASA and the NRCS to determine whether their products 
had ever caused interference or related problems. The regulators were not able to answer 
the question posed.  
 
RQ7L, however, advised caution in differentiating between suppliers, as this may entrench 
the market position of OEMs and larger suppliers. Smaller suppliers may not have the financial 
resources to access information required for the EA process, such as test reports relating to 
the equipment being tested. The tiering process would thus result in an easier EA process for 
the larger suppliers, while the smaller suppliers would have to conform with the various EA 
requirements that currently exist. Smaller suppliers may exit the EC equipment market in 
South Africa, decreasing competition in the market. 
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IOG4P also cautioned that larger suppliers might adhere to EA regulations only if the sanction 
for not doing so, is large enough. A large holding company for several well-known retailers 
and wholesalers, Massmart PTY (LTD) was cited as an example of a reputable company that 
was fined by the Complaints Compliance Committee for non-compliance to the EA 
regulations. The fine amounted to R100 000, of which R60 000 was suspended. Massmart 
probably accepted the sanction as it may have made more economic sense to them to pay 
the fine rather than to follow the EA process. IOG4P conceded, however, that Massmart might 
not have been aware that they had contravened the EA regulations until it was pointed out 
to them by ICASA inspectors. 
 
5.7 Lessons learnt with the EA process 
The overall consensus from most commentators was that the intention and objectives of the 
SA EA process were good, but required other structures to ensure that it was not 
burdensome. The current EA process in SA definitely required a review and local network 
testing capacity was required as part of that overhaul.   
 
While the self-declaration option of EA approvals, used extensively in first world countries, 
would seem to be a logical progression path for EA in South Africa, the majority of actors 
interviewed did not support self-declaration in the current environment, given the fact that 
the infrastructure required to support such an EA approach did not exist in South Africa. Some 
commentators conceded that exemptions to the EA process were a possibility, but there 
would be a need to strengthen market surveillance to ensure post-approval conformity with 
EA.  The enforcement framework would require strengthening as a closed loop from pre-
market testing to post-market testing must exist.  
 
Other countries invest in standards and conformity, and OEMs use the testing framework gain 
a competitive advantage through comparisons with similar products from their competitors. 
This testing framework was suggested as a goal to be encouraged in South Africa as well. The 
FCC was cited as the best example of using this testing framework as they have many 
representatives conducting EA on their behalf. The FCC  model was regarded as an excellent 
one since it makes the EA process easier for a “good” suppliers and challenging for the one 
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that does not follow the rules. This ‘differentiation of suppliers’ would also mean that only 
new technologies go through a rigorous testing phase as previous test reports for older 
technologies would be permitted. This mechanism was thought to provide a balance in the 
testing environment (RN2A, RQ7L, RN6B).  
 
OR1A, however, disagrees that EA is used as a competitive advantage by suppliers. EA should 
be a collaborative effort between all equipment suppliers to prevent a duplication of the EA 
process. Currently, EA is issued to a particular supplier or entity and is not issued to a 
particular model of equipment. This implies that whenever different suppliers import the 
same equipment, each supplier would have to apply individually for EA. By collaborating with 
each other, suppliers can submit a single EA application that would prevent duplication, allow 
for a quicker time to market and reduce costs associated with the EA process. OR1A listed the 
example of the three cellular operators, who each apply individually for EA for the same piece 
of network equipment via the vendor that they are working with, duplicating the EA effort 
and wasting both time and money. SM1E cited an example of this currently occurring, where 
32 different brands collaborate by working together on a “regulatory committee” to 
streamline approvals for all parties. This approach also prevents duplication and reduces the 
overall processing time.  
 
 
5.8 South Africa’s developmental state vs administrative efficiency  
RM1K was of the view that South Africa’s developmental state has affected the skills base in 
South Africa, and as such, the confidence level in the EA process is not 100%. There is general 
acknowledgement that there is limited competency in the EA environment, as well as the 
engineering environment in general.  This seems to have certainly affected the efficiency of 
the EA process. Training new staff in this area, although seen as a good idea, was mentioned 
as an area that ultimately leads to loss of productivity during the training sessions.  
 
TLS2L had a slightly different view and stated that South Africa did have the required skills in 
the EA environment, but these skills were more of a general nature. This is in contrast to 
countries in the EU, where the markets are large enough to support having individuals with 
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specialist skills in the EA environment. Specialist skills are required in the EA environment, 
especially in terms of supporting and contributing to the standardisation environment. PP1L 
agreed that specialist skills are needed in the EA environment, but cautioned that the small 
size of the EC equipment market in South Africa does not warrant a need for such specialised 
skills.  The Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) set-top box project was cited as an example of 
a three to five-year project, which is relatively short in duration. Such projects may require 
specialist EA skills, but the term of this project does not warrant dedicated EA competencies 
in a small EC market like South Africa.  
 
RN2A had a different view and was of the opinion that issues around administrative efficiency 
with regards a country’s developmental state was not applicable to SA. The current 
administrative staff was seen to be highly skilled and efficient. They were acutely aware of 
delays in the EA process, but were simply overwhelmed by the volume of the applications. 
Volumes were seen as the biggest source of pressure and problems of the EA process in South 
Africa. The focus to improve administrative efficiency would be to deploy technology with the 
aim of maximising efficiency and to automate the process. OK3H concurred with this view 
and listed the example of South Africa’s active participation in various International 
standardisation activities as evidence of the level of engineering skills found locally. 
 
Another key point raised spoke to the core of the administrative problem itself. Some 
operators were of the opinion that the current EA process was largely a paper-based exercise. 
The regulator is obliged to accept a summary of the test report and base the decision to 
approve the equipment or not thereon (OS5J, OR1A, OB2G). This exercise was seen as a 
duplication of resources, as the equipment would have been tested in other jurisdictions.  
Operators could thus not determine the value of interrogating a test report versus accepting 
a declaration of conformity, as the regulator does not have the means to verify the technical 
aspects of the test report independently.  
 
Automation was seen as a key resource to make the EA process more efficient (RM4J, OB2G). 
Automation allowed the EA process to handle larger volumes of applications using few 
resources. The current EA process was seen as a hybrid system, which relied on IT 
infrastructure for database recording and capturing, but was still largely a manual process. An 
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automated system that was web-based, could provide real-time decisions on EA applications, 
process applications online, process payments online and email certificates immediately at 
the end of the EA process. Such a system was seen to be capable of largely removing most of 
the administrative inefficiencies that are inherent to the current EA process. ICASA staff noted 
that the regulator was in the course of acquiring such a system, although it formed part of a 
larger modernisation program that is ongoing at the regulator. OB2G was of the opinion the 
EA process was acceptable as it currently is and that the biggest issue with Industry with 
regards to the process was the administrative efficiency.  
 
An interesting point raised by RN6B also relates to a perhaps unintended consequence of the 
inefficiency of the EA process. As the current EA regulations do not recognise previously 
approved equipment, multiple EA approvals for the same equipment does occur. While this 
is administratively inefficient, each additional approval was an added source of income for 
the regulator. This relates to the comments noted earlier, made by other informants who 
questioned the EA process as a rent-seeking initiative.  
 
The regulator is acutely aware that the administrative efficiency of the EA process impacts 
the economic stability of the equipment supplier. Delays in the approval process inflate 
storage costs at ports of entry for the equipment supplier, as EC equipment is only permitted 
into the country by the Customs and Revenue Department on presentation of a valid ICASA 
Type Approval certificate (RG5N).  Suppliers, however, are of the opinion that ICASA does not 
fully appreciate the impact of delays to their business (SN4M). The concept of “time is money” 
was used to describe the supplier’s view of delays in the EA process. Even though ICASA claims 
to be mindful of the impact of delays, suppliers have taken a somewhat cynical view and feel 
that ICASA seems to be paying “lip service” to their concerns (SN4M, SD2M, IOW2E). The 
“time is money” concept impacts their business, resulting in sometimes significant financial 
losses due to delays.  More concerning was the notion that certain suppliers, desperate to 
release their products onto the market, may resort to illegal means to do so (RD3M, RQ7L, 
OR1A). This reveals a significant amount of tension within the EA environment, as suppliers, 
although intent on lawfully approving EC equipment, are being forced to resort to illegal 
means out of sheer frustration with the current administrative process. OR1A noted that the 
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EA process might be inadvertently supporting the trade of illegal EC equipment into the 
country as the EA process is frustrating, expensive and difficult to understand.  
 
Equipment suppliers, in particular, were severely critical of the administrative efficiency of 
the current EA process. SN4M added that the lack of guidance impacted the costs incurred by 
the supplier: 
 
For a long time we had applied for both TA and TE approvals for a product with both wireless 
and wired interfaces, when one-day an ICASA staff member asked us why we did not just 
combine them into one TA application. This saved us an enormous amount of money as we 
did not have to do five separate approvals for a device with these five interfaces. We just had 
to include these interfaces in a single approval at 1/5 the previous cost! The lack of guidance 
from ICASA cost us a lot of money, we need ICASA approval and have no other options (SN4M). 
 
Equipment suppliers and operators attributed the administrative inefficiencies to a lack of 
resources, primarily human resource capacity at the regulator to handle the large volumes of 
EA applications. SD2M noted that it was a frustrating experience to even get hold of the EA 
regulatory staff and almost impossible to get timely feedback from them.  The entire EA 
process was described as “unprofessional, chaotic and a nightmare” while some of the staff 
at the regulator were described as being “rude, unpleasant and unhelpful” (SD2M).  There 
were, however, several other staff members that seem to try their best to be assistive despite 
being “overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of applications received” (SD2M). This lack of 
communication and guidance from the regulator is perceived as a regulatory risk by 
international manufacturers, who will not ship their products to South Africa without 
certainty with regards to the regulatory requirements. This in turn impacts the investment 
these manufacturers are willing to make in the country, with the manufacturer opting to 
invest elsewhere (SD2M, SN4M). Figure 25 depicts the key issues highlighted in terms of SA’s 
development state vs. administrative efficiency. 
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Figure 25: SA's developmental state vs. administrative efficiency 
 
 
 
5.9 South Africa’s developmental state vs trade  
RM1K noted that the EA regime has had a significant impact on trade as it impacts the trade 
of EC devices in general. There is a small portion of export of EC equipment, therefore there 
is generally only a one-way trade of goods coming into the country. 
 
Other commentators believed that the development state of a country did little to impact 
trade in that country, given the fact that goods and services imported to a country will have 
to comply with the rules and regulations of the receiving country. As EA imposes rules only 
on importing, its impact on trade in this respect may be negligible (OH1M). 
 
Facilitating regional trade was suggested as a mechanism for developing countries to leverage 
on EA frameworks that already exist. The SADC region was noted as having existing policy and 
governmental support, which could be leveraged upon (OZ4P). A regional EA regime has been 
mooted for some time within the SADC region and would serve as a central point through 
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which all EA approvals for the area could be processed. This initiative seems not to have 
gained much traction over the years, possibly due to reservations that South Africa has with 
the ability of other member countries to conduct EA verification to an acceptable standard. 
This relates to both the issues of confidence in the EA process as well as the lack of facilities 
to perform conformance testing. 
 
Regional specification of standards may act as a barrier to trade in a global market (OS5J). 
Smaller markets may suffer if the standards in their ITU region does not fall within a larger 
region (such as ITU Region 1 in Europe). Thus, any small incremental costs would prevent 
certain suppliers from trading with a particular country, if the cost of compliance outweighs 
the potential benefits. This is not a problem for mass market equipment such as cellular 
telephones, as the economies of scale make it viable for the vendor to comply with local 
conditions. Developing countries thus do not represent a niche market for EC equipment. The 
alternative is smaller volumes of equipment sales at higher prices, with the end user 
ultimately bearing the brunt of these higher prices.  
 
The fact that EA is based on an ITU region means that the EA process is in itself very specific 
to countries that belong to that particular area (TLS3T). EA thus acts as a barrier to trade by 
design, as the network characteristics and frequency bands used, differ from region to region. 
Equipment approved for use in region one will thus not function correctly in a region two 
country. A worst-case scenario would be equipment meant for one region causing harmful 
interference in another region. This had occurred in the past, when cordless telephones 
meant for ITU region two were sold illegally in South Africa, causing major network 
interference to the Vodacom cellular network (TLS3T). 
 
5.10 South Africa’s developmental state and the quality of EC equipment  
Several commentators thought that the developmental state does not affect the quality of 
the EC equipment (OR1A, TLJ1H, PP1L, RM1K, TLS2L). The rationale provided was that most 
of the equipment is manufactured overseas and imported to the country, hence the quality 
is determined by global factors, not South Africa’s developmental factors. An interesting point 
raised by RM1K however, was that that certain specialised features of EC equipment might 
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be removed prior to sale in South Africa by the EC equipment supplier, to make the equipment 
more affordable to the South African market. Affordability is thus a key determinant of trade.  
 
Equipment suppliers need to be able to offer a differentiated product to differentiated 
markets in terms of developed vs. developing countries. OH1M agreed with this assessment 
and stated that South Africa’s socio-economic factors created an environment in which grey 
market products thrived due to their low cost and functionality being suited to the market 
conditions.  Grey market products were not illegal products and were sometimes referred to 
as “parallel imports”, where EC equipment is imported and sold in a country via a vendor, 
who is not the official supplier of that equipment (OR1A). The current EA framework allows 
any supplier to import any equipment and hence does not differentiate between grey market 
products and “official” products. It was noted, however, that grey market products in most 
cases, by virtue of being cheaper than the OEM supplied equipment was more prevalent in 
developing countries than the “official” equipment (OR1A). This was problematic to the 
network operators and official suppliers, who are not liable to support such equipment should 
it prove to be defective when used on their networks. Further, official suppliers generally 
optimise equipment destined for the South African market to the appropriate standards and 
specifications. Grey market products are typically not optimised, leading either to degraded 
operation of the equipment, or in a worst case scenario (for the operator), a degraded 
network (OR1A).  
 
Although the trade-off between the price and quality is a reality for consumers, it is also 
dependent on the application of the device. Certain areas such as safety of life (e.g. aviation 
radios and maritime radios) are non-negotiable, and no compromise can be made on the 
quality of the device (OZ4P, TLS3T). Even interference caused by other EC equipment has to 
be managed to prevent interference to these safety of life radio equipment. There seems to 
be no consensus on a consistent process to treat all equipment, except that a carefully 
managed approach to device quality was required. The regulator would thus have to consider 
several variables, intrinsic to the market conditions to consider an EA approach that caters 
for the quality of EC equipment. 
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Equipment suppliers raised the issue of counterfeit equipment. Counterfeit equipment was 
regarded as illegal equipment and although it was not seen to be covered under the ambit of 
EA approvals, it seemed to be a significant factor in the EC equipment market of a developing 
country (OH1M, OS5J, OZ4P). Counterfeit equipment differs from grey market equipment in 
that it cannot be EA approved by virtue of being illegally manufactured.  Counterfeit 
equipment seems to have found a similar space in the market as grey market products, based 
on attractive pricing that matches the market demand. OR1A  & RS3R saw the Customs and 
Excise Department as the principal party responsible for ensuring that such equipment did 
not enter the South African market and called for a better working relationship between the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) and ICASA.  Such as relationship should serve to assist 
SARS officials to better differentiate between counterfeit equipment and ICASA approved 
equipment, and should entail SARS having primary access to the ICASA database of EA 
approved equipment. RS3R cautioned that even a single device bought overseas and brought 
into South Africa could be extremely problematic: 
 
People going overseas and buying EC equipment is also a serious problem. Their devices may 
not be compatible with our spectrum arrangement. They may work well but operate in bands 
that are not authorised in South Africa. A typical case would be a two-way radio, which can 
interwork with each other but can cause interference with other licensed users. A 167 MHz 
Public mobile two-way radio was supposed to work in the 446 MHz – 446.1 MHz, but it looked 
identical to the proper PMR 446 MHz radios approved in South Africa. The power level is 
500mW with an outside range of 3-4 Km! (RS3R). 
 
RS3R cited the same example as TLS3T, of just one pair of public mobile radios that caused 
significant interference in the Cape Town, effectively preventing GSM communications in a 
particular area. 
 
Dumping of obsolete equipment was also to be a major problem in South Africa and 
contributes to the issue of e-waste as well (OZ4P). The same reasoning applied with grey 
market and counterfeit products, being that developing countries were price sensitive and 
cheap EC equipment would always find a market share. Unscrupulous suppliers use this to 
their advantage and dump obsolete equipment in developing country markets. 
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5.11 Policy support in a developing country 
RM1K noted that the total budget that the government spent on ICT research and 
development declined over the past ten years, rather than increased. This had a significant 
negative impact on innovation. Innovation requires financial resources and governmental 
policy to improve in South Africa. This reiterated the theme of governmental and strategic 
support to the EC equipment market. Other commentators noted a disconnect between 
Research and Development (R&D) in South Africa, as there is no feedback loop between the 
R&D institutes and the equipment market (RN6B,OS5J,OH1M). There exists no platform for 
the sharing of knowledge and information. Forums to drive innovation were suggested as a 
necessary step, and ICASA was proposed as the body to set up such platforms. This lack of 
financial support through policy initiatives has contributed to the fact that very few 
organisations and individuals are actively involved in EC equipment R&D in South Africa. The 
country thus becomes a “technology colony”, inheriting technology from imported 
equipment without gaining intrinsic knowledge related to that equipment (RN6B, RM1K). 
 
OH1M made the following remarks around political and policy support, with a specific focus 
on empowering the local manufacturing industry: 
 
We would need some subsidy based upon governmental policy support for our local 
manufacturing industry. This could form part of the larger Industrial policy of the country. I’m 
afraid that this may not be a straightforward issue as we need first to increase our 
manufacturing base by policy.  Government could have incentives for manufacturers, such as 
special economic zones. Like the car industry. Export support as well. Specialist support to 
manufacturers to local manufacturing to expand our regional economic activity. For e.g. In 
SADC, we could remove barriers to trade in regional trade. Set-top boxes for digital migration 
is another example. The government had the right idea, but the execution was poor. SA has 
not produced the correct amount of set-top boxes, and SA was not able to generate the set-
top boxes for the rest of SADC and Africa (OH1M). 
 
OH1M cautions that although governmental policy would be a step in the right direction, it 
would have to be carefully thought out and executed to avoid failure in achieving the 
economic objectives of the policy. 
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5.12 South Africa’s developmental state and competition 
Most informants noted that the state of competition in South Africa was robust. There were 
challenges that South Africa faced in terms of innovation as discussed earlier, but this was 
seen as an opportunity for further innovation and increased competition in the market, as the 
current EC market was not considered to be saturated. Competition was considered to be 
unfortunately mutually exclusive with innovation. Solutions suggested by informants to drive 
innovation included collaboration - people need to collaborate to remain relevant. 
Information sharing was listed as being central to collaboration and ICASA was listed as the 
ideal central point to drive competition. In essence, collaborate was listed as a key success 
factor in driving competitive. 
 
Other informants, however, had a differing view, as they felt that competition itself drove 
innovation (OZ4P, TLJ1H). Consumer quality was seen as a determinant of consumer choice, 
hence the Quality of Service with regards to EA equipment would improve with competition 
in the market. Price sensitive consumers in developing countries hold on to their EC devices 
for longer periods of time and expect more from them (OZ4P, OR1A, RS3R, IOG4P). If one 
compared the entry-level phones from a decade ago to the basic phones of today, one can 
clearly see that the features available on these phones have increased dramatically, without 
an associated increase in relative price. Consumers are getting more value for an equivalent 
investment today, based on competition in the market. Using the example of the cellular 
phone, the number of manufacturers in this market has increased more than tenfold during 
the same period, substantially increasing competition in this space (OR1A). 
 
5.13 South Africa’s developmental state and consumer protection 
There is a lack of capacity as previously discussed to conduct specific testing, leading to a low 
confidence level of the EA process. This in turn negatively affects consumer protection efforts 
which thereby opens a market for inferior products. This is a funding issue that is linked to 
South Africa’s lack of funds as a developing country - South Africa’s focus is still on financing 
infrastructure for basic services, and building local testing capacity is not considered a basic 
service (OB2G, OZ4P, RM5S).  
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The opposing view was that South Africa’s developmental state did not impact on consumer 
protection issues at all, since the levels and standards set for South Africa with regards to EA 
approval do not differ from developed first world countries, hence the same quality of EC 
equipment can be expected (OH1M). 
 
The lack of a strong consumer advocacy groups in South African was seen as a further reason 
for ICASA to protect consumer rights (OZ4P, TLS2L, TLJ1H). Consumer protection was noted 
as being more important than protecting networks. ICASA is mandated to regulate in the 
interest of the consumer. Networks have many fail-safes to protect the network, but the 
regulator was seen as the last line of defence for the consumer. There are not enough 
consumer advocacy groups in SA to effectively advocate consumer protection, hence the 
consumer would rely more heavily on the regulator to provide an adequate level of 
protection. 
 
A surprising result was the view from EC equipment suppliers on the benefits of EA regulation. 
While the objective of EA regulation on consumer protection is well documented, SN4M also 
lists EA regulation as protecting the supplier as well. EA approval is a legally binding 
declaration from an independent third party that verifies that the equipment supplied by the 
EC equipment supplier, meets all regulatory requirements of that country. Suppliers use this 
fact against claims that may arise from consumers, should there be any legal challenge 
regarding the functionality of the equipment. A good example was the Samsung Note 7 
phone, which developed catastrophic battery failures despite receiving EA approval in 
countries around the world. The supplier could thus argue that due diligence regarding safety 
was applied as warranted by the EA approval, and the supplier could thus not be held liable 
for negligence. The EA process therefore serves as a mechanism to protect both the supplier 
and the consumer. 
 
SM1E commented sarcastically that the EA regulations in South Africa certainly protect the 
consumers since the process takes so long, it eventually prevents the consumer access to new 
products. The consumer is hence well protected as they are prevented access to these 
products.  
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5.14 Determining the appropriate level of performance standards for a 
developing country  
As previously discussed, the approach that enjoyed support from most informants was that 
ICASA should not tamper with standards, and that international standards must be adhered 
to. Lowering standards was seen as an invitation to open up other unforeseen problems, and 
the requirements for EA approval should always remain high.  Compatibility and 
interoperability issues were listed as potential areas of concern. Some commentators even 
suggested that lowering standards may increase the cost of EC equipment, as they would 
require testing to unique standards (as opposed to the accepted international standards) 
which in turn would drive up the costs of conformity assessment (RN2A). The integrity of the 
standards and the EA process seemed to be the key theme. ICASA, in particular, felt that there 
should be no compromise on standards, and that the focus should rather be on making the 
EA process easier, not less demanding. The requirements for EA should be aligned to global 
levels and not on creating a “watered down” version. The mechanism of conformance is at 
the core of the issue (RM1K, OH1M, RG5N, RS3R, RN6B). 
 
A differentiation of performance standards for a developing country would also serve to 
exacerbate the digital divide. It was noted that the services consumed by both developed and 
developing countries are the same. This also applies to rural and urban areas of a country as 
well. There is thus no rationale to differentiate the quality performance standards applicable 
to developing countries and rural areas (OH1M, RS3R).  
 
The point is clearly made by several commentators that the level of standard ultimately 
impacts the price of the EC equipment. Setting standards would require a cost-benefit analysis 
from the regulator, to ensure that public interest objectives are met at the right economic 
considerations. Market conditions were seen as the best mechanism to gauge the economic 
climate.  The focus of standard setting should not be on what standards (i.e. either local or 
international) to apply to EC equipment, as the prevailing theme suggests that international 
standards should be the norm. The focus of standards would rather be on which standards 
(i.e. core functional standards vs. service standards) should be applicable, as extending the 
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mandatory requirements for EA approval beyond basic functionality was guaranteed to 
increase EC equipment prices (OH1M, SD2M, RG5N, RN6B, IOW2E, RM4J). 
  
OS5J, however, notes an important caveat to blindly accepting international standards as the 
regulator generally does when adopting standards that apply to South Africa. In Europe, 
standards can be fairly easily changed and replaced based on their requirements and these 
requirements may not necessarily apply to the South African environment. It is thus 
dangerous to align South Africa to an automatic update of standards. This is not a problem of 
the actual process, but it is important to specify what the South African requirement is. 
Adopting the latest version of a standard may also substantially increase testing costs, without 
an appreciable gain in the functionality of the equipment. 
 
Another interesting point raised by OS5J related to the mandatory functional requires for EA 
equipment: 
Even if a piece of equipment complies with the basic EA requirements, the “bell and whistles” 
that relate to the equipment is not tested by the EA process. It is this additional functionality 
of the box that causes the problems to the end user, not the actual basic conformance 
requirements (key interfaces). An example is an ADSL modem, where the additional features 
cause most of the problems. The TR069 (testing and configuration of ADSL modems) standard 
is not a mandatory requirement for modems. Network operators use this test as a network 
functionality testing specification. This is not part of the EA process, hence no recourse if it 
does not work (OS5J). 
 
This comment raises two important issues. The first is that the basic testing required in terms 
of EA approval is not always indicative of the full performance of the equipment – it 
represents a small subset of all the possible performance standards that the equipment could 
be tested to. In that sense, we have an indication here that EA functional testing covers only 
the absolute basic conformance testing required for EA. The second issue relates to the 
operator's liability and exposure in supporting customer premises equipment that requires 
additional performance testing.  In cases like this, the operator is faced with additional 
reputational and economic damages (should equipment impede network functionality) and 
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would this be self-incentivised to ensure that all EC equipment on their network, not only 
meets but exceeds the functional requirements of the EA approval process. 
 
With this in mind, OS5J suggests a two-tier approach for operators providing EC equipment 
for use on their network: 
(a) Mandatory standards required by ICASA to be provided using a declaration of 
conformity mechanism 
(b) Additional requirements to test additional functionality as required by the operators. 
 
There was, however, one informant that disagreed with the popular view that the level of 
standards should be on par with international best practice. OB2G noted that minimum 
standards for developing countries should differ depending on the jurisdiction such standards 
were applied to. The goal should be to achieve universal service at the least possible cost to 
the consumer. International standards are set at a level that would add significant cost to the 
end product, making the product unaffordable to financially constrained consumers typically 
found in developing countries. OB2G noted that promoting broadband penetration is a key 
goal for many developing countries and wireless technologies are becoming increasingly 
important in delivering wireless broadband access. Cellular telephones are generally the most 
cost-effective device used by consumers in developing countries to access broadband 
services, and the price of these devices are significantly impacted by the EA process. 
International performance standards would invariably increase the base cost of cellular 
phones and would thus hamper broadband penetration in developing countries. OB2G did 
concede that there should be no compromise on the safety of the device and thus safety 
standards should be on par with international safety standards.  
 
SD2M had a more pragmatic view and said: 
 
We think that we are Switzerland. Everything does not run like clockwork here in South Africa 
as it does in Switzerland. We have people with illegal electricity connections, high crime rates, 
high levels of joblessness and unemployment - so why are we insisting on test reports? We 
can make things much less bureaucratic. 
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ICASA does not possess the mechanism to verify test reports independently, SD2M therefore 
argues that it is pointless to set any standard, either at a high or low level. Further 
compounding this issue is that fact that South Africa is a relatively small EC equipment market. 
Larger manufacturers will not conduct tests, costing more than a hundred thousand rands, 
just for the SA market.  
 
The level of performance of EC devices is driven by technology and not the regulator. The 
example of an entry-level cellular telephone was listed (OB2G). The features prevalent in most 
basic phones today far surpasses those of an entry-level phone a decade ago. Technology 
drives equipment manufacturers to innovate or risk losing market share. Mandatory 
performance standards via regulation would thus not drive innovation and lower costs as 
competition and market forces already fulfil this function.  
 
Standards also support competition, as the EA framework is based on open, international 
standards. Since international standards are based on an open platform, EA ensures that 
equipment that conforms to these standards are technically acceptable to operate on any 
network where such standards are adopted (TLS3T). This means that a range of markets is 
open to the equipment supplier, thereby increasing EC equipment competition in that 
market.  
 
TLS3T further explained the standards development process in the local environment. 
Standards are adopted in this environment via a balanced representation process (involving 
affected stakeholders such as manufacturers and the regulator) at a local level at SABS, where 
parties discuss and agree on standards. These standards can be either locally developed or 
adopted from internationally used standards. Standard experts, via consensus building, agree 
on the content of standards and the applicability to the country. Approval of the nation is 
then needed, via a public comment process. The standard is then approved as a national 
standard.  
 
The principle of standards supporting competition is still relevant at a local level, except only 
when a locally developed standard is adopted by South Africa (TLS3T). This is a relatively rare 
occurrence and is allowed only in exceptional circumstances. An example would be the level 
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of lightning protection required in South Africa, given South Africa’s high incidence of 
lightning. In this case, a more stringent and locally developed surge limits were added to the 
generic safety standard for EC equipment.  In any event, these modifications and deviations 
from international standards must be submitted to the World Trade Organisation for scrutiny 
as South Africa is a signatory to the WTO’s technical barriers to trade agreement. The WTO 
publishes these standards to all member countries to comment upon, with a view to 
determine whether the standard represents a technical barrier to trade. If the WTO rules as 
such after receiving representation from member states, South Africa would be obliged to 
remove such a deviation from an international standard (TLS3T). Figure 26 provides a 
representation of the main themes relating to the level of standards for a developing country. 
 
Figure 26: Level of standards for a developing country 
 
 
5.15 South Africa’s state of development and the perception of credibility and 
stability  
ICASA seems to be well aware that the perception and reputation of ICASA and the EA process 
are very poor. There are long lead times and inefficiencies of the system, raised by most of 
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the operators and suppliers. By not allowing for the self-declaration of certain EC equipment, 
some suppliers are of the view that ICASA has inadvertently deterred potential investors 
(SD2M, SM1E).  
 
The EA regime does not create a perception of stability and credibility in the market. OR1A 
also noted that the stability of the process seems to be upset by specific technical queries, for 
which the regulator seems unable or unwilling to respond to. Operators then do not have an 
avenue to address queries competently with skilled staff at ICASA, creating an unstable 
approval environment. This is further compounded by conflicting technical responses that are 
sometimes received by the operators from different technical specialists at ICASA. This lack 
of conformity in responses impacts both the credibility and stability of the EA process (OR1A, 
OK3H). 
 
The lack of distinct processes for EA also impacts the perception of credibility. SD2M 
highlighted an example of FCC test reports. ICASA sometimes accepts these reports and 
rejects them at other times, depending on the staff member evaluating the EA application. 
This subjective assessment of the technical requirements of the EA process creates 
uncertainty within the industry and in turn negatively impacts the credibility of the process 
as well. 
 
5.16 Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the  unique characteristics of a developing country when considering 
a future innovative approach to regulating EA. The overall data gathered shows that although 
there are several characteristics unique to a developing country, the generalisability of 
developing countries is not straight-forward. South Africa, in particular, was seen as having a 
mix of both first and third world infrastructure, This mix was considered advantageous in 
leveraging the experience of EA innovation implemented in first world countries. 
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Chapter Six: Applying innovation to EA 
 6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide data for the third and final research sub-question of this 
study: 
 
How can an innovative theoretical approach be created that addresses the challenges 
of the current theoretical approach to regulating EA? 
 
This chapter builds on the data presented in the last two chapters and summarises possible 
solutions for developing an innovative approach to EA regulation, while bearing in mind both 
the developmental challenges faced by South Africa, as well as being wary of the pitfalls that 
highlight the perceived failure of the current approach. Concepts such as collaboration, trust 
and innovation introduced in the last chapter, are extended further in this chapter, by 
suggesting a two-fold approach to both technology and regulatory innovation. This chapter 
provides practical solutions to creating an innovative approach to EA regulation in a 
developing country, with data grounded in South Africa. Using this data, chapter seven 
explores a theoretical approach to regulation using the grounded theory method. The data 
presented in this section, in some cases elaborate on data presented previously in chapters 
four and five, although the core focus is innovation with regards to the EA process.  
 
6.2 An innovative approach to addresses the challenges  
The broad objectives of the EA process going forward to develop a new innovative approach 
to EA regulation as envisioned by the informants interviewed. Informants were unanimous 
that the objective of “Integrity” of the EA process must not change. The focus should be on 
what matters in the EA process, which is the essential technical requirements. These technical 
requirements should be at an international level and should not be “watered down”. 
Collaboration should be a key item to leverage the existing resources available in the country. 
ICASA should tap into the real knowledge that exists in the country. Collaboration in terms of 
test facilities at both local and international levels are required (OB2G, OK3H, OH1M, SD2M, 
SM1E). 
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Policy decisions at governmental level are required to build capacity in understanding the 
entire value chain of the EA process from EC design to sale. The aim should not be to 
implement more regulations, but to understand the impact of the current regulations better. 
There should be fewer requirements in the EA value chain to ensure that the process is less 
cumbersome (TLS3T). 
 
The focus should be on the EA process and not the EA regulations.  The EA process must be 
cheaper and more efficient. A quicker time to market means more products meant greater 
revenue for the country through increased tax collection. Different funding models need to 
be considered to fund test facilities. An example would be public-private partnerships 
between government and industry to fund conformance testing (TLS2L).  
 
OK3H & RS3R saw testing as a regressive move and advocated a self-managed solution that 
accepted verified test reports from accredited institutions. Local testing duplicated efforts, 
increased conformance costs and created additional barriers to entry. Money spent on test 
facilities could be better devoted to promoting local manufacturing (TLJ1H). Local 
manufacturing should be encouraged, as this has proven to be a major driver of growth in 
developing countries. These innovations would increase confidence in the EA process and 
would stimulate innovation and competition. Superior products in the market would be the 
result of such initiatives (OH1M, TLJ1H). 
 
Automation would be an innovative way to increase productivity. Self-declaration, coupled 
with a local test facility as well as allowing exemptions would reduce the administrative 
workload relating to the EA process. Technology advancements such as cognitive radios using 
the unlicensed spectrum would create a self-regulating environment (Lemstra, 2008). The 
entire EA value chain is driven by the people embedded in the process, and upskilling of the 
individuals in the EA process would lead to substantial gains in the efficiency of the process. 
This upskilling process applies to people internal to ICASA as well as stakeholders external to 
the process. Internal efficiency gains can be realised via training and upskilling of ICASA staff. 
External stakeholders can be upskilled via a clear communication and instructions made 
available by the regulator to stakeholders. These instructions should be clearly and 
extensively articulated to guide people at different levels of skills in the EA process. The ICASA 
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upskilling process should also include an understanding of all the different product 
development process from prototyping to manufacturing (OR1A). 
 
ICASA should investigate a mechanism to allow exemptions of particular types of equipment, 
as this would support the focus of approving the essential requirements of equipment to 
assure confidence and stability in the process. The current EA workload leads to long delays 
and frustration with the system, which could be alleviated should ICASA be more selective on 
what equipment is required to be approved. Certain operators are the only parties affected 
by the EA process, hence they are self-motivated to ensure compliance with the standards. 
This allows the regulator a degree of freedom in allowing equipment in these categories to 
be declared as competent for use by the network operator (OB2G). 
 
A risk-based analysis should be applied to all equipment. The example of short-range infra-
red equipment highlights the approach of the current EA environment, where the time, costs 
and process for certifying such a relatively innocuous device is the same as that for approving 
a 100kW Radio transmitter that has a range of several kilometres. A risk matrix categorising 
high volume low-risk equipment should be developed, with a view to differentiate or exempt 
such devices from the current EA process. Careful thought would need to be applied in this 
area, as the cumulative effect of interference caused by large volumes of low powered devices 
would also have to be considered (OK3H). 
 
EA would always be a legal requirement. This is a core function that has to remain. It would 
be a much more efficient process that should not be considered as a regulatory hurdle. EA 
would contribute to the economy by enabling innovation and would no longer be a bottleneck 
or deterrent (PP1L). 
 
Innovation is a major factor driving a future EA framework. Technology cannot be predicted, 
and advancements in innovation are very rapid. Technology can be disruptive to the market 
(the example of Over the Top (OTT) technology was cited in the cellular market), and this 
benefits the consumer. Technology can render major telecommunications players moot 
(OH1M). Product innovation would ultimately benefit the consumer.  The key mandate of 
developing an innovative EA approach would be to ensure that such an approach does not 
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inhibit technology innovation. Innovation can in itself solve many public interest 
governmental objectives without direct regulatory or policy interventions.  
 
Any regulatory approach suggested should drive innovation and enable trade. Relaxing 
command and control would be an option - a more relaxed approach coupled with a strong 
enforcement regime (RM1K). This regime should prescribe severe consequences for non-
compliance.  Conversely, a “relaxed” EA regime was thought to provide more control for the 
regulator than a command and control regime. 
 
Any approach suggested by the regulator would require a phased-in approach to engage with 
stakeholders in the EA industry. The sector is of  vital importance to the economy of South 
Africa, and ICASA should be tentative in ensuring that any changes to the EA approach are 
well understood with as many negative scenarios mitigated before roll out (OK3H). Any new 
approach to EA should be focussed on maximising technical and administrative efficiency, 
although the effectiveness of the EA process should not be related to time as the only 
determinant factor. Quality of the EA process is paramount, with ICASA suggesting confidence 
in the EA process as one of its principal objectives (RN2A, RG5N, RM1K). 
 
Increasing administrative efficiency by using an automated system to manage the EA approval 
process was seen as a quick win, and being the only real requirement to improve the system 
by many commentators.  Efficiency was clearly related to costs, especially by equipment 
suppliers. 
 
The focus on the type of standard (in terms of design or output standard) was not clearly 
determined.  The proposed route of using international standards inhibits, to an extent, the 
ability of the regulator to choose the type of standards required for an innovative framework 
for EA in South Africa. The standards currently employed are a mix of design and output 
standards, as the design standards general describe the functioning of the equipment while 
the output standards describe the EMC and safety aspect of the device. The decision to 
maintain standards at an international level means that the earlier mix would still be 
applicable going forward as well.  
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There was limited support for South Africa to move to a liberalised EA regime such as those 
in Europe, where self-declaration is the norm. The rationale for such an approach was: 
i.  to decrease volumes of applications to ICASA, thereby reducing the 
administrative backlog 
ii. Decrease the processing time of EA applications, leading to a quicker time to 
market 
 
6.3 South Africa’s developmental state and innovation in the context of EA  
Several actors interviewed did not believe that that the current EA regime drove innovation. 
This seemed to be particularly true for South Africa’s developmental state, where although it 
was felt that there are people who are great innovators, they are unable to get their product 
to the market due to regulatory hurdles. In this context, the current EA regulatory 
environment was seen as a barrier to innovation rather than a driver of innovation. 
 
OZ4P provided an apt definition of innovation in the context of EA approvals as: 
“Innovation is understanding the objectives what the markets and industry need and 
supporting this need through regulation”. (OZ4P). 
 
This statement is premised on first understanding the requirements of the markets and the 
EC industry first, before trying to apply a regulatory framework to support innovation.   
 
Other commentators did not see any impact that the EA environment had on innovation. 
OH1M & OS5J were of the opinion that innovation exists naturally in South Africa and the EA 
framework has little to no impact on either driving or inhibiting innovation. 
 
RN9B, however, was of the view the EA process inhibited innovation, especially in a 
developing country. The EA process requires test reports from accredited test facilities for all 
products, locally produced or internationally imported. This requirement means that locally 
developed EC equipment would require testing to international standards. Such testing may 
not be available in South Africa, due to a lack of testing facilities and the costs associated with 
such testing. This in turn obliges the local manufacturer to test his product internationally, 
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which increases the overall cost of the product and immediately puts the manufacturer at a 
disadvantage, even before he enters the highly competitive EC equipment market. Local 
manufacturers are thus not incentivised to innovate and develop new products, and RN9B 
was of the opinion that the current EA framework was thus inflexible as it did not differentiate 
between local manufacturing and international imports.  
 
RN9B further stated that innovation in terms of the EA process itself could simply entail 
automation. The current process was described as largely manual, and automation would 
result in significant gains in terms of processing time and human resource loads. A paperless 
environment was also noted as a key innovative feature, as the current system is dependent 
on large volumes of printed test reports and ICASA no longer has the capacity to store the 
large amounts of documentation related to each approval. This in turn leads to search and 
retrieval difficulties as some documents are being stored off-site. 
 
OK3H noted that innovation need not entail South Africa developing unique solutions to the 
problems of the EA framework as adopting policies from other countries could be regarded 
as innovation. South Africa is not truly a developing country, as our infrastructure can 
compare to first world standards. Innovation of the EA process, using lessons learnt from 
other jurisdictions could easily constitute as innovation in the EA environment.  
 
SN4M felt that the fact that we are a developing country actually increases our scope for 
innovation. By collaborating with various partners such as network operators, equipment 
vendors are able to extract more revenue from their product line as these operators are in 
some cases international organisations. There is an issue of trust here, as the equipment 
supplier has to fully commit to research and development with a network operator, with a 
view of mutual economic benefit to both parties. Such research and development may entail 
the equipment supplier sharing proprietary technology skills and knowledge with the 
operator, in order to test and develop technology with the ultimate goal of driving sales of 
such equipment. The operator gains by having access to the latest generation of equipment 
on their network, which generally equates to better service at lower costs to their subscribers. 
This mutual trust can potentially be a win-win scenario for both the equipment supplier and 
network operator, whilst simultaneously driving innovation in the sector: 
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Sharing with partners is what helps drive innovation, e.g. The Vodafone group is rolling out 
technology in SA that they have in other first world regions such as the UK. These partnerships 
are global in nature and drive innovation, as equipment companies try to roll out the latest 
technology worldwide to lower equipment prices through economies of scale. We are not a 
standalone region, given the type of market that we have. Even as an equipment supplier, we 
partner with other regions to drive the latest technologies. This pushes SA companies to their 
limit of technology and is a very positive spin-off. (SN4M). 
 
6.4 Collaboration among the various EA stakeholders to drive innovation 
Collaboration with other test facilities was seen as a proposal to innovate the EA process, but 
the key point would be that the regulator was regarded as the key party still responsible for 
overseeing the entire process. Testing laboratories could conduct tests on behalf of ICASA and 
verify the test reports. Handing this function over to a third party would increase both 
technical and administrative efficiency.  The test laboratory would also issue the certificate 
on behalf of ICASA. (PP1L, RN2A, RM1K, SM1E). ICASA would then audit the test laboratories 
to ensure the integrity of the process. The may even not be a need for testing should the test 
laboratory verify the authenticity of a submitted test report, and there would need to be 
mutual recognition agreements between the test laboratories to support this. The rigour in 
this process cannot be compromised as this would, in turn, compromise the quality of the 
device.  There exists enough infrastructure in South Africa to leverage on existing facilities, 
without the need to build new facilities from scratch (TLS3T, TLS2L). The major disadvantage 
of this approach is the fact that the current test facilities in South Africa lack the ability to 
conduct the full suite of tests for EC equipment (RD3M). This would require significant 
investment from the test facilities for them to be able to conduct the necessary types of tests, 
hence collaboration between test facilities is needed to ensure that the full suite of testing is 
divided amongst them based on their ability and capacity (TLS2L). 
 
 It was also understood that confidence in such a collaboration process would improve over 
time, leading to administrative efficiencies later in the process. The added benefit of such 
collaboration using test laboratories is that they would also allow the regulator to circumvent 
the ‘golden sample’ problem, as the set up to test future products capacitates the test facility 
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with the ability to provide verification of past test reports (TLS3T). This has the benefit of once 
again increasing the level of confidence of the EA ecosystem with the added benefit of 
increased consumer protection.  The net result would be that such a program would enhance 
competition, although confidentiality and transparency of the process would need to be 
carefully managed by the regulator. 
 
Collaboration between ICASA and SARS was seen as a critical process and one that should 
form part of an innovative future approach to EA regulation (OR1A). As SARS manages all 
border ports of entry into South Africa, they are the primary agency responsible for ensuring 
that no counterfeit or illegal equipment enters the country.  The Customs and Excise 
Department within SARS should have up to date access to ICASA’s EA database to have up to 
date information on EA approved products. Customs and Excise could be trained to 
differentiate between illegal counterfeit EC equipment and legal ICASA approved equipment. 
Equipment suppliers may have to be involved in this collaboration to assist with the 
identification. 
 
In the same vein as cooperation with SARS, ICASA should develop some collaboration with 
the NRCS (TLS2L). The NCRS regularly conducts market surveillance at the airports, harbours 
and other ports of entry to check compliance of EC equipment for electrical safety. It would 
not be burdensome for them to check for ICASA approval at the same time and would also be 
preventing a duplication of resources regarding surveillance. Collaboration with the NRCS 
would result in ICASA being more proactive in terms of market surveillance. ICASA could 
reciprocate also checking electrical safety compliance of EC equipment during their own 
market surveillance campaigns, further enhancing the overall enforcement of the EC 
equipment market.  
 
The above process would be driven by the current standards process, with internationally 
developed standards that conform to first world levels (RM4J). This would be implemented 
with a view to saving costs associated with testing to a unique, country-specific standards and 
would leverage on the economies of scale associated with the widespread adoption of a 
particular international standard.  
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Collaboration between suppliers was also seen as an innovative way to approach the 
regulation of EA (SN4M).  EA should not be considered a competitive advantage between 
vendors. EA should be viewed as a shared task that allowed suppliers to work together to 
prevent a duplication of the EA process. In this way, a single application between several 
suppliers would result in a quicker approval for all vendors, prevent duplication, reducing time 
to market and reducing costs for all suppliers involved. ICASA would be central to facilitate 
such collaboration and should make an equipment database accessible to the public.  
 
6.5 Considering a limitation of the scope of the EA process 
An example of innovation cited was limiting the categories of equipment that require type 
approval (RM4J, RQ7L). It was considered not necessary to type approve all the equipment as 
defined by the broad ambit of the ECA. Some of the short range equipment, discussed earlier, 
using infra-red and having a very low probability of interference, was listed as an example. 
Based on power levels and EMC, ICASA could easily exempt such equipment from type 
approval without much concern for possible interference effects. The current EA regulations 
span equipment from 8.3 kHz to 6 GHz as requiring EA approval, which spans most of the 
usable spectrum bands. Another category of EC equipment that could be considered for 
exemption would be battery powered devices. Hand-held battery powered equipment could 
be considered as low-risk devices with a small probability of causing harmful interference. 
Mains powered devices are currently treated in the same manner as Hand-held battery-
powered devices, even though the potential for causing interference and electrical shock to 
the user is vastly different. Exemptions are seen as the first step to streamlining the process. 
High levels of innovation are driving the multiple product cycles throughout the year, and EA 
can become a stumbling block if ICASA considered all equipment as requiring approval. ICASA 
would need to develop guidelines that define categories of equipment based on electrical 
power consumption and frequency use that could be exempted from the EA process (RM4J). 
 
A simple process was seen as the most innovative one, as the “time is money” concept would 
serve as the basis for innovation. A quicker, simpler EA process that incorporates exemptions 
would save manufacturers valuable time, decreasing their compliance costs and making their 
processes more efficient (SN4M). This saving would, in turn, be passed onto the consumers, 
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which results in a positive knock-on effect on the entire EA value chain. A simplified EA 
process would also lead to administrative efficiencies within the regulator itself, requiring 
fewer resources and thus cost for the management of the EA process. Savings could be used 
to strengthen post-market surveillance, ensuring that emphasis of the EA process remains 
with its public interest objectives. 
 
 6.6 Challenges to implementing an innovative EA framework 
ICASA does not have test facilities to independently verify test reports sent to the regulator 
in support of an EA application. In this case, without implementing any further action- the 
regulator would have to consider instances where test declarations are accepted fully without 
the actual test report. This once again leads to the theme of trust between the manufacturer 
and the regulator, but given that the regulator does not have a mechanism for verification, it 
would be prudent to examine possibilities of accepting test declarations (OS5J). 
 
6.7 Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) in the EA environment 
ICASA has been advised to enter into both regional and international MRA’s. MRA’s were seen 
as a mechanism to streamline the EA process and ensure a quicker time to market for EC 
equipment (ITU, 2014). The requirements for the EA process would not change, but 
duplication of the EA process would be prevented. An MRA would assume that the technical 
considerations for EA approval between both countries are harmonised, and can then 
leverage the resources of both countries to ensure that the requirements for EA approval are 
met. Such harmonisation, however, can be difficult to achieve given that different countries 
have different requirements based on their national frequency allocation (RS3R). The ITU, 
therefore, suggests that like-minded authorities from developing countries develop a 
framework for harmonisation and agree on areas of cooperation to promote harmonisation 
(ITU, 2016:11).  RS3R notes that although mutual recognition agreements are necessary, 
technology itself prevents worldwide harmonisation. Country-specific requirements are thus 
unavoidable, although, in terms of technical barriers, MRAs between countries within the 
same radio region would still be a relatively straightforward proposition. 
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The financial considerations for both the EC equipment supplier and the country to which EA 
is applied for can be significant should MRAs be permitted. Suppliers would have quicker 
access to market and lower costs of compliance, which could ultimately lead to lower product 
costs. The EC market in which the product is being sold would have access to the latest 
equipment and competitive prices, stimulating the EC market through increased sales 
(OH1M).  
 
Even without a formal mutual recognition agreement in place, countries like Botswana 
already accept ICASA type approval certification without any further local approval (SD2M). 
South Africa was considered a leader in the African continent in terms of technology adoption 
and technology development (SN4M). South Africa had significant resources regarding access 
to information, especially since all the key EC manufacturers have a presence in the country. 
This ensures that South Africa can leverage such information and position itself as the 
gateway to Africa regarding EA approval. The major manufacturers would use their already 
established presence here to launch products throughout Africa, especially if South Africa 
entered in MRA’s with other countries. South Africa would thus benefit, rather than be 
disadvantaged by entering into MRA’s with its neighbours.  
 
6.8 Encouraging flexibility in interpretation of the current regulatory 
framework 
ICASA is seen as inflexible when it comes to interpreting the current EA regulation. A more 
consistent and pragmatic approach to interpretation would not require any “innovation” on 
the part of the regulator, aside from being innovative in considering differing interpretations 
of current regulation (OS5J).  As an example, ICASA was asked to be more pragmatic in terms 
of labelling equipment, with a specific focus on the size and type of device. For suppliers and 
operators to open boxes and affix ICASA labels onto devices to show compliance to the EA 
regulations, voids any warranty unless the labels were specifically pasted at the point of 
manufacture (SM1E, SD2M). Although this does occur, there are instances when the point of 
labelling happens when the equipment arrives in the country. ICASA could investigate other 
options to ensure that the regulations are followed, without voiding the warranty of the 
device. The same applies to very large or very small network equipment, where it is unfeasible 
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to affix an ICASA label onto the equipment. The e-labelling initiative by ICASA was seen as a 
positive step in this regard, where a software application on the device can be run to display 
the regulatory information about the approved device. 
 
OK3H concurred with the view that there is no need to change the regulatory framework that 
governs the EA process as all that was required was some flexibility in interpretation. 
Technology has meant that transactions worldwide are occurring in real time. Customers shop 
24/7/365 in real time. The EA process has to embrace technology and moving away from a 
physical-based approach to a time-based approach to prevent delays and bottlenecks within 
the EC equipment market value chain. Delays in one link of the chain invariably impact the 
consumer layer of the market.  EC equipment should be considered as fast moving consumer 
goods that are very sensitive to the time to market.  
 
 
6.9 The Review period for standards and regulations 
The review period of the regulatory framework for EA was found to be problematic. The 
Official List regulation is almost a decade old but was noted as being updated only twice in 
that period. The cycle of updates is not quick enough to follow the changing standards (OS5J) 
and issues of regulations being inflexible in its ability to be able to keep up with technology 
are once again made. Future innovative EA regulation must be flexible enough to allow the 
use of the latest standard, without specifying a standard name. SN4M cautions that any 
change to the EA process would need to be incremental in nature, as such changes would 
impact the equipment supplier the most.  
 
 
6.10 EA fostering 5G and future broadband technologies 
The future 5G mobile broadband spectrum use will depend on a coordinate use of these 
frequencies. EA was seen as a critical instrument in frequency coordination for devices 
operating in the 5G frequency bands (OZ4P). 5G would usher in a multitude of devices that 
may be an order of magnitude greater than what is currently used today. This explosion would 
be mainly due to the prevalence of machine to machine communications, exposing all users 
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of EC equipment to the risk of interference. A robust, innovative EA approach would need to 
ensure that the safety, performance and emission parameters of all EC devices are met, 
irrespective of the volumes of future devices that will be made available to the market. In 
essence, the future EA framework must be independent of volume but still cognisant to the 
essential requirements. 
 
In the same vein as future 5G technology, shared access technology such as Wi-Fi would 
continue to play a dominant role in facilitating broadband access. RS3R notes that sharing of 
frequency bands would become more critical, given the increase in the number of connected 
devices. A future EA framework would thus have to place greater emphasis on frequency 
sharing and harmonisation. RS3R states that South Africa should continue following the 
European example of a 100mW output power for Wi-Fi devices, as it allows for the higher 
reuse of the frequencies. In comparison, the US allows 1W output power for Wi-Fi, and the 
net results are that the reuse of frequencies is poor. The entire band becomes overused, and 
this leads to the eventual degradation of the whole Wi-Fi band, rendering it unusable. A future 
EA regime should value band sharing above coverage and range considerations, and thus 
should resist any attempts to increase the power of the Wi-Fi band.  Europe has conducted 
several studies that show that the lower power ultimately yields higher efficiencies for the 
use of shared bands. 
 
6.11 Outsourcing the EA function  
An innovative solution to addressing the issues of volume as well as capacity related to 
outsourcing the EA function to accredited test laboratories (OZ4P). This approach is similar to 
the FCC approach of designating Conformity Assessment Bodies. This takes the concept of 
collaboration with test facilities a step further, by empowering them to grant EA approvals on 
behalf of the regulator. This innovative approach has the added benefit of addressing the 
‘differentiation of suppliers’ theme, as all providers would be treated in the same way. It has 
the advantage of decentralising the EA approval process, removing the issues of 
administrative volumes and associated delays. No further information was provided regarding 
the specifics of deploying such a solution, leaving the details to be developed by the regulator.  
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Another suggestion was to outsource the EA function entirely to an independent third party 
(RM4J). There has been a precedent for such an initiative, with ICASA delegating the function 
of managing number portability to the Number Portability Company, which is co-owned by 
the cellular operators. The responsibility of the EA function itself would remain with the 
regulator, as only the management of the process would be delegated to maximise 
administrative efficiencies. 
 
6.12 Preventing  a duplication of the EA process 
RD3M noted that EC equipment approved in the EU form a large percentage of the equipment 
submitted for EA approval in South Africa. Such equipment has a compliance number or 
identification number that can be verified by ICASA, with limited technical and administrative 
burden to ICASA. Accepting such approvals without further technical or administrative checks 
would greatly streamline and prevent duplication of the EA process. The ECA already makes 
provision for this and thus removes any legal impediments. Claims of the EA process simply 
being a “rubber-stamping” exercise would also be laid to rest, as well as the assertion from 
certain commentators that the EA process is a rent-seeking exercise by the regulator.  
 
OK3H suggested adopting the banking sector approach using technology to assist with 
verification. ICASA should employ a smart solution that regularly updates a central database 
of approvals from various approval bodies. Inspectors could use a scanning device that 
automatically checks the equipment to this database. If approved elsewhere, there should be 
no further EA requirements imposed on the device locally. EC equipment can be scanned to 
check a database of previous approvals. There would be no need to duplicate the EA process 
locally as one could simply use the European level approval and scan equipment to ensure 
that the equipment is safe to use. This relates to the solution of collaboration with other 
regulatory approval bodies and will make sure that the workload of the regulator is 
substantially decreased as well (SN4M). This approach would be useful especially at the 
customs and border posts of entry. The current physical paper certificate ages and becomes 
illegible. An electronic copy was all that is required and can be easily shared (RS3R, SN4M, 
SM1E).   
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6.13 Globalisation and consumer protection 
OK3H made the somewhat contentious point about the future of the EC market. Globalisation 
of EC equipment has led to equipment manufacturers becoming global distributors of 
equipment. Consumers regularly buy equipment overseas with the tacit knowledge that they 
will not receive any local support or guarantee for the product. Economic considerations 
regarding a favourable price outweigh the potential consumer protection deficiencies, and 
the customer knowingly purchases EC equipment abroad. Some manufacturers offer 
worldwide guarantees for their products, making local regulations aimed at consumer 
protection moot. An innovative EA framework would thus need to consider the effect of 
globalisation of EC equipment to the changing consumer protection landscape.  
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Chapter 7: Towards a grounded theory of an Innovative approach to 
EA in a developing country 
 
 7.1 Key concepts emergent from the data - Initial coding and selective coding 
processes 
An emergent grounded theory of the EA environment in a developing country was advanced 
through the systematic adherence to the grounded theory method described in chapter 
three. 
I. Codes 
The first step of the process was to code the various data sources. The process of 
coding assists the researcher in sorting out the data and assigning a name to a 
particular category of data. In all, 2507 total codes and 939 unique codes were 
generated during this study. The complete list of these codes can be found in Appendix 
F. These codes were generated by breaking down the data gathered into individual 
ideas and concepts.  
II. Code-families 
The second step of the process involved selective and focused coding, whereby a more 
selective and conceptual approach to coding is adopted. Using the already developed 
codes from the initial coding process, the adequacy of these codes were tested using 
the philosophical framework adopted in chapter three, leading to codes that were 
more analytical and that categorised the data more completely.  Focused coding 
reduced the 939 distinct codes to 24 code-families. The approach adopted involved 
ensuring that duplications of codes were removed, where each code representing 
similar concepts that were captured by coding that essentially conveyed the same 
idea, but differed in the text used. The code-families developed were more directed, 
selective and conceptual as well as being grounded in the data.  The Atlas.Ti program 
manages the process of code families by linking various codes to a code-family. The 
process entailed analysing the data again, to code data in respect of the main themes, 
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using an analytical purview not previously considered (Charmaz, 2006:59). Figure 27 
depicts the process of selective coding into code-families. 
Figure 27: The code families 
 
III. Memos 
The next step in the grounded theory process involves writing memos. The memos 
contained here are the advanced memos, derived from interrogating the codes and 
defining the analytical properties subsumed by these codes to develop key categories. At 
times, raw data from the interviews have been brought into the memo to support the 
analytical claims being made, but the majority of associated data is stored and referenced 
by the QDA program used. These memos represent a level of abstraction of the data, and 
it is presented as part of the major themes or key categories developed in the analysis 
phase.  
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IV. Key categories 
The key categories are developed through a conceptual rendering of the code-
families. The key categories and related data are further analysed using inductive 
reasoning to develop the substantive theory. 
7.2 Determining the key categories 
The grounded theory method of constant comparisons is also adopted, with comparisons 
between data and data, data and codes, codes and codes, codes and categories, categories 
and categories being made. Such analysis enables these categories to coalesce, and more 
theoretical levels of abstraction are built directly from the data. The iterative constant 
comparison method is the cornerstone of the grounded theory method, and it aids in 
advancing theory development during each step of the data analysis phase (Charmaz, 2006). 
Several network diagrams (that follow in the next section) are incorporated into the data 
analysis, as a diagrammatic representation is ideal in depicting the various relationships 
between different codes, memos and texts. To simplify the diagrams, the links between the 
categories and the actual supporting data segments are not included. The Atlas.Ti program 
can show all data segments associated with every code and memo in the study and this 
functionality assists the researcher greatly with tracing the source data. 
The key categories are discussed next. 
 
7.2.1 Design for manufacturability 
Figure 28 depicts the properties and dimensions of the key category “Design for 
manufacturability”. The code-family of “Quality” is at the centre of this category. 
Applying the constant comparison technique of grounded theory across codes shows 
that the code-family of “Quality” is related to the code-families of “Confidence” and the 
“Regulatory perspective” as well. These codes will be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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Figure 28: Properties and dimensions of the key category "Design for manufacturability". 
 
 
Quality is a code-family that arises from the data analysed and relates to the envisaged end-
product of the EA process, where EC equipment subjected to the EA process is perceived to 
be of high quality. The data suggest that the EA process ultimately enforces the functionality 
of the equipment, not the quality. The assessment of quality is in itself a subjective process. 
There is a lack of focus on quality built into the EA process. The functionality of EC equipment 
relates only to the safety, interoperability and EMC characteristics. EA thus regulates only the 
minimum requirements relating to the functionality of the EC equipment. The EA process is 
aimed at creating consumer confidence only regarding the basic functional requirements and 
does not guarantee confidence regarding the quality of the equipment. The data analysed 
shows that quality is a function of consumer choice, i.e. the consumer makes conscience 
decisions regarding the quality of EC equipment purchased based on the price of the 
equipment. Customers expect high quality for higher priced EC equipment but would accept 
lower quality equipment at a lower price. The developing country environment also 
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determines the price at which EC equipment can be sold and ultimately price, not quality is 
the overriding factor in EC equipment purchases.  
Manufacturers apply the principle of “Design for manufacturability”, where equipment 
manufacturer is proactively optimised in terms of manufacturing, fabrication, testing, 
procurement, shipping, delivery, service and repair (Anderson, 2004). The function of the 
design for manufacturability process is intended to ensure that an appropriate balance 
between cost and quality is achieved. Safety and regulatory compliance are further noted as 
key determinants of the “design for manufacturability” process. The EA process, being a 
regulatory compliance exercise, is thus an important consideration in the design process for 
EC equipment. EC equipment is therefore designed to the mandated regulatory standards 
specifications. Cost and quality of the equipment are distinctly separate determinants of the 
“design for manufacturability” approach. “Design for manufacturability” is thus the first key 
category identified in the data analysis process. This category highlights the emphasis on 
functionality that is attributed to the EA process. 
The focus on functionality from an economic perspective was regarded as the correct 
approach based on the data analysed, as applying further quality standards to EC equipment 
would result in the net cost of the equipment increasing.  
Memo 1 describes the key category of “Design for manufacturability”. 
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Memo 1: Design for manufacturability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The purpose of EA approval centres on functional requirements. The question of whether 
the current EA process facilitates quality is not easily answered. The EA process ensures the 
interoperability and operability of EC equipment, but would not necessarily lead to a quality 
product. This raises the question of the extent to which consumer interest is being advanced 
via the EA process if only the rudimental functional requirements are tested. The implication 
is that only a rudimental level of quality can be guaranteed via the EA process. This 
implication leads back to the focus of EA. The current EA approach ensures network 
operability and interoperability but does little to ensure quality. EC equipment is “designed 
for manufacturability” from the outset, with a specific focus on the cost of the equipment. 
Functional requirements are key to the design, as is the ease of regulatory conformance. 
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7.2.2 Costs 
Figure 29 represents the properties and dimensions of the key category of “Cost”. 
Figure 29: Properties and dimensions of the key category "Costs" 
 
The code-family of “costs" is at the centre of this key-category. It is immediately evident that 
the code-family of “cost”, while cited numerously during the open-coding process, is not 
related to adjacent code-families. A clear indication of a multidimensional construct would 
have been visible in Figure 29, where an analysis of the data regarding the code of “costs” 
would subsume other code-families, indicated visually by arrows linking “costs” to these 
codes. “Costs” is certainly an important code analysed in this study, but appears to be 
superficial and self-contained. Analysing the relational statements to the code of “costs” 
shows that “costs” is an impacting variable on several code-families, but does not form a 
definitive construct in terms of the over-arching theoretical categories analysed in this study. 
As an example, “costs” was noted in the data to contribute to delays in the EA process and 
was coded as the “economic costs of delays”. “Costs” on its own however was not cited as a 
factor that caused delays to the EA process. It should be noted that only variables impacting 
the costs related to the EA process were considered as other costs exist in the EC equipment 
value chain.  
221 
 
 
 
This is a surprising finding, given that the study is grounded in a developing country 
environment,where economic considerations formed an integral part of the initial literature 
survey.  The data, therefore, suggest that the economic theory of regulation, although 
applicable to this environment, is not a key determinant of the core theoretical underpinning 
of EA regulation in a developing country. The evidence further points that the developing 
country status of South Africa has little to no impact on EA costs. Labour costs were a 
particular example cited in the study, where the relatively low labour rates in South Africa 
was seen as facilitating the EA process rather than hindering it.  
The data points to “costs” as a code-family that can have a significant impact on the success 
of an EA regime but does not contribute to a theoretical approach to a future EA regime. 
Evidence from the data gathered, in fact, suggests that manufacturers value the EA process 
and do not mind the associated costs related to EA approval. The confidence that an EA label 
instils in the customer is valuable, and manufacturers accept the cost related to generating 
such confidence. The economic costs of delays are a larger source of concern to the EA 
suppliers and thus the code of “time is money” as adopted in a commercial environment, was 
noted as a principle that is not well appreciated by the regulator.  The key-category of “cost” 
will be subjected to further theoretical sampling before a decision is made on including it in 
developing the final substantive theory. 
 
Memo 2 reflects on the importance of the key category of “Costs”. 
222 
 
 
 
Memo 2: Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
It was not evident amongst the interviewees that the costs related to the EA process 
are a stumbling block to the success of EA. There is a tacit acceptance that costs 
cannot be entirely reduced in this environment, but that the current costs are high 
and may serve as a barrier to market entry. The antithesis to this is the 
manufacturers do not mind the testing and conformance costs, as it serves to 
protect them and instils consumer confidence. EC equipment suppliers vertically 
integrate conformance costs into the cost management structure. 
 
Two developments seem to have co-occurred. The first is that the number of EA 
tests required per device has increased substantially, increasing the overall cost of 
testing. At the same time, however, the costs related to each test has decreased 
due to newer test technologies such as digital equipment as well as automation in 
the process. Another issue raised was that labour costs do not form a significant 
percentage of the EC equipment cost, hence South Africa as a developing country, 
with attractive labour rates, should not be at a disadvantage regarding labour costs. 
The overall net effect is that all expenses in the EC equipment environment is 
ultimately passed onto the consumer. EC market is driven by economies of scale, 
hence large volumes are required to drive profits. South Africa is a relatively small 
EC equipment market, and suppliers cannot request OEM's to conduct R100k tests 
just for the South African market. The cost of the EA process itself is not prohibitive, 
and the value of the process outweighs the cost. 
 
Manufacturers and equipment suppliers have raised the issue of "time is money". 
Although the regulator claims to understand the financial impact of delays that the 
EA process causes to the suppliers, the suppliers themselves are of the opinion that 
ICASA does not fully understand the financial burden of such delays. 
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7.2.3 Transactional process determinants 
Figure 30 is a network diagram that describes the nature of the EA process. The code-family 
of “cumbersome process” is at the centre of this category. 
Figure 30: Properties and Dimensions of the “Transactional process determinants” key category. 
 
 
The entire end-to-end EA transaction has been described as being “cumbersome” in several 
instances throughout the data. The term “transaction” is fitting, as it ultimately sums up the 
“time is money” code discussed earlier, where informants saw the EA process as a necessary 
business transaction.  
The code-family of a “cumbersome process” is also linked to the code-family of “Innovation”. 
The EA process was seen as a barrier to innovation and trade by equipment suppliers.  A 
general lack of value-add was noted concerning the EA process as it was thought to be a 
duplication of international approvals, and such a duplication was a key determinant of the 
perception of the EA process as being cumbersome. As ICASA did not have the mechanism to 
test equipment themselves, EC suppliers saw no value in a desktop approval process. EC 
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suppliers were primarily concerned with the time to market, where delays have a significant 
economic impact on them. The regulator’s inability to verify test reports for EA was 
surprisingly not a determinant in the EC equipment supplier’s trust in the regulator’s ability. 
Various transactional factors have impacted the EA process, although the prime focus seemed 
to be the efficiency of the process, which was characterised by constant delays, lack of 
communication and inflexibility.  
The regulator, however, did not trust the authenticity and validity of international test reports 
(exogenous to the EA process) and looked for mechanisms to corroborate the information 
received from EC equipment suppliers.  Other transactional determinants that exacerbated 
the cumbersome nature of the EA process was the regulator adopting a uniform approach to 
all EA applications, irrespective of the type of equipment being approved.  A key category of 
“transactional process determinants” was thus noted. 
Additionally, the EA transaction for EC equipment suppliers was uniform, irrespective of 
several trust and reputational determinants such as the supplier’s market share, previous 
application history and financial standing. Informants suggested that ICASA could consider 
these determinants as an opportunity to streamline the current EA process, by deviating from 
the mandated process in certain circumstances. It was thought that such deviations would 
decrease the administrative burden of the regulator and increase the efficiency of the EA 
process in general. This approach was in keeping with the theme of trust, where the regulator 
was willing to differentiate between suppliers, based on pre-defined criteria. This construct 
of “trust differentiation” will be discussed further later on in this chapter. 
The public interest objectives of EA have already been documented in this research. The data, 
however, points to the current EA approach aiding in the proliferation of illegal and obsolete 
equipment. Consumer protection and consumer safety objectives, subsets of public interest 
theory, are undermined by the current EA regulatory approach. The current EA regulatory 
approach was seen as a catalyst for the illegal equipment market, as its complex and 
cumbersome nature made adherence to the regulations problematic. As a result, an illegal EC 
equipment market has flourished in South Africa. The long turnaround times for processing 
EA applications has also resulted in obsolete equipment being introduced to the South African 
market, which allows EC equipment suppliers to legally “dump” their obsolete EC equipment 
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inventory into the country. The EA regulatory framework was intended to encourage 
innovation and ensure that South Africa has access to low-cost, cutting-edge technology EC 
equipment.   
An innovative theoretical approach to EA regulation in a developing country must, therefore, 
ensure that the regulatory process itself is agile and incorporates elements of “transactional 
process determinants” when applying rules to suppliers. This concept must be applied both 
at the EC equipment level (where categories of equipment and potential to cause harm is 
defined) and the EC equipment supplier level (where pre-defined criteria must be considered 
that would determine the approval path for different suppliers).  Such an approach would 
ensure that concerns such as illegal equipment and dumping of obsolete equipment would 
be largely neutralised. Memo 3 discusses the “transactional process determinants” of the 
current EA process as endorsed by the research informants. 
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Memo 3: The transactional process determinants of the EA process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ICASA is aware that the current EA process is not fit for purpose and may inhibit innovation 
and trade. ICASA does not believe that a faster time to process applications is related to an 
efficient EA transaction. Several determinants impact the perception of the EA transaction. 
 
Network Operators saw the current process as a duplication of what is done in other 
jurisdictions and noted that ICASA does not have the facilities and/or ability to verify test 
reports independently. The validity of test reports is thus a key determinant of the EA 
transaction, although this process is seen as a paper-based exercise without much value, 
given the ICASA has to rely on a summary of the test report. ICASA has never declined an 
application that was tested to the appropriate standards, which indicates that the EA 
process essentially duplicates the international approval, or merely rubber-stamps approval 
for the South African market.  There is no added value in technical conformity assessment. 
Also raised was the issue of trust, where ICASA has to trust the validity of the test report as 
it does not have an independent mechanism of verification.  Trust is a key determinant of 
the EA process. The long lead times of the EA process has a direct economic implication to 
the supplier.  
 
Another transactional determinant of the EA process is capacity. The human resource 
limitation faced by the regulator impacts the ability to communicate effectively with 
stakeholders. Stakeholders such as major equipment manufacturers will not ship equipment 
to a country without regulatory certainty, thus communication impacts EC equipment 
investment. Long processing times for EA applications leads to conflict between ICASA staff 
and EC equipment suppliers, exacerbated by limited human resource capacity and 
administrative inefficiency. There is no differentiation in EC products, as even battery 
powered equipment with a low probability of interference is treated in the same manner as 
other high-powered transmitting devices. This highlights the inflexibility of the EA regulatory 
framework in dealing with different types of EC equipment. The ability to cause harm is thus 
an important determinant of the EA transaction that is not catered for in the current 
regulatory approach. 
 
The current EA process is not clearly defined and not well understood. Some equipment 
that should require approval is not being approved, such as elements that make up network 
equipment. The EA process may, in fact, support the proliferation of illegal equipment by 
the process being difficult to comply with. The long processing time can cause equipment 
to become obsolete before the equipment is released in South Africa. This opens up the 
possibility of manufacturers dumping obsolete equipment in South Africa. The EA process 
is thus a contributor to the problem of dumping. 
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7.2.4 Differential trust 
Figure 31 details the properties and dimensions of the category "Differential trust". 
Figure 31: Properties and dimensions of the key category "Differential trust". 
 
 
 “Differentiation of suppliers” was determined to be the central code-family. Applying 
inductive analysis to this key code yielded “differential trust” as a key category. The argument 
for “differential trust” is made after analysis of the data revealed a distinctive differentiation 
between EC suppliers. A two-tier “trust matrix” was suggested, with larger suppliers (who 
ostensibly value the effects of reputational damage more than smaller suppliers) to be 
considered “more trustworthy” than a smaller supplier. Original Equipment Manufacturers 
were cited as a prime example of a tier one (or large supplier) based on company size, 
reputational awareness market share. A tier two supplier (or small supplier) would be 
considered a reseller of various OEM EC equipment with no brand loyalty. Tier two suppliers 
would also be considered to have a smaller market share, infrequent EA applications with 
lower volumes and less exposure to the impact of reputational damage.  
The code-family "Differentiation of suppliers“ was related to other code-families of 
“Confidence” and “Trust”. Once again, the underlying themes of organisational trust and 
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confidence are evident from the data. The concept of “differential trust” can be explained as 
the level of trust assigned by the regulator to a supplier, based on the tier status and salience 
of that EC equipment supplier, with tier one suppliers enjoying a higher level of trust than tier 
two.  Lyons (2013) proposes a similar model of differential trust across political institutions. 
The concept of “salience” or visibility was introduced in his study, where salient political 
organisations with high visibility to the public were trusted based on the basis of perceived 
political and economic performance. Salience is analogous to the reputational consideration 
of tier one OEMs, who can be considered to have higher visibility to the public than a tier two 
supplier, irrespective of the fact that the tier two supplier could be providing the same EC 
equipment as the OEM.  
Tier two suppliers were seen to have difficulties in accessing test facilities and test reports 
and did not understand the EA requirements. The technical information proved especially 
problematic to tier two supplier, given their limited resources when compared to tier one 
suppliers. Adherence to the ICASA EA process, the provision of the correct technical 
documentation and the access to the appropriate test facilities were key determinants of 
trust for the regulator. Organisational trust theory states that:   
...prior to their first encounter with another party, individuals tend to construct initial trust 
beliefs regarding that party. In the context of establishing a new inter-organisational 
relationship, the formation of preliminary trust beliefs is particularly relevant during the 
relationship initiation stage (Schilke & Cook, 2013). 
The initial interaction between tier two suppliers and the regulator is thus a contributing 
factor to the regulator’s preliminary trust belief towards tier two suppliers, further enforcing 
the “differential trust” concept. Tier one suppliers were noted to conduct their own, in-house 
testing – which further entrenches the notion of their results being trustworthy. These 
suppliers have also approached ICASA and the NRCS to enquire whether any of their products 
were ever the source of interference. The regulators have not been able to confirm this, which 
further ingrains the notion of trust with their products. By approaching the regulator and 
highlighting a positive track record, these suppliers have elevated the salience of their 
organisation, further engendering the primary trust relationship with the regulator. The 
analysis of the data, however, does not show conversely that the absence of salience lowers 
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the level of confidence in that supplier as viewed by the regulator. The presence of salience 
only increases the levels of confidence. 
 
 Memo 4: Differential trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are common threads from various interviews that speak to a two-category supplier 
definition. There are the "major manufacturers” and the "small suppliers".  Confidence 
levels and trust levels differ with these two types. Larger manufacturers and suppliers are 
happy and more easily able to conform to the current EA regulations. They have an overall 
positive outlook to the current EA framework, while it seems that the smaller manufacturers 
or suppliers do not view the EA framework in the same way. The majority of small suppliers 
find the process cumbersome and difficult to understand and comply with. ICASA is seen as 
having the responsibility to provide a level of support to the smaller suppliers, to assist them 
in understanding the EA process. There is support from all informants that a differentiation 
between suppliers is required and that the larger suppliers should be allowed a certain level 
of autonomy and trust, based on the risk to their reputational damage. A self-declaratory 
model is suggested for the larger suppliers. 
 
There is now a reversal of roles, where previously network operators tested OEM devices 
on their networks to determine whether to allow such devices onto their network. Larger 
OEMs such as Apple now test their equipment on the operator network first, before 
agreeing to release their equipment to the operator’s network. The brand reputation is 
essential to larger OEMs, and they would not jeopardise their brand without first conducting 
network interoperability. For smaller operators, access to test facilities is a problem - 
especially in the case of developing countries where test facilities are not easily available. 
 
A two-stage approach to suppliers is suggested with respect to operators: 
1. Mandatory standards required by ICASA for Tier One suppliers. 
2. Additional requirements to test additional functionality for Tier Two suppliers. 
 
Tier One suppliers will not purchase equipment without the proper ICASA equipment 
authorisation. The value of the ICASA brand is growing. Larger suppliers conduct their own 
in-house testing, much like the network operators and have approached ICASA and the 
NRCS to determine whether any of their products have ever caused interference. The 
regulators have not responded, either because they do not have any evidence or are not 
able to access such information easily. 
 
ICASA thus applies a “differential trust” approach, with OEMs listed at the highest level of 
trust based on their exposure to reputational damage. The regulator understands the 
danger in adopting this approach - it would favour Tier One suppliers as Tier Two supplier 
would not have the financial ability to meet the additional standards set out by the 
regulator. This would further entrench the larger operator’s market share and negatively 
impact competition in the market. 
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7.2.5 Technology assimilation 
Figure 32: Properties and dimensions of the key category  "Technology assimilation". 
 
 
Figure 32 depicts the properties and dimensions of the key category of “Technology 
assimilation” using the code-families of “Technology” and “Innovation” respectively. Data 
analysis of these code-families coalesced into the key category of “Technology assimilation”, 
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and hence they are considered simultaneously. Technology is a key element to innovation, 
and the two code-families are inextricably linked. The analysis of the data reveals that 
technology is a key driver of innovation, and such technology is driven through assimilation. 
Given the incredible pace of technology, and that South Africa is a net importer of EC 
equipment, informants suggest that technology innovation imported into the country be 
assimilated into both the EA regulatory framework and the local equipment manufacturing 
industry. Innovation can refer to something that is new to that particular market and not 
necessarily new to the world (World Bank, 2010). Assimilation of foreign technology and 
methods were seen to promote a “technology colony” mindset, although the lack of a robust 
domestic EC equipment research and development environment was also acknowledged.  
EA regulation was considered a bottleneck to technology diffusion and innovation. The 
“technology assimilation” concept was also applicable to the EA framework. Through the use 
of existing software solutions, the EA process could be automated, improving several 
elements that contribute to the problems experienced with the current approach. This can 
be regarded as an example of innovation. “Technology assimilation” can also involve applying 
technology intelligence to develop a risk rating of the equipment being approved. The EA 
process can exclude low-risk equipment from the approval process and is therefore also 
linked to the theme of innovation. 
The theme of “collaboration” is linked to “technology assimilation”, when international 
approval frameworks are considered. Innovation through preventing the duplication of the 
EA process by “assimilating” the results of an International approval framework, incorporates 
elements of innovation and technology into a developing country’s EA framework. 
Collaboration is also linked to the theme of the “cumbersome process” of the current EA 
framework, which allows for such duplication to occur.  
Technology assimilation cannot be adopted blindly, and indigenous variations based on the 
requirements of the implementing country is required. In this instance, the developing 
country status of South Africa is an important consideration when adopting technology 
standards from first world regions. A level of intelligence needs to be applied to the 
technology solution, either amending or ignoring characteristics of that solution to maximise 
the benefits of assimilation to the country of implementation. The data analysed suggests 
that such deviations should be an exception rather than the norm, as the economies of scale 
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benefits associated with mainstream technologies are not realised by custom solutions. The 
earlier theme of costs has relevance here, as developing countries are extremely cost 
sensitive, hence technology assimilation must be based on mass market adoption. The cost 
of the solution and applicability to the developing country environment is secondary to the 
cost of the product.  
 
Memo 5 describes the key category of “Technology assimilation.” 
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Memo 5: Technology assimilation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Innovation in technology has had the unintended consequence of increasing compliance 
costs, due to the variety of standards required for testing purposes. Technology will render 
EA moot. EA is not keeping up with the pace of technology. 
EA is required for future technologies, notably broadband technology. 5G will make 
interoperability a key issue, which is driven by EA. SA imports the majority of its EC 
equipment and is dependent on imports. SA lacks innovation in this regard. The intellectual 
capital that is associated with that equipment is not passed to the country. Although SA has 
access to the latest technology, it does not have the research and development ability to 
support EC equipment. SA is thus a technology colony, that simply adopts the technology of 
the "coloniser".  There is the opportunity to use "backward integration” or “technology 
assimilation” to obtain this knowledge, however, this process is a grey area that is deemed 
illegal in most developed countries. The example of Samsung copying the iPhone is an apt 
one, which eventually led to Samsung paying substantial fines to Apple for copyright 
infringement. There is an important caveat to the technology colony issue. South Africa 
cannot afford to blindly accept changes in standards adopted, in, for example, European 
regions. These changes may be necessary for the European market, but may only have the 
effect of increased testing costs for the South Africa environment.  
 
Given the fast-moving pace of technology, it seems that equipment could self-regulate and 
thus render EA moot. There are self-managing equipment such cognitive radios that can 
prevent interference by changing frequency. Frequency coordination is one of the key 
functions of EA.  Technology has also affected the testing process itself. Automation and 
digital technology have allowed testing to be conducted much quicker, allowing for greater 
volumes of testing to be conducted. The EA regulation itself needs to be flexible enough to 
keep up with technology. Regulations should refer to standard names and not versions of 
standards, to allow the latest version of the standard to be referenced. 
 
Competition is critical for industrial development, and EA is based on standards, which are 
developed on an open platform. By measuring equipment to internationally recognised 
norms, a level playing field for all manufacturers is created, and this also enables 
competition. Equipment tested to open standards can be used anywhere in the world that 
such standards are used, thus again supporting competition. The current EA process deters 
innovation. It creates several barriers to entry, especially for small manufacturers. The EA 
process puts local EC equipment manufacturers at a disadvantage as the process requires 
testing to international standards, which is difficult and sometimes not possible in South 
Africa. Local manufacturers are forced to test outside the country, raising their input costs. 
 
Innovation can be related to what the market needs, and can also be related to existing 
ways of doing things. It is clear that the market drives innovation and that innovation is not 
necessarily driven by unique solutions developed by a country. South Africa can “assimilate” 
technology in order to drive innovation. 
 
Another interesting point is that we can drive innovation through collaboration, both locally 
and internationally. Changing how the EA process is run is also an example of innovation.  
Innovation could involve exempting some equipment from the EA process. Innovation is 
also linked to making the process easier - as an easier process means more investment 
which in turn will stimulate innovation in equipment. Network operators were ambivalent 
to the impact of EA on innovation, with some stating that while it did not encourage 
innovation. It did not inhibit innovation either. Automation of the EA process is an example 
of innovation. International best practise for EA can be assimilated in an automated manner 
to drive innovation. 
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7.2.6 Deterministic validation 
Figure 33: Properties and dimensions of the key category “Deterministic validation”. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 depicts the properties and dimensions of the key category “deterministic validation” 
through an analysis of the code-families “Level of conformance” and “Objectives of EA” 
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respectively. “Deterministic validation” describes the manner and form of the current EA 
regulatory approach, being pre-determined in validating the technical interoperability and 
performance. The analysis of the data reveals that the level of performance of EA in 
developing countries should be limited to the technical interoperability characteristics. The 
objectives of EA, although steeped in a public interest guise, is currently operationalised 
through regulation as a technical validation of test reports. The current EA process is thus 
deterministic with a core focus on validation. The deterministic nature of the current EA 
approach is underscored by the technical regulations in place for various categories of 
equipment. The successful completion of the EA process is usually binary in its outcome, with 
a technical review process used for validation. Outside of the technical considerations, very 
little else can significantly impact the EA outcome. The data shows that no EA approval has 
ever been declined by the regulator if the technical parameters have been met. Memo 6 
provides an elaboration of the key category of “Deterministic validation”. 
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Memo 6: Deterministic validation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The objective of EA in terms of ICASA’s perspective seems misplaced. The ECA is clear in its 
public interest objectives, while the EA regulatory approach seems to centre on technical 
interoperability, standards and QoS. Safety and consumer protection are added almost as 
an afterthought.  The process is deterministic with a core focus on the validation of the 
technical parameters. There is a clear indication that the current level of performance 
demanded by the current EA regime remain as is. The focus should be in making the 
conformance process easier. Given all the challenges faced by validating conformance, the 
ultimate goal of EA should remain as is. 
 
There are indications, that should the level of performance required be "watered down", it 
may cause more problems than it would solve. This view is supported by operators, the 
regulator and suppliers. ICASA has a legislative mandate to allow exemptions from EA and 
was encouraged to implement this. Network operators, more especially the smaller 
operators, are more incentivised to ensure EC equipment conformance due to number 
portability. Number portability allows consumers to "port" or move their number to a new 
operator. Cellular handsets must be able to function in the different frequency band 
assigned to operators, as they differ from each other. Conformance to all frequency bands 
is thus critical to operators wanting to support number portability. 
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7.2.7 Decentralisation of transactional costs 
Figure 34: Properties and dimensions of the key category “Decentralisation of transactional costs”. 
 
 
Figure 34 depicts the properties and dimensions of the key category “Decentralisation of 
transactional costs”. Inductive analysis of the code-family of “Delegating the EA function” led 
to the creation of this key category. “Decentralisation of transactional costs” shifts the burden 
of proof of EA approvals from the regulator to selected third parties. By collaborating with 
these third parties, the regulator can decentralise the EA process and thus the transactional 
costs associated with the process. Trust and confidence are key themes that are prevalent in 
the data, as this collaborative process is seen to drive trust and confidence in the process. The 
bottlenecks created by a centralised approval process would be largely eliminated in a 
collaborative environment. The transactional costs may decrease substantially in a 
collaborative environment, as a duplication of previous approval processes would not occur. 
Innovation was seen to be positively impacted as well, with a key determinant of this being a 
quicker time to market. Decentralisation through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) was 
deemed to be the ideal way forward as it represented gains for both the regulator and 
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industry. Memo 7 further explains the key category of “Decentralisation of transactional 
costs”. 
Memo 7: Decentralised transactional costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ICASA is aware that the current EA process is flawed, cumbersome and creates bottlenecks. 
ICASA does not want to relax any requirements of the EA process but feels that the 
administration of the system should be better managed. There is a sense that the regulator 
would like to encourage a local manufacturing sector, although this seems counterintuitive, 
given the increasing number of imports of EC equipment into South Africa. This argument is 
taken further in the measures required to remedy the situation, with some representatives 
of the regulator looking to the DTPS and the DTI, to initiate measures to stimulate a local 
manufacturing sector. The regulator does not have an inward facing approach, and looks 
externally to address the situation at hand. Policy initiatives that are aligned with national 
developmental objectives are required, as these would have a knock-on effect on the EA 
environment. The consensus amongst informants is that the objectives and intentions of 
the current EA process are not misaligned. The overall perspective of EA that ICASA wants 
to convey is one of “integrity”. The focus on integrity seems to be misplaced, considering 
that it shifts the focus to the EA process, rather than the objective of EA. ICASA believes that 
the current type approval process is recognised and respected by the industry. The best 
possible solution to solving the administrative burden of EA would be to decentralise the EA 
process to accredited testing facilities to decrease transactional costs. This shifts the onus 
onto a third party to prove and declare compliance. There is an exemplary model for ICASA 
to follow, in the outsourcing of the number portability function to an outside entity, which 
has proven to be successful. The focus should be on the responsibility, which should still lie 
with ICASA. 
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7.2.8 Global economy interaction  
Figure 35: Properties and dimensions of the key category “Global Economy Interaction”. 
 
Figure 35 represents the properties and dimensions of the key category “Global economy 
interaction”. Data analysis of the code family “Developing country status” has led to the 
creation of this key category. The consideration of South Africa as a developing country when 
analysing the EA environment, was surprisingly negligible. The EA market is driven by South 
Africa’s interaction with the global EC economy. Standards for EC equipment and the level of 
conformance required to such standards, are mostly driven by global trends. Technology is 
the key driver of EC equipment standards, and technology adoption is dictated by the global 
economy. Local research and development are adversely affected as imported EC equipment 
are supported through global technology demand and adoption. The quality and 
differentiation of EC equipment is a function of the local market, and as such, grey market 
products enjoy a significant share of the local market. South Africa is obliged to accept global 
approvals and testing regimes, as the regulator lacks an internal mechanism of verification. 
Local conditions are rarely considered when equipment is imported, therefore indigenous 
public interest objectives such as safety considerations must align to the global standard. The 
EC market in South Africa is not significant enough to warrant any deviation from the 
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international benchmark, hence EA public interest objectives are determined by South 
Africa’s global economy interaction.  
Memo 8: Global economy interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa's status as a developing country should not impact its approach to EA. Even though a 
multitude of reasons (such as the lack of facilities for verification) impacts the ability of South Africa 
to effectively manage the EA environment, being a developing country does not hinder South Africa 
enough to impact its approach to EA. Some commentators have alluded to the fact that South Africa 
is not a developing country in the true sense of the definition, rather, the country was seen as being 
on the border between developing and developed countries. SA has some access to essential EA 
facilities such as test labs, even though it is a developing country. In terms of levels of development, 
SA has access to infrastructure that surpasses other developing countries. SA can be regarded as a mix 
of first and third world attributes, especially with regards to infrastructure. SA is obliged to follow 
global standards and is thus part of the global economy concerning the EC approvals. 
 
Developing countries have other pressing developmental problems, such as access to essential 
services. ICTs are generally neglected, even though there is sufficient evidence showing the impact of 
ICTs on a country’s development in general. The level of standards should also be kept at a first world 
level. Even though SA is a developing country, it is felt that the country should not "water down" the 
standards adopted. South Africa is setting the bar as high as global standards, with the knowledge that 
it may not have the resources of first world countries. Some equipment suppliers, however, felt that 
ICASA should bear in mind its developmental status and ability to enforce regulations, before applying 
first world standards. The determining factor is the source of EC equipment, with imports forming the 
bulk of the equipment sold in South Africa. This obliges South Africa to interact on a global level when 
considering the economics of the EA process, with standards and testing ultimately falling in line with 
global trends. 
 
The level of standards has an economic consideration. Industry associations agree that there should 
be no compromise with the focus of EA. Taking this a step forward, some commentators have 
suggested that the opposite applies to developing countries, in that they would have to safeguard the 
level of standards at a level higher than developed countries, given that equipment suppliers would 
possibly try to "cut corners" to lower the prices of EC equipment to suit the market conditions. This 
will impact the EC equipment market, as sub-standard equipment may be forced into the market. 
Although sub-standard equipment can be tolerated in some instances, it can be critical to safety of life 
devices. Developing countries are more vulnerable to inferior products, especially if they do not have 
an EA framework. Grey market products are prevalent in developing countries. EC markets are 
determined by the global market and South Africa would not be able to veer too far away from global 
markets in terms of standards.  
 
The statement that the more developed a country is, the less there is a need for extensive EA 
regulations, was not applicable to South Africa. While the inefficiencies of the current EA process is 
widely acknowledged, the EA process has a significant contribution to a developing country economy. 
The process of duplicating approvals is a source of revenue generation for the regulator, and the 
process of creating efficiencies in the EA process may lead to financial losses, which may in the long 
term, be more detrimental to a developing country.  
 
Very few individuals and organisations are conducting EC equipment research and development in 
South Africa, as sufficient funding for R&D in the EC equipment market are not available. This is due 
to the lack of policy and political support for the EC equipment market. Real world issues such as 
access to information, in particular for enforcement purposes is problematic. The regulator did not 
have proper systems in place to manage data relating to the type approval process, leading to 
administrative inefficiencies. 
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7.2.9 Institutional void - Deliberative policy direction 
Figure 36: Properties and dimensions of the key category “Institutional void - Deliberative policy direction”. 
 
 
The code-family “Governmental and policy intervention” is another example of a stand-alone 
code family, that is not linked directly to other code-families when the properties and 
dimensions of that code are analysed. Relational analysis of this code-family elevates it to the 
key category of “Institutional void - Deliberative policy direction”. The key category describes 
the institutional void created by a lack of deliberative government policy in the EA 
environment. A lack of direct links to other code-families highlights the fact that, although 
this code is important, it is self-contained and does not contribute to the understanding of 
the entire EA environment. Governmental policy was seen as a tool to address developmental 
challenges such as skills and capacity, through subsidies aimed at promoting a local 
manufacturing industry. As discussed in the previous section, South Africa’s participation in 
the global EC equipment economy is the deciding factor in determining the composition of 
the local EC equipment market. If South African products were able to compete on a global 
scale, the need for a domestic market would intensify. Although a national market would 
ideally impact South Africa’s economy favourably, the data analysed shows this to be an 
adjacent issue that has little bearing on the current EA environment. Even a forward-looking 
view that adopts an innovative theoretical approach to EA regulations focuses on developing 
an approach based predominantly on imported equipment. The institutional void created by 
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a lack of government policy to support local manufacturing, therefore, does not impact on 
the EA framework required to further an innovative approach to EA regulation. 
 
Memo 9: Institutional Void - Deliberative policy direction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
There is an overarching theme to the type of support required for the EA regime in South 
Africa. This theme is one of policy initiatives realised through governmental support, that 
advances the creation of a local manufacturing EC equipment market.  There is evidence, 
however, that the current EA regime has supported regional trade within the SADC region, 
without specific governmental and policy support. It was also noted the governmental 
policy would need to be carefully thought out in order to ensure that the economic 
considerations of governmental policy are successful. 
 
Governmental policy was seen as important to ensure that revenue generation from testing 
remains within the country, as testing for major science projects such as the Square 
Kilometer Array is currently outsourced. ICT investment and policy support seem to be 
neglected in South Africa. There is no deliberative government policy for EA, which has led 
to an institutional void, especially with regards to creating a local EC equipment 
manufacturing market. 
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7.2.10 Deterrence versus knowledge-based trust 
Figure 37: Properties and dimensions of the key category “Deterrence versus Knowledge-based trust”. 
 
Analysis of the code-family in Figure 37 led to the creation of a key category of “deterrence 
versus knowledge-based trust”.  The object of market surveillance was to ensure that 
confidence levels in the EA process are high to prevent the golden sample problem. 
Ultimately, market surveillance was seen as a mechanism to gauge the level of trust (or lack 
thereof) in the EA process. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) have researched the centrality of trust 
in an organisational context and suggested a three-stage model that underlies the 
development of trust. The first stage is referred to as “deterrence-based trust”, and this stage 
examines an actor’s willingness to trust in relation to the notion that a credible sanction exists 
should the actor fail to cooperate. Market surveillance validates the outcome of such trust, 
with a sanction being applied as a deterrence if this trust relationship was voided.  This 
psychological model micro-level analysis of trust principles can be compared to the 
“command and control”  approach to regulation. EA regulation provides an appropriate level 
of deterrence in the form of fines and sanctions, ensuring that the actor can trust the outcome 
of a regulatory process.  
There is a broader shift in regulatory regimes, especially in the environmental regulatory field, 
towards new forms of governance that are moving away from the hierarchical command and 
control application of regulation. The new focus is geared towards joint working between 
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government, business and stakeholders (Lange & Gouldson, 2010: 5236). This shift aligns well 
with the second stage of trust as defined by Lewicki and Bunker (1996). 
The second stage of trust is referred to as “knowledge-based trust”, where the actor’s 
willingness to trust is determined by his predetermined knowledge of the context of the 
situation, and this knowledge forms a sufficient base from which the actor can reliably predict 
a rational outcome. This stage of trust can be applied to the trust matrix discussed earlier, 
where the regulator can display a willingness to trust certain suppliers based on a subset of 
criteria or predetermined knowledge. This knowledge allows the regulator to make a decision 
based on trust with regards to accepting or rejecting test reports from that supplier. 
The final stage of trust is referred to as “identification-based trust”, where the communities 
act harmoniously to fulfil mutual gains. Given the current level of mistrust, the lack of 
confidence and the developing country environment, the data analysed suggests that South 
Africa has not yet reached a level of maturity for the market to act cohesively to realise joint 
gains. There is certainly an indication from the larger EA equipment suppliers to support such 
cohesive action, especially multi-national companies that leverage economy of scale benefits 
by working together with rival organisations to streamline and fast-track EA applications in 
different countries. 
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Memo 10: Deterrence vs knowledge-based trust 
  
There is a view that post-market conformity verification is low, and emphasis is placed on 
pre-market conformance. ICASA concedes that it does not have the resources to conduct 
post-market verification and conformance testing. A key reason for this is that the testing 
infrastructure to conduct such post-market conformity assessment testing does not exist in 
South Africa. ICASA would need to develop a strong deterrent in terms of fines levied to 
ensure that equipment suppliers are incentivised not to break the law. Such penalties could 
be used to fund ICASA's future enforcement activities, and the exercise could be self-
funding. ICASA is seen to be inflexible with regards to the interpretation of the EA 
regulations. There are specific cases that relate to the labelling of equipment that is proving 
problematic to operators in particular. Larger operators would respond well to identification 
based trust, as this is common practice in international markets. The golden sample problem 
is a significant one. It represents the Achilles heel of the current equipment authorisation 
process. The key stakeholders in the process are fully aware of the loopholes that can be 
exploited in the EA process by this problem. In essence, the golden sample is the EC 
equipment sample that is sent in for testing and equipment authorisation purposes, and this 
sample is not necessarily representative of the equipment that is sold for mass consumption 
on the open market. The golden sample is modified to ensure full compliance to EA technical 
standards. The manufacturer or supplier of the equipment can thus retail equipment that 
cannot be audited in terms of the South African equipment authorisation standards, as 
ICASA does not have the resources to randomly check a sample of the equipment against 
the test reports provided for the same during the EA process. South Africa does have some 
testing capabilities, but these are limited in scope and represent only a portion of the 
functional testing. Without a mechanism for verification, applying knowledge-based trust 
uniformly to all licensees is not possible. A deterrence-based trust approach remains the 
predominant approach to the majority of EA applicants. 
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7.2.11 Sub-optimal decision heuristics 
Figure 38: Properties and dimensions of the key category “Sub-optimal decision heuristics”. 
 
 “Collaboration” is the next code-family that has been elevated to a key category. Data-
analysis of this code-family resulted in the key category of “sub-optimal decision heuristics. 
Figure 38 lists the properties and dimensions of the key category “Sub-optimal decision 
heuristics”. Collaboration is a key process in the EA environment, although the data gathered 
shows that it is a product of the key themes of trust and confidence. Collaboration is required 
to capacitate the regulator with data pertinent to the EA decision heuristics. Challenges in 
obtaining such data limit the options available to the regulator, ultimately resulting in the 
regulator accepting submitted data. The trust and confidence levels of this data result in a 
sub-optimal decision heuristic protocol being adopted for current EA approvals.  
“Collaboration” is related to five codes families in total. It should be noted that these linkages 
are based on shared codes and data, thus the strength of the analysis is not based simply on 
a code count or a count of the linkages. Although a code-family may be linked to just a single 
other code family, the frequency of unique codes referenced by that particular code family is 
essential to the analysis. The focus of the study is to develop analytical categories that explain 
the fundamental social and psychological processes. In this respect, a simple count of the 
frequency of codes and linkages will not yield as much insight into the data as a thorough 
analysis of the data would reveal. 
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“Collaboration” is linked to the code-families of “Delegating EA function”, “Innovation” and 
“Technology”. The memo on “sub-optimal decision heuristics” explore these linkages further, 
with collaboration seen as a key mechanism to divest the burden of proof regarding EA 
compliance from the regulator to other entities. This can be achieved via the delegation of 
the EA process. Collaboration drives innovation, as the regulator would have access to an 
independent source of verification, thereby allowing more EC products into the country. 
“Collaboration” is linked to “Technology”, as increasing the range and availability of EC 
equipment in South Africa positively impacts the technology available to the country. 
Memo 11 is an advanced memo on “sub-optimal decision heuristics”.  The memo describes 
the various forms of collaboration, both nationally and internationally. Comparisons between 
categories of collaboration and categories of trust are made. Comparisons between codes 
and categories are also made.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248 
 
 
 
      Memo 11: Sub-optimal decision heuristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The issue of collaboration is two-fold. The first type of collaboration is related to the 
regulator collaborating directly with test labs. The second relates to South Africa 
collaborating with other countries to accept EA results. This is further broken down into 
collaboration with first-world countries and collaboration with developing countries. 
Collaboration with developing countries is more problematic, if this collaboration is based 
on mutual recognition of the EA certification. South Africa will allow other developing 
countries to accept its certification, but has reservations accepting results from countries 
that may not have the ability to conduct a comprehensive test of an EA application. 
Ultimately, the purpose of collaboration is in providing independent data required for EA 
the decision heuristic.  
 
The pursuit of independent data is an issue of trust, where the regulator does not have 
sufficient trust and confidence in the EA process of developing countries.  A "one-stop shop" 
for EA approvals in the SADC region has been long suggested. This initiative has not gained 
much traction over the years, possibly due to reservations that South Africa has, with 
regards to the ability of other member countries to conduct EA verification to an acceptable 
standard. This relates to both the issues of confidence in the EA process as well as the lack 
of facilities to conduct conformance testing. The biggest drawback to local test facilities, is 
that they lack the full suite of testing. ICASA sees collaboration as a key way forward to solve 
some of the issues of the current equipment authorisation regime.  ICASA is aware that 
shortfalls exist in its ability to verify the functionally ability of equipment that is being tested. 
For that reason, the regulator suggests a higher level of collaboration between itself and 
other test facilities that could assist with verifying equipment. This is linked to the golden 
sample issue, where continuous compliance of the equipment is required. Collaboration 
was essential for EA, given the difficulty in gaining accreditation for test facilities and the 
difficulty in finding or moving a test facility. This increased the value of incumbent facilities 
already available. Collaboration with test houses to conduct EA approvals on behalf of the 
regulator is a viable option. Collaboration within the SADC region in accepting EA approvals 
exists, without formal governmental intervention. Countries like Botswana already accept 
ICASA EA certification without local testing and a formal agreement in place. 
Even competing companies needed to collaborate. Some interviewees were adamant that 
such collaboration was the only way to drive competition, and that ICASA should be central 
to drive such collaboration. 
 
Collaboration is a major driving force to reduce the cost of EA. EA should not be regarded 
as a competitive advantage, and all entities in SA should collaborate to prevent duplication. 
Major OEMs are happy to work with ICASA, by hosting informational workshops, with a view 
to ensure that the regulator could put the necessary approval frameworks in place for new 
technologies. Suppliers saw this as a win-win situation, as the regulator was able to leverage 
on the vendor’s experience and technological advantage, while the vendor would also gain 
by ensuring that there would be no delays in the EA framework when the technology was 
deployed. Suppliers also drive technology development, especially in developing countries, 
as they collaborate with network providers in both developed and developing countries. 
Their aim is generally to deploy the latest technology to all countries simultaneously, to 
drive lower prices through economies of scale, hence collaboration in this sense drives 
innovation. SABS is an example of collaboration being implemented incorrectly. Non-
intentional transmitters are tested by SABS, who require all suppliers to retest their 
equipment locally. This process has increased conformance costs and has led to significant 
delays in the overall authorisation time frames.  Applying inflexible rules has the added 
disadvantage of encouraging suppliers to sell their products illegally. 
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7.2.12 The calculated concept of trust 
Figure 39: The properties and dimension of the key category “Calculated concept of trust”. 
 
Figure 39 defines the properties and dimension of the key category “Calculated concept of 
trust”. It is immediately noticeable that the network diagram of the code-family of “Trust” is 
more complex and horizontally integrated with other code-families than what has been 
previously analysed.  This is a second code-family linked to the category of trust, as the code-
family of “differentiation of suppliers” led to the creation of the key category of “differential 
trust”, which has been discussed earlier. Trust facilitates decentralisation and encourages 
collaboration (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). There exists a “calculated conception of trust” where 
“…the assumption that the decision to trust is predicated primarily on the computation of 
risks” (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996:10). This construct applies to the “trust” code-family and the 
analysis of the data results in a key category of “calculated conception of trust”. The network 
diagram in Figure 39 indicates that the codes linked to the central code-family are largely risk 
driven - for example, the codes “lack of verification”, “lack of facilities” and “lack of resources” 
are all risks that contribute to the regulator's decision to trust. Other codes that relate directly 
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to trust such as “trust with labs”, “trust with OEMS” and “trust with suppliers” relate to 
organisational trust, which again is predicated by the regulator's computation of the risk 
associated with that particular group or organisation.  The conception of trust is therefore 
calculated in the EA environment, with different metrics being applied to gauge the risk 
associated with a particular organisation or entity.  
The second code-family related to trust is confidence. Incremental increases or decreases in 
confidence impact the associated level of trust. Confidence is, therefore, a further metric, in 
addition to risk discussed earlier, that forms the calculated computation of trust that ICASA 
applies to the EA process. In the EA environment, confidence is an issue concerning data 
obtained by EA suppliers in the form of test reports. ICASA has a lack of confidence and thus 
a lack of trust in the test reports.  
ICASA also has a differential level of confidence in EC EA approval regimes. ICASA is confident 
in the results from certain approval regimes and hence has a higher level of trust in them. 
Regional EA approvals are subject to more scrutiny by ICASA, and hence such approvals are 
assigned a lower level of confidence and trust in the process. This once again is another 
dimension of ICASA’s calculated concept of trust when examining EA approvals conducted by 
other approval bodies. 
The final concept of trust relates to the EA process in South Africa itself. One of ICASA’s goals 
is to create a high level of confidence in the EA process, in order to ensure that all stakeholders 
view the EA process as one that is trustworthy. The perception of trust in the EA process is 
key to the Regulator, who actively works to promote such a perception. Some of the 
Regulator’s actions include consciously adopting inefficient administrative processes, such as 
duplicating certain approvals, with the sole purpose of creating the perception of trust and 
confidence in the EA process. 
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Memo 12: Calculated concept of trust 
Trust is a major theme that appears in the research. The trust levels are differentiated between the "major 
manufacturers" and the "small suppliers". There is a greater degree of trust for OEMs. ICASA has pioneered the 
simplified type approval process and found that there is a level of dishonesty amongst the smaller suppliers. ICASA 
applies a risk-based analysis when assigning a level of trust. The current EA process, although noted as a command 
and control process, is still largely dependent on the information available to the regulator. The validity of such 
information can be questionable, which begs the question whether the process is truly a command and control one. 
Suppliers sometimes use this to their advantage and conduct "forum shopping" amongst different staff members 
at ICASA, using incomplete and sometimes forged information. ICASA is of the opinion that the EC market is not 
mature enough to allow for a self-declaratory regime, based on the levels of trust in the market. Trust is related to 
the relationship with test facilities, given that ICASA has no mechanism to verify the authenticity of test reports. 
Trust is also related to confidence, as the lack of verification lowers the overall confidence that the regulator has in 
the EA process. 
 
The EC equipment industry is aware of the inability of the regulator to conduct enforcement and is not motivated 
by fear of reprisal due to non-conformity to the EA regulations. The level of trust from both the regulator and the 
supplier would increase, should ICASA obtain a verification mechanism. EC equipment suppliers would be less likely 
to sell non-conforming equipment and would be motivated to adhere to the EA regulations. This would ensure that 
the regulator has a higher level of trust with regards to suppliers, regarding the information that they submit. There 
is a growing trend toward the ICASA brand value. The larger suppliers insist on ICASA EA approval, while the public 
in general also are aware of the ICASA logo. 
 
Another level of trust is between the equipment supplier and the network operators. The equipment supplier 
invests heavily in research and development with the network operator, to deploy latest generation technologies 
across all areas that the operator serves. This relationship is based on trust, as the equipment supplier shares 
confidential technology with the network operator, by mutual economic gain. SABS has conducted a risk analysis 
and concluded that they would issue all test reports themselves, even if they cannot do some of the physical testing 
that is required. SABS has entered into agreements with several test labs to conduct testing on their behalf, but 
they will still issue the final test report themselves. In that way, a random sample can be tested, alleviating the 
"golden sample" issue and ensuring that all products are subjected to local testing. Even in an ideal scenario, the 
regulator does not envisage completely relinquishing the EA function, as the harmonised use of spectrum is 
essential and cannot be outsourced. 
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ICASA is acutely aware of its lack of confidence in its own EA approval approach. A 60-70% 
figure is suggested as a level of confidence, but even this number seems optimistic.  
RN2A notes that:  
I ask myself the question, can I really put my head on the block and say that all the 
equipment that is approved meet the standards? The answer is yes and no. You are basing 
your approval on the test reports from accredited laboratories. Some of the laboratories - 
you do not even know them and are not aware of them.  It is challenging to confirm that the 
particular product is of good quality. More especially if the documentation can be changed. 
Hence I said yes and no. Yes, if it is coming from the proper labs. No forms a percentage that 
we do not have confidence in. 
 
ICASA is aware that the EA process does not ensure confidence and segregates suppliers 
into two general categories, the "major manufacturers" and the "small suppliers". The issue 
of confidence in the test reports seems to be directed at the "small manufacturers". ICASA 
also believes that its engineers are not involved in the EA process at a technical level. They 
do not actually test any equipment themselves. They are not involved in the testing process 
at all, hence their ability to properly make a determination on the eligibility of equipment 
to be approved is diminished to an extent. Operators question the value of the EA process, 
given that there is no post-market surveillance or even validation testing at the approval 
process. ICASA, however, believes that confidence in the system will be developed over 
time. 
 
Network operators allude to the fact the EA process provides a level of confidence that the 
equipment tested, meets the functional requirements. Confidence is also linked to the 
objectives of EA, namely to create a level of confidence for the consumer who purchases 
the equipment, in terms of the safety and performance of the equipment. ICASA provided 
examples of how it attempts to increase confidence of the EA process. The first is to conduct 
a verification of the lab that conducts the testing, and the second is to conduct a technical 
evaluation of the test report. EA should provide a reasonable level of trust, not necessarily 
a guarantee of trust. 
 
Memo 12 continued 
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7.3 The determination of a substantive grounded theory of EA in developing 
countries 
Figure 40: Properties and dimensions of all code-families. 
 
In developing a substantive grounded theory of EA regulation in a developing country, all 
code-families were once again analysed with linkages based on the associated data. This 
differs from the data analysis in the preceding sections, where analysis between codes and 
data as well as codes and code-families were made with the intention of developing the key 
categories. To test the completeness of the key categories in developing the substantive 
theory, further analysis between code-families and code-families are made using theoretical 
sampling. All the data gathered was revisited in the analytic process, with interview data, in 
particular, being re-analysed with the purpose of validating the emerging key categories. 
Particular emphasis was paid to the outlying constructs that were elevated to code-families, 
such as “costs”, “governmental and policy intervention” as well as “EA and technology” to 
solicit data to support the inclusion of such codes into the developing theory. Figure 40 
represents all the properties and dimensions of all code-families. The figure provides a useful 
illustration in the form of a network diagram, showing the linkages between the various 
constructs. As with previous network diagrams, the actual data sources have been removed 
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from the network to prevent clutter, along with the key-codes that were present in all 
networks diagrams thus far. Only the linkages between the code-families are listed. It should 
be noted that the diagram is a result of further iterations of theoretical sampling, with the 
linkages drawn from re-analysing the data linked to these code-families. The code-families of 
“trust” and “confidence” were validated during the data analysis, to determine the linkages 
between these categories and other code-families.  The result of the theoretical sampling 
reveals that almost all the code-families identified in the initial data analysis are linked directly 
to either “trust” or “confidence”. The outlying code-families were noted as “costs”, 
“governmental and policy intervention” as well as “EA and technology”. These code-families 
were not supported by the extended theoretical sampling process and hence do not 
contribute toward the development of the substantive theory. “Technology”, “cumbersome 
process” and “innovation” as code-families were carefully analysed through theoretical 
sampling and the linkages differ from the initial data analysis. These code-families are linked 
primarily to the “developing country” code-family as all data related to the aforementioned 
code-families are subsumed by the “developing country” code-family.  
The constant comparative process of comparing data with data, data with codes, codes with 
codes, codes with code-families and code-families with code-families eventually led to the 
development of the core category. Figure 40 shows the central linkage to all code-families is 
either the code-family of “confidence” or “trust”. Using several iterations of data analysis, the 
core category was determined through conceptual rendering as the “calculated concept of 
trust”. Although the network diagram linkages in Figure 40 show the code-family of 
“confidence” appearing as the core category, the data analysis discussed earlier where the 
code-family “confidence” was shown to be a determinant of the key category “calculated 
concept of trust”, was further ratified through rigorous and continuous theoretical sampling. 
The “calculated concept of trust” is thus the overarching category that conceptualises the 
emergent theory of EA in developing countries.  
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 7.4 The process of theory building by iterative theoretical sampling 
The foundational elements of the nascent theory are determined by applying inductive 
reasoning to the key analytical categories. An interesting finding from the iterative data 
analysis process showed that the initially argued contestation between the public interest 
paradigm of regulation and the economic theory of regulation were not key determinants of 
EA in a developing country.  The theme of trust emerged as the golden thread that permeated 
through all the key categories. Trust as a theme on its own, however, was deemed to be too 
general did not function at a conceptual level of applicability and was not considered 
analytical enough to be explicated to a theoretical level. Theoretical saturation showed that 
the themes of trust and confidence were convergent and ultimately, after multiple iterations, 
were expressed as a “calculated concept of trust”. The “calculated concept of trust” was more 
nuanced, retained the complexity of the concept of trust and had definitive linkages to all the 
key categories.  
 
Table 3: Definitions of the elemental conceptual categories that would be used to develop the final theory 
Key Category Definition 
Calculated concept of trust The concept of trust in the EA environment is 
characterised by the risk associated with a 
particular organisation or entity, predicated by 
the regulator applying different metrics for a 
tacit computation of trust. This tacit calculation 
is the process of mental agility that the regulator 
goes through and is based on the assumption 
that the decision to trust is largely risk driven. 
This risk assessment leads to the differential 
trust concept. 
Differential trust The level of trust assigned by the regulator to an 
EC equipment supplier is based on the tier status 
and salience of that supplier, with tier one 
suppliers enjoying a higher level of trust than tier 
two. This belief is cemented by the initial 
interaction between tier two suppliers and the 
regulator and is a contributing factor to the 
regulator’s preliminary trust belief towards tier 
two suppliers which ultimately leads to a lower 
risk rating. The risk associated with a supplier 
impacts the decision heuristic employed in the 
EA process. Differential trust is a mechanism 
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that the regulator employs to deal with the 
reality of sub-optimal decision heuristics.  
Sub-optimal decision heuristics The regulator requires data pertinent to the EA 
process. The source of the data coupled with an 
inability to verify the data, limit the options 
available to the regulator, ultimately resulting in 
the regulator accepting unverified data. The 
trust and confidence level of this data results in 
a sub-optimal decision heuristic protocol being 
adopted for current EA approvals.  
 
Global economy interaction The consideration of South Africa as a 
developing country, when analysing the EA 
environment, is negligible. The EA market is 
driven by South Africa’s interaction with the 
global EC economy. Technology is the key driver 
of EC equipment standards, and technology 
adoption is dictated by the global economy. 
South Africa’s is obliged to accept global 
approvals and testing regimes, as the EC market 
in South Africa is not sufficient to support an 
indigenous market. 
 
Design for manufacturability Design for manufacturability refers to the 
proactive optimisation of EC equipment of the 
entire equipment value-chain for the global 
market, prior to sale to ensure that an 
appropriate balance between cost and quality is 
achieved. Safety and regulatory compliance are 
key determinants of the process- hence EC 
equipment is designed with EA conformity in 
mind.  
 
Deterministic validation The current EA regulatory approach is pre-
determined, as it validates known technical 
interoperability and performance standards as 
most EA equipment are designed for 
manufacturability. The current EA process is 
thus deterministic, with a core focus on 
validation. Technical regulations are usually 
binary in their outcome, with a technical review 
process used for validation. Little else can 
significantly impact the EA outcome.  
 
Transactional process determinants Various exogenous factors impact the EA 
transaction and are determinants of the overall 
efficiency of the EA process. At the same time, 
other key transactional determinants with the 
ability introduce institutional process efficiency 
are ignored. Some of the current processes that 
determine the current EA process are 
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responsible for significant negative externalities 
to the EC equipment market. 
Technology assimilation EA innovation through technology could be 
driven using existing software solutions, 
automation coupled with incremental process 
improvements, would mitigate the transactional 
process determinants. Applying technology 
intelligence is required in order to develop a risk 
rating of the equipment being approved as well 
as assimilating the results of a proven 
international approval framework, are further 
examples of EA innovation. Technology 
assimilation must incorporate indigenous 
variations based on the requirements of the 
implementing country. 
 
Decentralisation of transactional costs An innovative EA approach would aim to shift 
the burden of proof of EA approvals from the 
regulator to selected third parties. By 
collaborating with these third parties, the 
regulator can decentralise the EA process and 
thus the associated transactional costs. 
Decentralisation through Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) was deemed to be the ideal 
way forward, as it represented gains for both the 
regulator and industry. 
 
Deterrence versus knowledge-based trust ICASA applies “deterrence based trust” in 
relation to the notion that a credible sanction 
exists, should an actor fail to cooperate. EA 
regulation provides an appropriate level of 
deterrence in the form of fines and sanctions, 
ensuring that the actor can trust the outcome of 
a regulatory process. An innovative EA approach 
should incorporate “knowledge-based trust”, 
where the actor’s willingness to trust is 
determined by his knowledge of the context of 
the situation, and this knowledge forms a 
sufficient base from which the actor can reliably 
predict a rational outcome.  
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Figure 41: The calculated concept of trust 
 
Applying axial coding once again at this stage helped in comparing key categories with other 
key categories. Such a comparison assists in developing a holistic view of the concepts with 
the aim of developing a substantive theory.  
 
7.5 An explication of a substantive theory - a calculated concept of trust of EA 
regulation in developing countries. 
The EA framework, applicable to efficiency driven and transitional countries with a relatively 
rich EA testing infrastructure, is predicated on a calculated concept of trust. The regulatory 
authority employs a tacit computational mechanism to determine the level of trust when 
dealing with EA applications. The rationale for such an approach is largely driven by sub-
optimal decision heuristics available to the regulator, as a result of the inability to corroborate 
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technical data associated with the EA process. The regulator thus applies a differential trust 
paradigm, assigning a high level of trust to EA suppliers with a high level of salience.  
The global economy has a significant impact on the EA approach. A developing country is 
primarily a net importer of EC equipment and is therefore compelled to adopt international 
technology trends and standards. EC equipment is designed for manufacturability, including 
evidentiary data required for global EA approval. The global EA approval process is thus 
deterministic, with a binary result either approving equipment for the global market or not.  
Developing countries have therefore little control or influence over the global EA process or 
the source of the evidentiary data. The calculated concept of trust is once again applied, 
grounded in the source of the data provided to the regulator. 
Trust in the sources of data is fundamental to the regulator. An innovative approach to EA 
regulation should be based on mechanisms to validate data integrity, such as collaboration 
with multiple stakeholders to promote data validation. A consequence of collaboration is the 
decentralisation of transactional costs associated with the EA process. Using appropriately 
vetted stakeholders to validate EA evidentiary data decentralises the EA transactional costs - 
which has traditionally been the domain of the regulator. Collaboration also has the effect of 
facilitating knowledge-based trust in the EA process, providing the regulator with a sufficient 
base to reliably predict a rational outcome to the EA process. When juxtaposed with the 
current deterrence-based trust approach of the EA process, a knowledge-based trust 
approach would not require the threat of a credible sanction. Knowledge-based trust is thus 
a positive contributor to the calculated concept of trust in the EA environment. 
There are numerous exogenous transactional process determinants impacting the overall 
efficiency of the EA process. Applying technology to the EA process can improve institutional 
efficiency. Assimilating technology from other EA environments is an example of innovation, 
although such assimilation must incorporate indigenous variations based on the 
requirements of the implementing country. The goal of applying technology and innovation 
to the EA process is ultimately centred around increasing the trust value proposition.  
 
260 
 
 
 
 7.6 A revisit of the scholarly literature reviewed - Theories of trust 
An extensive literature review was conducted at the beginning of the research. This literature 
review focused on the key theories applicable to the EA environment, namely regulatory 
theory, public interest theory and the economic theory of regulation. The grounded theory 
method of qualitative data analysis, however, suggests that a literature review is conducted 
at the end of the research process. This research has followed the traditional route of defining 
the key theories upfront but also examines the theories that may not have been considered 
at the start of the research journey. One such analytical category that has proven to be vital 
from the data analysis conducted in this study was trust theory. 
The definitions of trust are varying and broad. The definition of trust is dependent on its 
application in social interactions. For example, researchers view trust as encompassing 
psychological, cognitive, emotional or behavioural dimensions (Lewis & Weigert, 1985: 969). 
In the context of this study, the existing theories trust can be narrowed to “institutional based 
trust”, which is defined as “the belief that needed structure conditions are to enhance the 
probability of achieving a successful outcome” (McKnight & Chervany, 2002).  In the literature 
surveyed earlier, it was noted that regulation is the product of an environment in which it is 
applied to address market failure, especially in instances of a natural monopoly (Mclean, 
2004:42). In such instances, the multi-dimensional construction of trust is applied to the 
narrow domain of regulation, where regulation provides the structured conditions required 
to achieve a level of trust in addressing market failure. Regulation can thus be considered as 
a deterrent, as the level of trust that the public has in the market behaving in a manner that 
instils confidence is limited. Cline and Williamson (2016) explore this linkage and find that 
formal regulation can be considered as a substitution for trust, as it provides an alternative 
protection mechanism for the shareholder (albeit in the financial sector). The concept of trust 
is therefore closely linked to regulation, and it is not surprising that trust is an important 
theory relevant to this study. Aghion et al. (2010) show a strong relationship between 
government regulation and trust. In this study, transitional economies similar to South Africa 
are researched. These economies are characterised by high regulation, low output and low 
trust. The low levels of trust feed the requirement for more regulation, which in turn 
contributes to lower output. This self-feeding cycle is a challenge to developing countries 
looking to increase economic output. Although several factors are discussed in the study that 
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impacts this cycle, trust is an imperative process required to restore the balance necessary to 
break the cycle. 
Shapiro (1987) notes that deterrents are not a form of trust support, as they are only used 
when trust breaks down. Public interest objectives would thus result in the regulator having 
an arduous task of creating an environment that instils trust in the consumer, as the social 
interaction that helps form personal bonds and creates a sense of security, is absent from 
interactions within formal institutions such as the regulator. Several scholars allude to this 
situation and note that in modern market economies, impersonal, faceless and large-scale 
exchanges are common, and the trust derived from social ties and direct personal contact is 
limited and fragile (Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1985; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Wand & Gordon, 
2011). The opposite holds true as well, as  Lange and Gouldson (2010: 5235) point out that 
“..where trust is pervasive and embedded in social interactions, cultures of trust develop”. 
The EA process is largely devoid of interpersonal contact, and an entire EA application can be 
processed without a face-to-face meeting between the regulator and the supplier. Electronic 
applications are encouraged, and face-to-face meetings are allowed in exceptional 
circumstances, given the volume of applications that the regulator has to deal with. This lack 
of social interaction is a factor that limits the building of the trust relationship in the EA 
environment. 
Trust is also related to development, and there exists sufficient empirical evidence suggesting 
that trusting societies experience higher levels of economic and financial development (Cline 
& Williamson, 2016:573). Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) further defines trust-based social capital as 
a key enabler of institutions in developing countries. Trust is thus a key element in both 
regulation and development, having a measurable socio-economic impact on a developing 
society. Social capital is an important term used in this regard, and can be defined as the: 
...obligations and expectations, information channels, and social norms. Social capital in the 
form of cooperative behaviour, norms and values in a society that serve to enhance trust 
among individuals and facilitate transactions by reducing (or even eliminating) costs 
associated with acquiring information and with monitoring  (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2011:336).  
This social capital is required by the actors in the EA environment to ensure that the public 
interest objectives are met during the EA process. The regulator is also aware of the social 
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capital obligations and has put in mechanisms to try to alleviate constructs that impede public 
interest objectives.  
Schilke and Cook (2013) define three categorically distinct trust relations that can be 
recognised as relevant to trust in inter-organisational relationships: 
i. individual–individual (interpersonal) 
ii. individual–organisation (institutional) 
iii. Organisation–organisation (inter-organisational). 
The one-on-one interactions between the stakeholders of the EA process form the 
interpersonal level of trust. Individual actions and relations are related to the individual’s 
socioeconomic characteristics. These interactions could be represented by suppliers and 
specific regulatory staff members, as well as individual licensees represented by a proxy and 
the specific regulatory officials.  
To determine a national characteristic, empirical studies usually aggregate individual-level 
data to the national level (Wand & Gordon, 2011: 584). In this manner, empirical evidence 
from the EA environment is representative of the industry view of trust. While this research 
is cognisant of the fact that a multi-level perspective is required to develop an all-
encompassing formal theory of trust, a substantive theory of trust based on the population 
sample surveyed is certainly possible. The differentiation between individual and collective 
levels is important, as it is accepted that only individuals are capable of trusting, as 
organisations are incapable of creating a “trust intention” and hence the collective individual 
trust shapes the multi-level organisational or institutional trust (Wand & Gordon, 2011: 584). 
Schilke and Cook (2013) conclude that trust is the fabric of inter-organisational relationships 
and that such trust can be differentiated into a granular understanding of individual actions 
and relations. In the individual-organisational perspective, the specific regulatory staff 
member interactions ultimately represent the regulator. In the same manner, the individuals 
representing the EC equipment suppliers ultimately represent the EC equipment supply 
industry. 
The third level of trust applicable to the EA environment is the organisation-organisation level 
of trust. Given the various stakeholders involved the EA process, the issue of organisational 
trust is an important one. ICASA’s dependence on test results from third parties raises issues 
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of organisational trust between ICASA and the various testing entities. The developments 
around a regional mutual recognition regime raises the inter-organisational trust between 
ICASA and other SADC regulators. Cline and Williamson (2016:579) find that in instances when 
trust is low, formal regulation is required to promote cooperation and economic exchange. In 
the case of ICASA trusting the output of other regional regulatory bodies, formal structures 
would be required to promote cooperation and increase the level of trust. Such structures 
may involve setting uniform performance standards for the regional regulatory authorities.  
The earlier reference to “informational deficiencies” in the literature review of this study dealt 
with the regulator's inability to obtain information relevant to the regulated industry. This has 
a significant impact on trust and choice, as the regulator may not have a choice on whether 
to trust or not. Lange and Gouldson (2010: 5236) state that: 
Regulators do not always know the regulated process, as well as the regulated, do. Hence, 
they may not have a choice about whether to trust the regulated, but have to trust the 
information that they provide, for instance in the context of licensing and enforcement. 
Extensive collection and scrutiny of information may involve a disproportionate investment of 
both business' and regulators' resources.   
Although their study dealt with environmental regulation, the same principle would apply to 
the EA environment, as this study shows that the regulator could not verify information 
provided by EC equipment licensees. The cost of verifying information provided to the 
regulator would be significant, and could disrupt the EC equipment economic model. Trust is, 
therefore, a key concept in the EA regulatory framework. 
Trust can be based on several variables, such as religion, income, political institutions and 
ethnicity amongst others (Cline & Williamson, 2016:580). The ‘hierarchies of trust’ concept 
discussed earlier is based on the same principle, applied to an organisational level. Suppliers 
with higher market share, brand value and financial resources were deemed more 
‘trustworthy’ than smaller suppliers, by ICASA.  These determinants of trust contribute 
towards the overall “calculated concept of trust”. 
Trust and innovation are also linked. Lange and Gouldson (2010: 5235) note that “Trust-
based, cooperative styles of regulation have contributed to the development and diffusion of 
new technologies and techniques, thereby improving environmental performance”. Although 
264 
 
 
 
their study is based on environmental regulation, the findings are of relevance in linking trust 
theory and innovation to regulation. Lange and Gouldson (2010) also draw an interesting 
parallel between trust and public interest, which is considered a key theoretical basis for EA 
regulation. They note that actors would trust those that they believed acted in the public 
interest. A relationship of trust is crucial and challenges the dominant assumptions of 
conflicting interests of actors in a regulatory environment. 
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Chapter 8: Evaluation of the emergent theory and conclusion  
This study aimed to develop an innovative approach to EA regulation in a developing country, 
using a grounded theory approach to qualitative data analysis.  The central research question 
asked: 
In which ways can innovative theoretical approaches to regulation be applied to the 
EA regime of a developing country such as South Africa, in order to address the 
limitations presented by the current theoretical approaches? 
 
This final chapter of the thesis, therefore, evaluates the substantive emergent theory, to 
standards and measures of the defined grounded theory process in answering the research 
question. Evaluation of the constructed theory also indicates how well the emergent theory 
renders the data gathered during the research process.  
A discussion on how well this thesis contributes to knowledge is accompanied by a reflection 
of the extant literature on trust theory, as well as positioning the study within the greater 
body of literature related to trust, regulation and EA. Originality is an important consideration 
for the creation of new theoretical insights, and a summation of originality in both content 
and methodology is included below. The final section of this chapter is allotted to a discussion 
of the study limitations and areas of future research. 
 
8.1 Evaluation of the emergent theory 
Classical grounded theorists generally cite Glaser’s (1992) criteria of fitness, workability, 
relevance and modifiability, when evaluating a grounded theory study. Furthermore, as the 
research has largely followed Charmaz’s (2006) grounded theory methodology, her evaluative 
criteria seem more relevant to this thesis, as it provides an accompanying verification 
framework to complement her suggested methodology . It is important to note that grounded 
theory studies do not necessarily result in an interpretative result or verifiable findings, as 
“…the essence of a classic grounded theory study is a conceptual suggestion rather than the 
verification of fact” (Glaser, 2003). Charmaz (2006:182) lists the following four criteria as a 
266 
 
 
 
basis for acceptability of the grounded theory process. These criteria are credibility, 
originality, resonance and usefulness and are discussed in more detail in the following: 
8.1.1 Credibility 
Charmaz (2006) lists several conditions that the researcher should meet when testing the 
credibility of a grounded theory study, including (i) intimate familiarity with the setting or 
topic; (ii) range, number and depth of observations in the data; (iii) systematic comparisons 
between observations and categories; (iv) the range of empirical observations; (v) links 
between data and analysis and argument and (vi) evidence to allow for an independent 
assessment. 
i) The thesis was completed over a three-year period and included data from intensive 
interviews with 25 key stakeholders in the EA environment as well as an extensive 
analysis of 53 documents relating to the EA field. The aforementioned data collection 
strategy coupled with the researcher’s access to EA specialists contributed to the 
researcher achieving an intimate familiarity with the topic of EA. 
ii) As noted in the previous section, the range of data collected was recorded, 
transcribed (in the case of interviews) and coded using the grounded theory doctrine. 
A total of 2507 codes were generated, of which 938 were unique codes (A complete 
code list is included in Appendix F). Successive levels of analysis created code families 
and then eventually key categories. All relational observations were based directly on 
the data, and network diagrams of key data were included as part of the study. The 
range, depth and number of observations strived to faithfully represent the data 
gathered and provided a sufficient foundation to merit the claims made in the study. 
iii) Comparisons were made iteratively (following the grounded theory methodology) 
between codes, code-families and key categories. The key categories contain 
analytical memos that made systematic comparisons between the categories and 
other observations. These observations included other categories, data, codes and 
code-families. Network diagrams were also used to illustrate linkages between the 
key categories as well. Using the network diagram was ultimately the most important 
tool in assisting with determining the core category of the research, as the Atlas Ti. 
Program recorded all linkages, notes and associations made by the researcher during 
the coding process. 
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iv) The key categories in the study cover a wide range of empirical observations, all 
centred around the calculated concept of trust. The determinants of the calculation 
of trust are distinct empirical observations, ranging from the decision heuristics 
available to the regulatory authority to the differential level of trust that the authority 
applies to EA applications. 
v) A powerful tool that is available in the Atlas Ti. program, is the ability to illustrate links 
between key sources of data as a network diagram. Codes that are “grounded” in the 
data, meaning that they have a particular quotation associated with it, can be shown 
graphically as part of key themes. All data linked to that particular theme or key 
category as it is referred to in the thesis, demonstrate a verifiable logical connection 
to that category. These links assist in building the category in a multifaceted manner, 
as they are drawn from various data sources and codes. Applying inductive logic and 
critical thinking provides the level of abstraction required to elevate these categories 
into key aspects of the argument or theory being developed. 
vi) While it is not possible for the reader to view all data associated with codes (such as 
quotations adopted directly from the transcription of the interviews), a substantial 
number of “raw” codes are included in the analysis of the data. Each step of the 
analysis, from the creation of code families from the coded data, to the elevation to 
key categories, is carefully documented, allowing a reader sufficient evidence to form 
an independent assessment of the claims made in this thesis. 
 
8.1.2 Originality 
The section on originality, while included here for completeness to highlight all of Charmaz’s 
(2006) categories when evaluating a grounded theory study, has been explicated in detail in 
section 8.3 of this chapter. Originality is a key component of this thesis, and thus a dedicated 
section has been included. 
 
8.1.3 Resonance  
Charmaz (2006:182) suggests several criteria in evaluating the resonance of a grounded 
theory study, including (i) the fullness of the studied experience; (ii) revealing liminal 
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meanings; (iii) drawing linkages to larger collectivities and (iv) making sense of the grounded 
theory. 
i) The key categories of this study ultimately subsume all the collected data and thus 
represent the complete studied experience. Certain categories, however, were not 
included as part of the final theoretical narrative. The reasons for the exclusions have 
been documented in the study. 
ii) The code families and “trust” and “confidence” highlighted the difficulty in revealing 
the intention and direction provided by the data. Several iterations of theoretical 
sampling were required to define the concept of “trust”, which was multifaceted and 
intrinsically linked to the concept of “confidence”. Taken-for-granted meanings of 
these words, or any of the key categories, were therefore not helpful. 
iii) The data collection strategy was intended to adopt South Africa as a proxy for 
developing countries, to generalise the findings of this study and to draw linkages to 
the larger developing country environment in general. The data, however, did not 
indicate as such. This finding is discussed in further detail in the study limitations 
included in this chapter. 
iv) The theory was discussed with several key informants to the research process who 
confirm that the findings provided them with a deeper understanding of the key 
psychological processes that underpin the EA framework in South Africa. 
8.1.4 Usefulness 
The final measure of the evaluative criteria of the grounded theory method is usefulness. 
Charmaz (2006:183) provides guidelines regarding the usefulness of the analysis, 
including (i) useful interpretation; (ii) generic processes derived from the analysis; (iii) 
examining generic processes for tacit implications; (iv) further research in other 
substantive areas and (v) contribution to knowledge. 
i) In answering the research question, the analysis of the data provides a level of 
direction that describes the underlying theoretical approach to EA regulation. Given 
that the research question itself was framed to develop a theoretical perspective, the 
applicability of the research was not aimed at developing an everyday solution. In 
further answering the research question, the study details the limitations of the 
current theoretical approach by highlighting the inability of the regulator to validate 
evidentiary data. The emergent theory details an innovative approach to EA 
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regulation and is applicable to efficiency driven and transitional countries with a 
relatively rich EA testing infrastructure, wherein a decentralised approach to EA is  
suggested. Such an approach decreases costs associated with the EA process as well 
as increases trust in the sources of data. 
ii) Several generic processes were identified in the key analytical categories. These 
categories are all related to the “Global Economy Interaction”, where the global 
generic EA process becomes the de facto process to all linked economies.  
iii) Interaction with the global economy has a tacit implication of global standards 
adoption. The thesis raises issues about blindly accepting the standardisation 
framework of other approval systems. 
iv) This is discussed further in section 8.3 of this chapter. 
v) This is discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
8.2 Contribution to theory 
The concept of trust pertaining to regulation is widely discussed in the available literature. 
These studies focus predominantly on the levels of trust in regulators and regulatory 
processes. The concept of trust in the prevailing literature is therefore largely endogenously 
focussed, with the regulator and regulatory decisions being scrutinised by actors outside of 
the regulator. To my knowledge, very little research has been conducted regarding the 
exogenous trust relationship between the regulator in an EA environment and the regulated 
entities. A study of environmental regulation is the closest example of an area in which a 
similar exogenous trust relationship is portrayed. 
The thesis also combines the organisational trust model of Lewicki and Bunker (1996) with a 
differential trust concept. The concept of differential trust is similar to the model proposed 
by Lyons (2013) across political institutions. In his study, salient political organisations with 
high visibility to the public were trusted based on the basis of perceived political and 
economic performance. This thesis proposes several other trust determinants, including 
salience, that the regulator uses to determine a level of trust in the EA environment. These 
trust determinants are part of the tacit calculated concept of trust that the regulator applies 
to determine a trust relationship. Lewicki and Bunker (1996:10) first define the “calculated 
conception of trust” as “…the assumption that the decision to trust is predicated primarily on 
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the computation of risks”.  Although the wording of this concept is similar to Lewicki and 
Bunker (1996), the exposition of the concept is unique. This study examines the variables that 
impact this tacit trust calculation in an EA environment and proposes the concept of 
“differential trust” as the key determinant of the trust calculation.  This study goes further by 
applying innovation as a mechanism to address the sub-optimal decision heuristics 
encountered by the regulator. 
Lange and Gouldson (2010: 5235) state that: 
…the real potential of trust is to open up new ways for participants in regulatory 
regimes to engage in collective action, to go beyond a perception of regulation as 
driven by the competing interests of individual actors, and thus, to open up new 
channels of influence for behavioural change...  
In developing an innovative approach to EA regulation, the thesis proposes collaboration with 
multiple stakeholders as a key mechanism to validate data integrity. This approach would 
both neutralise the sub-optimal decision heuristic problem as well as positively impact the 
overall trust calculation. This approach suggests a knowledge-based trust framework for EA 
regulation to replace the current deterrence-based trust approach. Lange and Gouldson 
(2010: 5236) conclude that: 
…trust relationships challenges the dominant assumption that environmental 
regulation is best understood through the lens of social actors' competing, conflicting 
and potentially irreconcilable interests.  
This thesis supports the notion that EA regulation, in addition to environmental regulation, 
need not be a product of diverse and conflicting interests of actors in the EA environment. 
There is sufficient data to show that a knowledge-based trust approach to EA regulation, 
would be supported by the actors in the EA environment. A positive consequence to all parties 
of such an approach would be the decentralisation of transactional costs associated with the 
EA process, which in turn decreases costs to all actors. Decreased costs incentivise actors to 
support the regulatory framework as it is in their self-interest. Incentive-based regulation is 
considered to be an efficient type of regulatory approach (Bruneau, 2004:538). 
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There is literature that views regulation as a rent-seeking exercise by government that adds 
a burden to the cost of doing business (Mueller, 2003; Shleifer, 2005). This research refutes 
that claim and presents evidence that shows, in an EC equipment environment, that EA 
regulation is considered crucial in a developing country environment. Even flawed EA 
regulation was considered better than no regulation. 
Another area of the extant literature that this thesis supports is in the field of regulatory 
theory, particularly the concept of self-regulation. This study suggests a decentralisation of 
transactional costs in the EA environment, through collaboration with other regulatory 
entities and test facilities.  This approach is essentially a self-declaratory model that is well 
described in regulatory theory. Gunningham (1995) highlights the importance of external 
validation of a self-declaratory environment. This research combines the well-defined global 
standards environment with the ability and reputation of equipment suppliers and test 
facilities (variables in the trust calculation), to ensure that a high level of trust can be achieved 
in a self-declaratory environment.  
The differential trust concept adopted in this thesis, based on aforementioned reputation and 
ability of the EC equipment supplier, also supports the literature that suggests that the size of 
an organisation should be the prime criterion for adopting a trust-based approach. Larger 
organisations with a good record of compliance are recommended as the best candidates, as 
the resources available to them allows them to better manage their compliance requirements 
to regulatory environments (Orts, 1995). The decision to trust an organisation in this study 
was predicated on the salience and reputational risk that the organisation may face. While 
the outcome in both studies is the same, i.e. differential trust based on organisational size, 
the variables used to determine the trust relationship differ. 
The final area of academic research that this thesis has contributed to relates to innovation. 
The diffusion of innovation theory defines how innovation is taken up within a social system 
and places emphasis on the time taken for the diffusion as well as the communications 
channels used (Rogers, 2003). This research provides evidence that supports the notion that 
innovation refers to something that is new to that particular market and not necessarily new 
to the world (World Bank, 2010). Innovation in the South African market must assimilate 
technology from other EA environments, although such assimilation must incorporate 
indigenous variations based on the requirements of the implementing country. The 
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developing country factor is crucial to consider in technology adoption, as technology 
assimilation was shown to have detrimental effects if a level of circumspection is not applied.   
The second aspect of innovation that this research promotes is that of collaboration through 
validation. This study shows that innovation through collaboration are linked to the calculated 
concept of trust, as validation is found to be a key determinant of trust. 
 
8.3  Originality 
The originality of PhD research can be judged on both content and methodology. Cryer (2006) 
lists several factors that contribute to “originality” regarding academic research. These factors 
are used as a guide to demonstrate the originality of this research. This thesis demonstrates 
originality in: (i) tools, techniques and procedures; (ii) exploring the unknown; (iii) exploring 
the unanticipated and (iv) originality in the use of data. 
i) The grounded theory method of data collection and analysis in studying the EA 
environment is an original approach. The data collection and analysis process 
incorporated the Atlas.Ti program as qualitative data analysis tool, in 
conjunction with the grounded theory method to define the techniques and 
procedures. 
ii) The exploration of an exogenous regulatory view in an EA environment remains 
largely unexplored. This study combines trust theory and regulatory theory in a 
unique manner in developing an innovative approach to EA regulation. Linkages 
between several concepts are shown in developing the substantive theory. 
iii) The initial assumption of the theoretical underpinning of the EA regulatory 
framework in a developing country was primarily centred around public interest 
theory, the economic theory of regulation and regulatory theory. Trust theory 
was unanticipated. The analysis of the data led to an in-depth exploration of 
trust theory in an EA environment. 
iv) Analysis of the data resulted in a total of 2507 codes. These codes, subjected to various 
analytical processes guided by the grounded theory method, resulted in an original, 
substantive theory of a calculated concept of trust in an EA environment. 
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8.4  Study limitations 
This scope of this research was noted to focus only on South Africa as a developing country. 
It would be possible to develop a formal theory on an approach to EA regulation by focusing 
on multiple developing countries and removing any delimitations. This was beyond the scope 
of this research, and the emphasis was to exclusively to develop a substantive theory on EA 
in a developing country with a delimitation to South Africa. Using the World Economic Forum 
(WEF, 2015) categorisation of countries into the developmental stages defined by Porter et 
al. (2002), South Africa was noted as a stage two economy classification that was primarily 
efficiency-driven. This categorisation was meant to identify the 30 other developing countries 
in similar stages of development as South Africa. The rationale was that the findings of this 
study could be generalised across these countries. Data gathered during the research process, 
however, points to South Africa having many of the first world infrastructure requirements of 
the EA environment (albeit decentralised and varied in testing capabilities). This limits the 
generalisability of this research to countries who are both stage two economies as well as EA 
infrastructure-rich. 
8.5  Areas of future research 
The structures of trust investigated in this thesis are predominantly exogenously focused as 
the regulator applies the trust calculation to stakeholders involved in the EA environment. It 
would be interesting to research an endogenous view, with stakeholders expressing their 
views on the application of the EA regulatory framework by the regulator. This research 
collected some initial data from informants in this regard, and further data in this area is 
warranted. Although research does exist showing a strong relationship between government 
regulation and trust (Aghion et al.,2010), future research should focus primarily on the EA 
environment. 
 
The third area of potential future research should focus on organisational trust. Schilke and 
Cook’s (2013) work in categories of trust relations is of significance here, as trust in inter-
organisational relationships is a key aspect advanced by this research. The rationale inter-
organisational collaboration proposed in this thesis is based on remedying the sub-optimal 
decision heuristic challenge faced by the regulator. In terms of the trust calculation, the 
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regulator should be able to explicitly trust the organisation with which such collaboration 
occurs before the data from that organisation could be used. This is an interesting dynamic 
that would be favoured by further research. 
 
This thesis lays the foundation for trust theory to be applied in an EA environment in a 
developing country. Trust theory is a multidimensional construct, and this research applies it 
to a narrow domain of EA regulation in a developing country. Future research can build upon 
this work by first comparing the calculated concept of trust in a developed versus a developing 
environment and then examining the trust determinants that make up the trust calculation. 
 
8.6 Conclusion  
An innovative approach to EA regulation in a developing country is underpinned by a 
calculated concept of trust applied by the regulator. This trust paradigm is an exogenous one, 
with the regulator applying a differential level of trust to EC equipment suppliers, based 
primarily on the salience of the organisation. Trust is the core concept that underpins the EA 
approach in a developing country such as South Africa. This trust is a product of the sub-
optimal decision heuristics experienced by the regulator in South Africa. There are other trust 
determinants in the calculated concept of trust, including validation through collaboration. 
Validation of information is a key driver that impacts the trust equation in the EA 
environment. By collaborating with other entities such as test laboratories and other approval 
bodies, the regulator has sufficient information to make credible decisions in the EA process. 
The impact of collaboration is three-fold. The first being the introduction of innovation in the 
EA environment. By collaborating with other EA entities, innovation adopted in other first 
world EA environments can be adopted in South Africa. Innovation does not entail a unique 
approach to EA regulation. The adoption of EA approaches in other jurisdictions also 
constitutes innovation. The only caveat is that such adoption, especially with regards to 
standards and technology, should always take into account the developing country 
conditions. The second impact of collaboration is the decentralisation of transactional costs. 
With the current approach to EA regulation, ICASA is the central point for submission and 
payment for EA approvals. A collaborative approach would enable other organisations to 
either test or approve EC equipment, which could result in cost-savings for the EC equipment 
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supplier as well as introduce efficiencies in the EC process as a consequence of the regulator 
having a reduced number of EA applications.  
The final impact of collaboration is in facilitating knowledge-based trust in the EA process. 
The regulator is dependent on the information received during the EA process to evaluate 
conformance to national or international standards. Should a mechanism of verification 
through collaboration be made available to the regulator, the current deterrence-based trust 
approach of the EA process will not be required. A knowledge-based trust approach does not 
entail the threat of a credible sanction as it depends on a trust-based mechanism that can be 
verified. This theory, therefore, argues that knowledge-based trust can only be facilitated by 
the calculated concept of trust in an EA environment of a developing country. 
South Africa is a net importer of EC equipment and is thus intrinsically intertwined in the 
global economy. This has a significant impact on the EA approach as the country is compelled 
to adopt international technology trends and standards. The technological trends in the 
manufacture of EC equipment have led to a “designed for manufacturability” approach in 
which evidentiary data required for global EA approval is easily accessible. Deviations from 
such an approach are, therefore, a difficult proposition, as the global EA approval process is 
deterministic. Equipment submitted for approval in the global EC market generally results in 
a binary outcome, with the equipment either being approved or not. Developing countries, 
therefore, have little control or influence over the global EA process, and the regulator has to 
make a decision based on the information provided. The calculated concept of trust is thus 
crucial for the regulator to determine the authenticity of the source of data provided during 
the EA application process. 
Applying technology to the EA process has the added benefit of improving the institutional 
process efficiency. Ultimately, applying technology and innovation to the EA process has the 
core purpose of increasing the trust value proposition. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide Version One 
Central Question 
In which ways can innovative theoretical approaches to regulation be applied to the EA 
regime of a developing country such as South Africa, in order to address the limitations 
presented by the current theoretical approaches? 
Introductory questions 
 Who are the key players in the EA environment? 
 What is your involvement in this process? 
 What do you think the focus of EA should be? 
 
Sub Questions 
 In which ways does the current theoretical approach to regulation pose challenges to the 
EA regulatory approach? 
 Tell me about the current EA process and your involvement in? 
 What, if at all, was your experience in dealing with EA at ICASA? 
 Tell me about your view on EA in terms of its objectives first, then importance? 
 To what extent does the current EA process achieve these objectives? 
 What did you think are the positive aspects of the process and why? 
 What do you think should be the objectives of EA? 
 How has technology impacted on EA? 
 Could you describe the negative aspects of the EA process? Why are these aspects 
negative? 
 What do you think contributes to these negative aspects? 
 How do you cope with these negative aspects? 
 Does the current EA process support competition? 
 Does the current EA process support innovation? 
 Does the current EA approach support trade? 
 Does the current EA approach facilitate quality EC products?  
 Does the current EA approach protect consumers? 
 How would you describe the current EA regulatory approach (Command and Control 
vs Self-declaration)? 
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 How would you describe the current EA approach to standards? 
 Does the level of performance in terms of standards in the current EA framework 
represent an acceptable balance between cost vs harm avoidance? 
 Would you consider the current EA framework as being credible and does it provide 
stability in the EC equipment industry? 
 
 
• Why are the characteristics of a developing country unique and how can these 
characteristics be considered when developing an innovative theoretical approach to 
regulating EA? 
• Are there characteristics that are unique to a developing country and what are 
they? 
• What challenges/problems do you face when involved in the EA process in relation 
to the developmental state of South Africa? What is the source of these challenges 
or problems?  
• Are some or all of these challenges applicable worldwide or are they specific to 
South Africa? If specific, then why do you think that it is specific to South Africa? 
• What contributes to these challenges? 
• How can a balance be struck in order to prioritise the objectives of EA, given South 
Africa’s developmental state? 
• What lessons have you learnt when dealing with the EA process in South Africa? 
Can you compare it to other countries? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact administrative efficiency to 
EA and why? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact trade? 
• How does the state of development of South Africa affect the quality of EC 
equipment? 
• What does innovation mean to you with regards to EA? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact EA innovation? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact competition? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact consumer protection? 
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• What level of performance in terms of EA standards would be considered suitable 
for a developing country?  
• How does the state of development of South Africa affect the perception of the 
credibility of the EA environment and how does this affect the stability of the EC 
equipment market? 
 
 
• How can an innovative theoretical approach be created that addresses the challenges 
of the current theoretical approach to regulating EA? 
• What do you think should be the objectives of EA in South Africa?  
• What solutions would you suggest would be best suited to EA in South Africa and 
why? 
• How would you view (solutions above) versus the previous process in terms of the 
benefits it could bring? 
• Tell me about your views on innovation in terms of the EA process in the context 
of South Africa’s developing country status?  
• How does it affect innovation in the telecommunications field in general? 
• Describe the EA process and environment in 5 years/ten years given your 
solutions? 
• Bearing in mind the characteristics of developing countries, please answer the 
questions that follow. 
• What type of regulatory approach to EA should be implemented in order to drive 
trade and innovation? 
• What type of approach to EA would maximise administrative efficiency? 
• What type of approach to EA would maximise technical efficiency? 
• What type of approach to EA would maximise EC equipment quality? 
• What type of approach to EA would be the most effective in protecting 
consumers? 
• Would the approaches suggested above promote competition? 
• What type of standards would be required in order to drive trade and innovation? 
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• What level of performance in terms of standards should be implemented in the EA 
process in order to create an adequate balance between cost vs. efficiency given 
the characteristics of a developing country? 
• Is there anything that you may have thought about that I have not covered in this 
interview? 
• Is there anything that you would like to ask me? 
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Appendix B : Interview Guide Version Two 
Central Question 
In which ways can innovative theoretical approaches to regulation be applied to the EA 
regime of a developing country such as South Africa, in order to address the limitations 
presented by the current theoretical approaches? 
 
Introductory questions 
 Who are the key players in the EA environment? 
 What, if at all, was your experience in dealing with EA at ICASA? 
 Tell me about your view on EA in terms of its objectives first, then importance? 
 To what extent does the current EA process achieve these objectives? 
 What did you think are the positive aspects of the process and why? 
 How has technology impacted on EA? 
 Could you describe the negative aspects of the EA process? Why are these aspects 
negative? 
 What do you think contributes to these negative aspects? 
 How do you cope with these negative aspects? 
 Does the current EA process support competition? 
 Does the current EA approach support trade? 
 Does the current EA approach facilitate quality EC products?  
 
 How would you describe the current EA approach to standards? 
Does the level of performance in terms of standards in the current EA framework 
represent an acceptable balance between cost vs harm avoidance? 
 
• Why are the characteristics of a developing country unique and how can these 
characteristics be considered when developing an innovative theoretical approach to 
regulating EA? 
• Are there characteristics that are unique to a developing country and what are 
they? 
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• What challenges/problems do you face when involved in the EA process in relation 
to the developmental state of South Africa? What is the source of these challenges 
or problems? 
• Are some or all of these challenges applicable worldwide or are they specific to 
South Africa? If specific, then why do you think that it is specific to South Africa? 
• What lessons have you learnt when dealing with the EA process in South Africa? 
Can you compare it to other countries? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact administrative efficiency to 
EA and why? 
• What does innovation mean to you with regards to EA? 
• How does South Africa’s developmental state impact EA innovation? 
• What level of performance in terms of EA standards would be considered suitable 
for a developing country?  
 
• How can an innovative theoretical approach be created that addresses the challenges 
of the current theoretical approach to regulating EA? 
 
• What solutions would you suggest would be best suited to EA in South Africa and 
why? 
• Is there anything that you may have thought about that I have not covered in this 
interview? 
• Is there anything that you would like to ask me? 
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Appendix C : List of Documents reviewed 
1 The Electronic Communications Act (Act 35 of 2005) 
2 Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act (Act 13 of 2000) 
3 The Standards Act (Act No. 29 of 1993) 
4 The ICASA Type Approval Regulation (Notice 871 of 2013) 
5 The ICASA Revised List of Regulated Standards for technical equipment and electronic 
communications equipment regulations (Notice 896 of 2015) 
6 The ICASA Labelling Regulation (Notice 872 of 2013) 
7 Reasons document in respect of type Approval labelling regulations (Notice 882 of 2013) 
8 ICASA's Guidelines relating to the type approval framework (Notice 883 of 2013) 
9  ICASA Annual report 2006 
10  ICASA Annual report 2007 
11  ICASA Annual report 2008 
12  ICASA Annual report 2009 
13  ICASA Annual report 2010 
14  ICASA Annual report 2011 
15  ICASA Annual report 2012 
16  ICASA Annual report 2013 
17  ICASA Annual report 2014 
18  ICASA Annual report 2015 
19  ICASA Annual report 2016 
20 ASBIS Complaint 19 July 2016 (email) 
21 ITU-D Interoperability and conformity Guidelines 2015 
22 ITC Safety Query 30 November 2016 (email) 
23 ICASA/SABS MoU signed 3 June 2016 
24 Insource TA Query 8 November 2016 
25 ICASA Internal Council Submission on the type approval investigation report 11 March 2017 
26 Complaints and Compliance Committee Ruling on MASSMART PTY(Ltd) Case 63/2012 
27 SAMSA TA Query on Maritime Equipment 11 April 2017  
28 TA-2016/1133 ICASA Type Approval application file 
29 TA-2016/1134 ICASA Type Approval application file 
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30 TA-2016/1135 ICASA Type Approval application file 
31 TA-2016/1313 ICASA Type Approval application file 
32 TA-2016/1312 ICASA Type Approval application file 
33 TA-2016/1136 ICASA Type Approval application file 
34 TA-2016/1090 ICASA Type Approval application file 
35 TA-2016/1089 ICASA Type Approval application file 
36 TA-2016/1176 ICASA Type Approval application file 
37 TA-2016/1088 ICASA Type Approval application file 
38 TA-2016/1091 ICASA Type Approval application file 
39 TA-2016/1293 ICASA Type Approval application file 
40 Mustek National ICASA Application file 5 May 2016 
41 Letter: National Debacle NRCS compliance 4 December 2016 
42 Intel TA Request 26 May 2014 
43 Vodacom query on TA 11 October 2016 
44 ITU Conformity and Interoperability presentation 17 October 2016 
45 Favoursea Africa TA Query 2 December 2016 
46 2016 IEC CISPR Meeting 24 October 2016 
47 Cell-C TA Query 12 April 2016 
48 SA/Mozambique Regulators agreement 10 November 2016 
49 Nextivity TA Query 13 October 2016 
50 Adams & Adams TA complaint 20 June 2016 
51 Diopoint TA Query 20 September 2017 
52 Reutech Complaint 6 May 2014 
53 Dept. of Mineral Resource PowerPoint on TA 31 March 2016 
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Appendix D: Informed Consent 
 
1 Jan Smuts Avenue  
Braamfontein,  
Johannesburg  
2000 
Phone: 011 717 1000 
 
Participant Information Sheet, Informed Consent Form and Interview Guide 
My name is Praneel Ruplal and I am a PhD student conducting research on “An Innovative Approach 
to Regulation of Equipment Authorisation in Developing Countries: A Grounded Theory Study of South 
Africa”. The research report forms part of the requirements for a PhD degree from the University of 
the Witwatersrand. The purpose of this document is to invite participants to contribute to the research 
being conducted.  
 
1. Key details  
Name  : Praneel Haricharan Ruplal 
St No.  : 9302970J 
Degree Title : PhD  
University : University of the Witwatersrand 
Thesis Title : An Innovative Approach to Regulation of Equipment Authorisation in      
  Developing Countries: A Grounded Theory Study of South Africa 
 
2. Synopsis of the research proposal 
This research will try to determine the type and level of regulatory intervention required in the 
Equipment Authorisation (EA) environment in a developing country. An innovative approach to EA 
regulation using the South African environment is envisaged as the outcome of this research. This 
approach will be determined using grounded theory to create a substantive theory of EA regulation.  
 
3. Informed consent 
This interview is being conducted as part of the research for a PhD thesis concerned with reviewing 
the equipment authorisation framework for the electronic communications (EC) sector in South Africa. 
The research report forms part of the requirements for a PhD degree from the University of the 
Witwatersrand. I declare that although I am an employee of the Independent Communications 
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Authority of South Africa (ICASA), this research is solely for academic purposes and does not reflect 
an official ICASA position. I will be interviewing managers and representatives from equipment 
suppliers, network operators and industry groups associated with EC equipment. Interviews would be 
face to face if possible, although Skype or telephonic interviews may also be necessary. 
 
The interview should take approximately an hour to complete.  
 
Anonymity and confidentiality: The results of the study will be published in the Wits electronic library 
and in scholarly publications, but anonymity will be observed in that the thesis and other publications 
will not contain material that would identify any particular individual or company. Furthermore, 
confidentiality will be observed with respect to those responses to any questions, that you would 
prefer not to be published. With your permission, this interview will be recorded. The recordings will 
be stored in a password protected file on a password protected computer. The recordings and any 
notes from this interview will be securely stored, accessible only by the principal investigator on the 
project. The expected time of completion of the research is July 2018. All recordings will be 
permanently deleted within two weeks of the successful completion of this degree. 
 
Deciding to participate: If you have any questions about this interview or the broader research of 
which it is a part, please feel free to ask the interviewer at this time. Your participation is voluntary 
and you may withdraw from the interview at any time, without giving reasons. To participate, please 
sign the informed consent form. 
 
Contact details: 
Praneel Ruplal 
Tel: 011 566 3841 
Fax: 011 566 3842 
Cell: 0832621057 
Email: pruplal@icasa.org.za 
 
Supervisor’s Details: 
Luci Abrahams  
Director: LINK Centre  
University of the Witwatersrand 
email: luciennesa@gmail.com and lucienne.abrahams@wits.ac.za 
web: www.wits.ac.za/linkcentre  
Tel: 082 569 7675   
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1 Jan Smuts Avenue  
Braamfontein,  
Johannesburg  
2000 
Phone: 011 717 1000 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR SIGNATURE: An Innovative Approach to 
Regulation of Equipment Authorisation in      
  Developing Countries: A Grounded Theory Study of South Africa 
 
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet    
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
3. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any  
reports using information obtained from this interview and that the private views 
I express not relevant to this research will remain confidential; OR 
 
4. I agree to my name being listed as a participant in this study in the  
annexure to the report, but not to be referenced in the main body of the report,  
noting that the private views I express not relevant to this research will 
remain confidential. 
 
5. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. 
 
6. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in the dissertation. 
 
7. I agree to be interviewed using Skype (If required)     
 
8. I agree that data gathered from me in this study may be stored  
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(after it has been anonymised) and may be used for future research. 
 
 
 
Name of Research Participant Date  Signature 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher   Date  Signature 
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Appendix F: List of all codes 
Name Count 
3rd party assurance providers 1 
Ability to assess bottlenecks 1 
ability to track applications 1 
access to developmental infrastructure 2 
access to ICT 1 
Access to information limited 3 
access to test facilities 6 
accessibility 1 
Accountability 1 
Acknowledgement of bottlenecks 2 
Acknowledgement of government inability 1 
Acknowledgement of lack of consumer education 2 
Acknowledgement of necessity of human element 2 
active monitoring 1 
ad hoc administrative process 2 
adapt international standards for local conditions 6 
additional functionality causes problems 2 
additional interfaces not tested 1 
administration not confined by developmental state 1 
adopt international solutions 6 
advertise value of ea process 1 
Advertised vs. Actual 1 
affordability of services 1 
affordability of devices 1 
affordable prices 2 
affordable provision of telecoms 1 
align to international standards 5 
allocation of resources 1 
allow competitive conformance environment 1 
allow declaration of conformity 3 
allow exemptions 13 
allow exemptions to prevent duplication 1 
ambivalence towards competition 1 
Angry customers 1 
applicability to technology to South Africa 1 
Apply technology to EA process 9 
archaic process 1 
Assessed for conformity 1 
automation efficient 1 
automation for long term 6 
automation has helped a lot. t.. 1 
automation is innovation 1 
automation lowers costs 1 
automation of ea process 6 
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automation speeds process 3 
automation uses fewer resources 2 
automation using a web based system 2 
availability of EA staff 7 
awareness of regime limitations 1 
backlog of applications 1 
Backward integration 1 
balance between probability of harm 4 
Balancing obligations vs. costs 6 
benchmark with international r.. 1 
benefit of EA outweighs cost 1 
better communication of process 14 
better customs checks required 2 
Bill the supplier for testing 1 
bribes 2 
bridge the digital divide 1 
broadband future linked to mobile 1 
broadband penetration linked to device 1 
broaden economic participation.. 1 
budgetary constraints 1 
build confidence 3 
build ICASA brand value 4 
build local testing capacity 11 
building mutual recognition agreements 4 
Built in cost of conformance 1 
burden of proof 3 
can't water down our standards 16 
cannot guarantee confidence 3 
cannot guarantee credibility 1 
cannot guarantee effectiveness of the EA process 2 
cannot outsource ea 1 
capture correct information 1 
centralised approval system 2 
challenges due to low income 1 
cheaper accepting test reports 2 
cheaper EA process 1 
clear process leads to faster approval 1 
cognitive radios 1 
collaborate to survive 1 
collaboration 27 
collaboration alleviates frustrations 2 
collaboration drives down cost of EA 1 
collaboration improves process times 1 
collaboration in international standardisation systems 7 
collaboration to drive competition 1 
collaboration to prevent duplication 3 
collaboration with customs 1 
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collaboration with industry 1 
collaboration with other approval systems 10 
collaboration with other developing countries 1 
collaboration with suppliers 1 
collaboration with test labs 11 
command and control 4 
communication impacts costs 2 
communication impacts investment 1 
competency 1 
competition enhanced in developing country 1 
competition 1 
competition between licensees 1 
competition drives innovation 1 
competition drives quality of service 1 
competition indirectly based on standards 1 
competitive environment 1 
complaints delay process further 1 
complete loop 1 
complexity of consumer protection 1 
complexity of EC equipment 1 
compliance to standards 2 
computer algorithms 1 
confidence in system 15 
confidence vs time 1 
confirming validity 2 
confiscation 1 
Conformance 2 
Conformity (with standards) 5 
conformity is a business decision 1 
Consistency 1 
consultation 2 
consumer awareness 6 
consumer driven by market forces 1 
consumer education 4 
consumer education focus 1 
consumer protection 15 
consumer satisfaction 1 
continuous compliance 8 
control and command 1 
convergence 1 
cooperation 1 
cooperation between regulator and manufacturer 2 
coordinated approach to Ea 1 
cost benefit anlysis of standards 1 
cost cutting measures 1 
cost of authorisation 2 
cost of authorisation impacts innovation 1 
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cost of conformance 10 
cost of conformance deters investment 1 
cost of conformance impact on established entities 1 
cost of conformance key indicator to investment 1 
cost of conformance leads to barriers to entry 2 
cost of devices impacts replacement time 1 
costs passed onto consumer 4 
counterfeit equipment 5 
country objectives need to be decided 1 
create accreditation schemes 1 
create category for urgent applications 1 
create regional EA body 1 
creates a vibrant market 1 
creates consumer confidence 2 
creating unnecessary burden 1 
credibility of test reports 1 
credible 0 
credible ea process 3 
Cross-border coordination 1 
cross check information 1 
cumulative positive effect of EA 1 
Cumbersome 1 
Cumbersome process 18 
Cumbersome process deters innovation 3 
Cumbersome process deters investment 1 
current ea process does not drive innovation 5 
current EA process manual 4 
current inefficient process financially rewarding 1 
customer at end of value chain 2 
customs and excise control equipment entry 4 
Data monitoring in place 1 
Day to day struggle 1 
declaration of conformity 1 
decrease costs 4 
delay in deploying new technology 2 
delays 15 
delays impact trade 4 
delays protect monopoly 1 
delegating ea function 1 
demand for mobile 1 
demonstrate capability to industry to ensure compliance 1 
denying responsibility? 1 
deregulation 2 
design standards limit innovation 1 
develop verification mechanism 4 
developed country different environment 2 
developed country differentiated features of ec equipment 1 
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developed country level of trust 3 
developing countries are price sensitive 1 
developing country counterfeit equipment 2 
Developing country no hindrance 2 
developing country problems generalisable 7 
developing country should have high growth 1 
development state does not affect administrative efficiency 1 
development state does not affect trade 1 
developmental challenges drive innovation 1 
difference in objectives vs reality 1 
differentiated level of standards 1 
differentiation between different suppliers 25 
differentiation between suppliers EA fees 2 
Differentiation of application complexity 1 
Differentiation of company ea fee 1 
Differentiation of comparison (Developed vs. Developing) 2 
Differentiation of subsidies w.r.t. company size 1 
difficult to duplicate testing facilities 1 
difficulty in gauging success of EA 1 
difficulty of defining types of technology 1 
digital divide 1 
Digital Dividend 1 
digital literacy 1 
Digital Migration 3 
digital society 1 
disruptive technology 2 
does the regulator possess requisite technical skills 3 
Double jeopardy 1 
dual role of network operators 2 
dupicate approvals 3 
duplicate approvals 5 
duplication of approval process 16 
duplication of resources 9 
dynamic industry 1 
e-waste issue 1 
EA about getting products to market 1 
EA adds to cost structure 4 
EA administration requires people 1 
EA administration requirements gotten worse 4 
ea agnostic to trade 2 
ea approach incorrect 2 
ea barrier to entry 3 
EA based on standards 2 
ea can promote competition 5 
EA certificate lacking info 1 
EA certification lacks information 1 
ea cost not prohibitive 3 
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EA crucial to business continuity 1 
EA databased required 6 
ea delays speed to market 6 
ea delivers quality 11 
ea does not achieve objectives 1 
ea does not guarantee confidence 2 
ea does not guarantee quality 1 
ea does not hinder innovation 1 
ea drives innovation 2 
EA enforcement support lacking 1 
EA enhances device coordination 1 
EA essential to promote competition 1 
EA evaluation is technical based 3 
Ea favours larger suppliers 2 
EA growth linked to tax increase 1 
ea has no impact on consumer protection 1 
ea hinders business 2 
ea hinders innovation 7 
EA impacts cost benefit analysis of trade 1 
EA impacts cyber security 1 
EA impacts trade 1 
EA implies quality 1 
ea inflexible 2 
ea inhibits local manufacturing 1 
EA instills confidence 6 
ea is a specialised skill 1 
EA is region specific 2 
EA legislative scope too broad 4 
ea limits sub-standard equipment 2 
EA money making scheme 1 
EA mostly effective 1 
EA must aim to reduce costs 2 
ea must be transparent 1 
ea must instil confidence in the product 1 
EA must keep up with technology 1 
EA must support local markets 2 
EA needed in developing countries 1 
EA needed in SA 1 
ea not a catch all process 1 
EA not keeping up with technology 11 
EA not obstacle to trade 2 
EA not seen as competitive advantage 1 
EA obstacle to trade 4 
EA ownership misplaced 1 
EA prevents dumping 2 
EA prevents grey market 1 
EA prevents interference 3 
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EA problems self made 1 
ea process deters investment 1 
ea process clearly defined 2 
EA process difficult 6 
EA process does not guarantee functionality 2 
EA process encourages illegal equipment sales 3 
EA process includes lab verification 1 
EA process inspires consumer confidence 1 
ea process is sound 5 
EA process limited to mandatory requirements 2 
ea process not clear 4 
EA process not well documented 4 
EA process paper based 6 
ea process requires review 8 
ea process serves as a deterrent to investment 1 
ea process still key in the future 2 
EA process varies 1 
EA process works 4 
ea promotes competition 1 
EA promotes QoS 1 
EA promotes trade 1 
EA protects supplier 1 
ea provide accessibility for disabled 1 
Ea public interest objectives 10 
EA required for future broadband technology 1 
EA revenue generating exercise 2 
EA rubber stamping exercise 4 
EA sampling methodology 1 
ea should level playing field 1 
EA should not support competition 2 
EA significant impact on economy 1 
ea stifles competition 4 
Ea suppliers always local 1 
EA supports competition 8 
ea supports consumer protection 3 
ea supports illegal equipment 1 
ea supports trade 7 
ea theoretical exercise 1 
EA visibility not enough 2 
ea vitally important 10 
ease of EA process 1 
easing the conducting of business 1 
EC market driven by economies of scale 1 
EC market multi-disciplinary problem 1 
EC products match market 3 
economic growth 1 
economic value 1 
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economic cost of delays 8 
economic growth 2 
economic impact of policy failure 1 
economic role 1 
economic value of spectrum 1 
economies of scale 8 
education challenges 1 
effective competition 2 
effective management 1 
Effectiveness 1 
efficient management 1 
efficient spectrum usage 1 
efficient collection of revenue 1 
Efficient EA process 7 
Efficient use 0 
Efficient use of resources 2 
efficient use of this crucial .. 1 
encourage foreign investment 1 
encourage new technologies 1 
encouraging effective competition 1 
Encouraging investment 2 
end user perspective 1 
enforcement 12 
enforcement will impact quality 1 
enforcing compliance 1 
engagement 2 
engagement with regulator required 1 
ensure compliance 1 
ensure safety 1 
equipment life cycle very fast 2 
exemptions allow streamlining of EA process 6 
experience in testing 1 
exploit developing country resources 1 
Extending testing facilities to include regional 2 
facilitate greater choice 1 
facilities for smaller suppliers 1 
facilitates trade 2 
fair prices 1 
fertile ground for competition 1 
finite national resource 1 
financially constrained 4 
fines for non-compliance 1 
First come first served approach 1 
first mover advantage 4 
First world standards 4 
Flexibility for EA process required 4 
flexibility in interpretation 3 
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focus of research and development 1 
focus on consumer 12 
focus on CPE 1 
focus on ease of conformance 3 
focus on enforcement 14 
Focus on exemptions 6 
focus on functional requirements 14 
focus on imports 2 
focus on improving confidence levels 1 
focus on interference 16 
focus on interoperability 8 
focus on mandatory standards 3 
focus on operation of device 2 
focus on quality 5 
focus on safety 15 
Focus on transmitting equipment 1 
Follows the "official line" 1 
forging test reports 3 
fragmented regional harmonisation 2 
frequency sharing 2 
from a manufactures perspective 1 
frustration 1 
Functional overload 1 
functionality 3 
funds for ICASA 1 
future EA as an enabler 1 
future EA as an enabler of trade 2 
future EA environment contributing to economy 1 
future enabling EA environment 1 
future focus on strong post market surveillance 6 
global competitor 1 
global skills 1 
golden sample problem 11 
governmental collaboration 5 
governmental intervention 2 
governmental intervention & policies to address developmental 
challenges 5 
governmental subsidies 6 
governmental subsidies for local manufacturers 2 
governmental support required 1 
grey market a problem 4 
grey market interference 2 
grey market more prevalent in developing countries 1 
grey market remains 2 
grounds for exemptions 3 
guidance and communication required 2 
guidelines 1 
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handset subsidies 1 
harmonised approach required 2 
health challenges 1 
Health related focus 1 
high-quality communication 1 
high cost of ICT services 1 
high cost of test facilities 4 
high cost of testing 3 
High Demand Spectrum 1 
high EA cost 1 
high fines for non-compliance 1 
High integrity of network 1 
high labour costs 1 
high level of innovation in SA 1 
High level of retailer sensitivity 1 
high level of trust 1 
high levels of investment in standards 1 
high manufacturing costs 1 
high quality communication 1 
high unemployment rate 1 
higher state development negates need for EA 1 
hiring correct skills 3 
hybrid EA solution 3 
ICASA EA national focus 1 
ICASA should be decisive 1 
ICASA standards scope limited 1 
ICT budget declining 1 
ICT budget dictated by developmental priorities 2 
ICTs neglected in SA 1 
illegal equipment 6 
illegal equipment remains 3 
illegal frequency use 1 
illegal operations 1 
immaturity of market 1 
impact of standard on industry not quantified 1 
implement market surveillance 1 
importance of accreditation bodies 1 
imports exclude intellectual capital 1 
imports impact local manufacturing 1 
imports inhibit innovation 4 
improve confidence level 4 
improving the administrative, .. 1 
In-line with international standards 4 
inconsistent approach to requirements 1 
increase efficiency of EA 1 
increase scope of testing 3 
Increased administration for conformity 4 
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increased number of suppliers 1 
increased time to market 5 
Increasing turn-around times 7 
incremental improvement 3 
indicating conformance issues 2 
industry frustration 2 
Ineffective post market surveillance 8 
Inefficiency 3 
Inefficiency creates opportunities 2 
Inefficiency in the process 7 
inefficient use of resources 1 
inequitable skill levels 1 
inferior products 1 
information asymmetry 1 
Information supports enforcement 2 
informational deficiency 7 
infrastructure sharing 1 
inherent positive ability in current system 2 
inhibits innovation 3 
innovate on current process 5 
innovation 1 
innovation affects efficiency 2 
innovation based on international best practise 2 
innovation boon to consumer 1 
innovation driven by market 1 
innovation drives volumes 1 
innovation higher in developing country 2 
innovation linked to process 1 
innovation makes things cheaper for consumer 1 
innovation makes things easier for the consumer 1 
innovation not local 2 
innovation related to effectiveness 2 
innovation via collaboration 3 
innovative competition 1 
Integrity 2 
intention of the EA process sound 1 
interference 2 
interference mitigation 11 
interference resolution 3 
internal coordination 2 
international best practice 8 
international collaboration 4 
Interoperability 7 
introduce competition 1 
investing in research and development 3 
investment 1 
investment in testing equipment 1 
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investment in testing equipment business proposition 1 
irate customers 1 
Is it a revenue generating exe.. 1 
ITU support to set up conformance and interoperability facilities 1 
job creation 1 
justify spending on ICTs 1 
Keep up with 1st world 1 
Keeping control 1 
knowledge-based economy 1 
labour intensive process 3 
Lack of adequate number of staff for EA 9 
lack of automation 6 
lack of communication 19 
lack of confidence in certain test labs 4 
lack of confidence in products 1 
Lack of consultation 1 
lack of consumer activism 5 
lack of consumer education 4 
lack of cross border EA integration 1 
Lack of e-resources 1 
lack of exemptions 1 
lack of expertise 1 
lack of exports of EC equipment 1 
Lack of facilities for verification 29 
lack of funds 1 
lack of funds for R&D 1 
lack of funds for standardisation activities 1 
lack of hierarchy in determining importance 1 
lack of industrial development 1 
lack of information 12 
Lack of international standards participation 2 
lack of local manufacturing 4 
lack of local test facilities 19 
lack of local vendors 1 
lack of mechanism to verify 2 
lack of policy support 2 
Lack of punitive measures 2 
lack of quality 1 
Lack of regional mutual recognition of EA 4 
lack of regulatory enforcement 2 
Lack of resources 18 
lack of service delivery 1 
lack of skills to be a global competitor 3 
Lack of support 1 
Lack of trust with suppliers 19 
lack of understanding 10 
lack of verification 4 
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language barrier 1 
large backlogs 1 
leap frog legacy technology 1 
legal framework 1 
legal framework problematic 2 
less focus on consumer protection 1 
less interventionist approach 2 
level of standard must suit market 1 
level of standards impacts costs 4 
level of trust 1 
leverage on existing resources 4 
liability of supplier 1 
light licensing regime 3 
Limit efficiency of system 2 
Limit harmful effects 1 
limited mechanism of EA approval in SA 1 
limited pool of EA skills 7 
limited post market testing 5 
limited window of opportunity 1 
linear process on standards conformance 1 
literacy levels 1 
Local collaboration 3 
local conditions not considered 1 
local development generates revenue 1 
Local market for low cost devices 1 
Local market for testing devices exists 1 
local market impacts economy 2 
Local market linked to job creation 2 
local standards development framework 2 
local test capacity 3 
local test capacity driven by demand 1 
local test capacity limited 1 
local testing a duplication 3 
local testing essential 3 
local testing highlights deficiencies of internationally approved products 1 
local testing regressive 1 
long training times 1 
long turn around times 15 
Low confidence in process 8 
low literacy inhibits innovation 1 
low power 1 
Lower costs 7 
lower volumes 1 
maintain standards at a global level 3 
maintaining control 1 
making a contribution 1 
manufacturing will support GDP 1 
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market for counterfeit devices 4 
market for low cost products 2 
market forces determine price 2 
market predominantly rich manufacturers 1 
market should drive standards 1 
market stability vs credibility 1 
Measures of recourse 1 
method of conformance 1 
minimise duplication of resources 1 
Misplaced confidence? 1 
mixing standards regimes with EA regimes 1 
mobile gained traction 1 
modular approval 3 
move burden of proof 1 
multi governmental approach to tackle developmental challenges 1 
national radio frequency plan 1 
Necessity 1 
need to be competitive in world market 1 
need to improve confidence level 2 
network operator conducts own testing 4 
network operator not always a vendor 1 
network protection 8 
no brand value 1 
No compromise on objectives 7 
No compromise on objectives of EA 5 
no compromise on quality 4 
No compromise on safety 3 
No consistency when dealing with applications 1 
no consumer confidence 1 
no deviation for specialised cases 1 
no differentiation in products 9 
no differentiation w.r.t. enforcement of suppliers 1 
no evidence of faulty equipment 1 
no exemptions 1 
No feedback verification mechanism for market surveillance 1 
no independent verification 2 
no local compliance testing 3 
No market for local test facility 1 
no need for local test facility 2 
no proper system in place 2 
no quality standards 1 
no trust with smaller  suppliers 2 
non-discriminatory approach 1 
not labour intensive process 1 
objective to remove barriers to trade 2 
Objectives of EA 3 
Objectives of EA efficiency 1 
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objectives of the process is sound 2 
obsolete equipment in SA 2 
OEM reputation 6 
one way trade 1 
online applications 5 
open international standards 2 
open standards drive competition 1 
open standards drive innovation 1 
Opening up markets 2 
operators check quality independent to EA 2 
opportunity costs 1 
optimise radio frequency 1 
Optimising resources 1 
Other regulatory bodies 1 
output standards 1 
outsource EA function 2 
over-haul required 1 
pace of technology 5 
partial testing 2 
peer review of standards 1 
perpetuate digital divide 1 
policies to build skills and capacity 4 
policy intervention 4 
policy to drive development 2 
political landscape hinders growth 1 
politics contributes to developmental challenges 1 
poor admin staff support 3 
Poor IT support 1 
poor policy intervention 2 
porous border points of entry 1 
post market sample testing required 7 
Potential to cause harm 1 
poverty 1 
PPP (Public Private partnerships) 3 
PPP (Public Private partnerships) mutual benefit 2 
precedent set for regulatory exemptions 2 
predictability 2 
predictable regulatory environ.. 2 
predominantly imports 9 
prevent bottlenecks 2 
prevent dumping 11 
prevent duplication 17 
prevent harmful effects 5 
prevents competition 1 
price determines quality 2 
price hurdle of equipment 1 
price inelasticity of smaller suppliers 1 
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priority to larger developmental challenges 3 
problems accrediting test facilities 1 
problems similar to developed countries 2 
problems with collaboration 2 
problems with labelling 1 
procedure for unique approvals 1 
Process improvement 6 
process improvement innovation 1 
process straight-forward to technical people 1 
processing time improvement 5 
Processing time too long 10 
product innovation 1 
profit goal of private company 1 
progress noted but not enough 1 
prohibits self-declaration 2 
promote competition 2 
promote efficiency 1 
promote innovation 1 
promote local manufacturing 5 
promote local market 1 
promote transparency 1 
promoting competition 1 
Proportion of compliance cost vs. company size 1 
Proportionality 1 
protect consumer 1 
protect consumers 1 
protect smaller suppliers 1 
Protect the consumer 2 
protection of consumers 1 
protection of scare resources 1 
provision of broadband service.. 2 
public consultation 1 
public education and awareness.. 2 
public interest 17 
quality 8 
quality consumer choice 5 
quality of electronic communication 1 
quality of service 1 
quality of service vs device quality 1 
quality related to standards 2 
Quest for efficiency 1 
questioning need for EA vs. technology 1 
quicker 1 
quicker EA process decreases costs 1 
quicker response times 2 
quicker time to market 11 
rapid technology development 4 
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reactive rather than proactive 5 
real time response 1 
realistic about requirements 4 
realistic verification required 2 
reasonable certainty 2 
record keeping 1 
red tape 3 
Reducing regulatory burden 5 
reduction in prices 1 
regional harmonisation 1 
regional trade not facilitated 2 
regional trade organisation framework exists 3 
Regional trust 1 
regulation must facilitate technology 1 
regulation to facilitate service 1 
regulations inflexible 2 
regulator doing well 2 
regulatory framework for EA not updated 3 
regulatory framework for EA too broad 3 
regulatory framework not quick enough 2 
regulatory importance 3 
relax command and control 1 
relaxing means more control 1 
relevance of EA 1 
reliance of test results 3 
remove barriers to entry 4 
Require more experts 1 
requirement to compete internationally 1 
research and development lacking 7 
Respect for ICASA approval 4 
reversal of objectives of EA 1 
revolutionise industrialisation 1 
RF coordination 4 
RIA for EA regulations 1 
rigidity in EA regimes 1 
rigour in EA process 1 
risk accepting test reports 2 
Risk of dumping 2 
SA  not unique 7 
SA blend of 1st and 3rd world 2 
SA EA accepted within SADC 1 
SA fully inclusive of world economy 1 
SA has adequate skills 5 
SA is a small market 5 
SA lagging behind on technology 1 
SA leader in SADC 6 
SA many ports of entry 1 
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SA missed opportunity for lab 1 
SA net importer of equipment 5 
SA not really a developing country 2 
SA participates in International standardisation 1 
SA significant EC equipment market 1 
SA technology on par with world 4 
SA unique 8 
SABS issues all test reports 1 
safe to use 1 
safety 3 
sanctions required for non-conformance 1 
SAR exposure 1 
scrap current EA process 1 
Self-correcting technology 2 
self-declaration 4 
self-declaration to drive innovation 1 
self-declaration will drive trade 1 
self-manage 2 
self-optimise 1 
self-regulate 3 
Self-regulation 3 
set high standards 4 
sharing technology 3 
simplicity is innovation 1 
simplified process 4 
skills development lacking 5 
skills transfer from industry to regulator 1 
slow economic growth 1 
small local market 6 
social and economic goals 1 
social development 1 
socio-economic and development.. 1 
socio-economic objectives 3 
soft touch approach 1 
some EA only impact network operator 2 
Some SADC countries do not require EA 1 
spectrum efficiency 1 
spectrum issues 7 
spectrum scare resource 1 
speed of EA process 3 
stability 1 
Stakeholder relations 1 
standards bodies key 2 
standards developed via balanced representation 1 
standards developed via consensus 1 
standards drive economies of scale 3 
standards embedded in regulation 3 
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standards impact not considered 1 
standards process too long 4 
standards regulation living document 2 
standards very important 5 
streamline EA process 6 
stringent future penalties for non-compliance 2 
strong monitoring 1 
Structure of enforcement lacking 4 
structured way of engagement 1 
supplier registration 1 
Supplier reputation 3 
suppliers conduct own testing 1 
support structures for EA 1 
support to smaller suppliers 4 
technical training for EA staff 2 
technical understanding lacking from suppliers 2 
technological advances 1 
technological colony 3 
technological development 1 
technology advancement increases cost of conformance 2 
technology allows equipment self-regulation 1 
technology because of Standard.. 3 
technology commoditised 3 
Technology convergence 4 
technology depends on environment 1 
technology drives demand 2 
technology drives volumes 5 
technology has not impacted EA. 1 
Technology highlights deficiencies of EA 4 
technology impacts EA processing time 1 
technology impacts markets and equipment suppliers 2 
technology impacts radio protection 2 
Technology Intelligence 4 
technology makes EA cumbersome 3 
technology makes equipment cheaper 1 
Technology neutrality 1 
Technology overtakes regulation 9 
technology overtakes standards 5 
technology puts pressure on the regulator 3 
technology reduces complexity of test equipment 2 
Technology renders EA objectives moot 2 
Technology to improve efficiency 2 
test facilities 3 
test facilities not an issue 2 
test functionality only 5 
test labs exist 2 
Test reports difficult to get hold off 3 
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testing capacity expanded regionally 2 
testing costs too high 2 
testing expensive 5 
Testing now automated vs manual 1 
time 1 
time is money 9 
time to market crucial investment indicator 3 
time vs efficiency 1 
too many standards required to prove conformity 3 
transformative country 1 
transparency 5 
transparent 1 
transparent regulation 1 
Treat EA as business case 1 
trust 20 
trust in the EA process limited 3 
trust matrix 1 
trust with labs 5 
trust with OEMS 6 
trust with operators 2 
trust with other countries 1 
trust with suppliers 7 
turn-around times too long 4 
two tier approach to functionality 1 
underserved areas 1 
understanding process 6 
universal access and service 1 
universal service and access 1 
unprofessional administration 1 
unscrupulous retail practices 1 
Unseen costs 1 
urban and rural split. 1 
use international best practice 3 
use interns for capacity building 1 
user-friendly 2 
using ea as a competitive advantage 1 
using standards as a competitive advantage 1 
validity of EA never ceases 1 
value in the fact that at least process exists 1 
value of current EA technical process 8 
value of standards not interrogated 1 
vendors compromise quality to lower costs 1 
Verification limited to functional requirements 2 
volume of approvals impact productivity 9 
waste of resources 1 
well-capacitated consumer protection 1 
wireless technology for broadband penetration 2 
317 
 
 
 
wireless technology is future 1 
working regime 1 
 
 
